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Abstract  
This thesis analyzes the processes of framing that took place within a matrix comprising 
influential intellectuals, a potent Arab media outlet whose audience amounts to tens of millions 
of Arab spectators, and the vibrant social movements calling for political change in Egypt and 
Libya in 2011. It explores the various forms of meaning construction carried out by al-Jazeera 
and the intellectuals it regularly hosted to comment on the uprisings in both countries as they 
occurred. By addressing two case studies defined by different contextualizing variables, the 
thesis illustrates how al-Jazeera’s commentators were part and parcel of the network’s output 
and its daily engagement with its audiences. The thesis examines the means through which these 
intellectuals capitalized on the channel’s powerful broadcast imagery to articulate their 
interpretations of the unfolding uprisings and propose alternative political possibilities. It argues 
that the network’s intricate processes of meaning construction rendered it an institutional organic 
intellectual with an ability to communicate persuasive messages and accordingly incite mass 
mobilization. It also contends that al-Jazeera’s attempts to void long-sustained regime 
legitimacies, by countering their narratives and critically engaging with their political rationale, 
have contributed to redesigning political realities in the cases under study. 
 
  




Following the eruption of the Tunisian uprising that toppled President Zine el-
Abidine Bin Ali in January 2011, al-Jazeera’s impact on the Arab public sphere reached 
a new zenith. The Qatari sponsored network played a significant role in shaping a 
contagious discourse that destabilized long sustained status quos in various Arab 
countries. Al-Jazeera capitalized on the intense influx of events in Arab states witnessing 
popular unrest to promote a revolutionary rhetoric and reinforce a process of mass 
mobilization. Apart from the case of Bahrain in which regime change conflicted with 
Qatar’s geopolitical interests,1 al-Jazeera was supportive of local demands for political 
transformation. In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, the network’s engagement 
with popular uprisings was characterized by extensive coverage of events, a dynamic 
interchange with the public, and an ardent tone endorsing calls for fundamental change. 
Al-Jazeera had always been thought to be a magnifier of dissent in the Arab World. Yet 
for the first time in modern Arab history, a number of state authorities and institutions 
were standing on the brink of collapse due to domestic popular pressures. And for the 
first time since its advent 15 years earlier, al-Jazeera was interacting with a lively 
discourse that manifested itself on the streets rather than with static audiences or passive 
ones, and was actively contributing to the deconstruction of social realities in various 
states around the Arab World.  
Although tens of Arabic speaking networks provided wide coverage of the 
uprisings, al-Jazeera’s broadcast material differed from all others in terms of magnitude, 
nature, and impact. Not only did the network deploy considerable technical capabilities 
and human resources, but was also the first to utilize social media platforms to expand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Rabie Barakat. “New Media in the Arab World: A Tool for Redesigning Geopolitical Realities” (MA 
diss., Lebanese American University, 2011).  
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its sources of news and visual content. In the wake of the uprisings, al-Jazeera altered its 
policy regarding its refusal to air footage provided by citizen journalists2 and became the 
first to heavily rely on alternative sources of information. Its aim was “to identify key 
bloggers before protests broke out [and to count on them to] verify information 
[thereafter] and act as citizen reporters”.3 Yet the network’s impact during the uprisings 
resulted from more than obtaining exclusive news material and amplifying certain angles 
of the popular discourse. It was rather an outcome of its ability to make sense of events 
and to assemble them in a meaningful constellation. In this regard, al-Jazeera challenged 
the regimes’	  narratives of events. It also contributed to discrediting their rationale and to 
dismantling the authoritative image they had managed to build and maintain for decades. 
The network’s various forms of framing were meant to further provoke protesters to 
pursue a full-fledged political transformation. For that, al-Jazeera regularly hosted 
intellectuals to articulate its oratory and therefore to enhance its impact on the popular 
discourse. These intellectuals commented on the uprisings’ daily occurrences and 
emphasized the protesting masses’ need and aptitude to pursue alternative political 
possibilities. As they did so, they rendered the outlet a space for vital interaction 
between the public on the one hand, and its broadcast news output and intellectual 
articulations on the other. 
Research Question 
This research accordingly highlights the matrix comprising of three interplaying 
elements during the Arab uprisings: a powerful media outlet, influential intellectuals, 
and a revolutionized public sphere. It examines a discursive process of representation 
construction generated by al-Jazeera and its televised intellectuals by addressing the 
following question: How did al-Jazeera’s intellectual engagements with the Arab 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Interview with a senior presenter on al-Jazeera. The interview was given on condition of anonymity on 
October 26, 2014. 
3 Rachel Bartlett, “Journalism.co.uk #media140 – Al Jazeera’s early start reporting revolutions”, 
Journalism.co.uk, accessed April 5, 2014, https://www.journalism.co.uk/news/-media140---al-jazeera-s-
early-start-reporting-revolutions/s2/a543674/. 
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popular uprisings contribute to the deconstruction of social realities and to the 
promotion of alternative political possibilities? 	  
The thesis thus aims to explain the process through which al-Jazeera deployed its 
intellectual output, not only to dismantle regime narratives, but also to deconstruct the 
social facts of the regimes themselves. It therefore argues that the intellectual facet in 
this process performed a dual task. The first pertains to the channel’s creation of 
ideational constructs to counter regime narratives and promote alternative political 
possibilities, and the second relates to the actual reconfiguration of existing social 
realities. This discursive intellectual engagement with the popular protests and their 
prospected outcomes resulted in the generation of new institutions on the rubble of old 
ones. It was a process that al-Jazeera and its guest intellectuals contributed to through 
various forms of meaning construction.      
In the course of answering its central question, the thesis presents a theoretical 
framework that builds on scholarly work on intellectuals, framing and social 
movements, and social reality construction through linguistic practices. This framework 
is used to explain how al-Jazeera’s guest intellectuals took part in delegitimizing 
existing regimes and in promoting fundamental political transformations in Egypt and 
Libya. The chosen case studies demonstrate two different contexts with distinct 
characteristic features and intervening variables. They help explain how the network’s 
intellectual output played a role in remolding social realities with varying degrees, and 
how the extent and forms of this engagement were contingent on elements defining the 
regimes in question and the social realities they govern and regulate. For example, the 
network and its intellectuals delineated an array of strategies for engaging with the 
regimes in Egypt and Libya, as each generated different reactions to threat. In this 
regard, al-Jazeera provided a more specialized form of coverage in the case of Libya, as 
it hosted local commentators to complement its two Pan Arab intellectuals that had 
previously played a role in framing the events of the uprising in Egypt. Moreover, its 
intellectuals’ approach was more aggressive in the case of Libya than it had been 
regarding Egypt. This was primarily in response to the Libyan regime’s expression of 
	   10	  
vast animosity towards protesters and its overtly vocalized intent to crush the uprising 
from the very beginning.  	  
Al-Jazeera reached out to dissident activists and opposition figures in Egypt and 
Libya and provided them with a platform to voice their demands and concerns all 
throughout its coverage. At times, the channel even indirectly contributed to the 
organization of protests, as calls for assembly were aired live and reporters took part in 
promoting demonstrations prior to their actual occurrence.4 Yet the network’s main 
“added value” to the discourse was its intellectual output that allowed it to engage with it 
as a constructor of meaning, a potent orator, an inciting mobilizer, and an actual 
strategist proposing alternative political possibilities. This connection with the social 
movements in question rendered al-Jazeera an institutional organic intellectual as shall 
be defined and explained in later chapters. Its overall output was inclusive of a multi-
faceted engagement with events, starting from the basic essentials of news dissemination 
and image production and transmission, and ending in its more active role as a platform 
for proposing means to redesign existing social facts and for facilitating their 
reconfiguration. 
Identifying the literature  
The topic of televised media and its representational power has been engaged 
with by a variety of social scientists in a range of disciplines. Of those were Jurgen 
Habermas who introduced and conceptualized the term public sphere in the early 1960s. 
In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas examined the shifts in 
the sphere’s formation in Europe, where growing capitalism and industrialized culture 
redefined the sphere after its initial crystallization in the late 17th century. Habermas 
explained that the bourgeois public sphere was formed of institutions of information 
(newspapers and journals) and political discussion (parliaments, public assemblies, 
coffeehouses…) where interactive debates took place thus allowing the public to play a 
role in shaping state policies. Towards the end of the 19th century, however, the public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Interview with Dina Samak, al-Jazeera’s reporter in Egypt during the uprising, September 9, 2015. 
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sphere mutated along with the emergence of the social-welfare state. Henceforth, giant 
corporations and media elites have manufactured public discourse and have replaced 
rational argumentation and consensus with passive consumerism and mass democracy.5  
Unlike Europe, in the Arab World, the public was far from impacting its local 
and foreign state policies through rational deliberation, and its elites were incapable of 
launching any form of communicative discussion that helped formulate a collective 
opinion regarding critical issues of general concern. The public sphere, in the sense 
initially proposed by Habermas, was virtually non-existent, albeit Arabs invoked it “to 
make sense of an emerging transnational public opinion critical of states and not 
reducible to their interests”.6 Yet the public’s engagement with political affairs was 
undergoing gradual change, one that had initiated more than 10 years prior to the 
outburst of the popular uprisings. In this regard, Lynch, borrowing Habermas’s famous 
book title, examined the role of al-Jazeera in reconstructing the Arab public sphere, 
which he defines “in terms of active arguments before an audience about issues of 
shared concern”.7 According to Lynch, the “emergence of satellite television networks 
established the technical possibility of an Arab public sphere”, but “only when al-
Jazeera refocused the satellites away from entertainment and toward politics (…) did it 
become a public sphere”.8 
Al-Jazeera made use of the tremendous vacuum characterizing the Arab 
mediascape in order to acquire its highly recognized posture. In this regard, Zayani 
contends that the network “not only fill(ed) a media void but a political void” as well.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Douglas Kellner, “Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy: A Critical Intervention,” in 
Perspectives on Habermas, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn (Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 2000), 
259-287. 
6 Marc Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 29.  
7 Ibid, 32. 
8 Ibid, 33. 
9 Mohammad Zayani, ed., The Al Jazeera Phenomenon: Critical Perspectives on New Arab Media 
(London: Pluto Press, 2005), 2. 
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Its “pluralist media discourse”10 was thought to have expanded the medium of debate in 
the Arab World and to have breached authoritarian restraints limiting freedom of 
expression. El-Oifi adds that the channel has triggered “a profound shift in the way the 
Arab mediascape functions” and “may potentially contribute to the reconfiguration of 
the political systems in the Middle East”,11 a prediction that proved true years later. 
Satellite media, precisely al-Jazeera, was thus thought to have the potential to trigger 
change and to play a vital role in redesigning the regional system, though none of the 
scholarly contributions previous to the Arab uprisings explained how that might actually 
occur. Pan Arabism and transnational rhetoric were thought to constitute a powerful tool 
in this regard. Zayani argued that al-Jazeera “promotes an Arab Nationalist discourse 
wrapped in a democratic style” and “reinvigorates a sense of common destiny in the 
Arab World”.12 Yet he asserted that one “should not be under the illusion that satellite 
TV can dramatically change society or revolutionize its institutions”.13 To Zayani, the 
impact of news media was therefore bound to institutional dynamics, local and regional, 
and media output was incapable of inciting profound and revolutionary change. The 
visible media effect on the Arab uprisings challenges this hypothesis, as does this thesis. 
Albeit considerable work has been done on televised media in the Arab World 
and on al-Jazeera in particular as the next chapter explains in detail, the vast majority of 
contributions accentuated the channel’s ability to instigate deliberations regarding 
controversial political affairs rather than to actually reconfigure social realities as this 
thesis suggests. On an international scale, the impact of televised media on global 
politics was first sensed in the 1960s, during the American war in Vietnam. The term 
Vietnam syndrome mirrored the belief that footage of destruction and human casualties 
highly contributed to mounting domestic pressures that forced Washington to withdraw 
its troops from the country. This hypothesis was contested, however, as some believed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid, 18. 
11 El Oifi, The Al-Jazeera Phenomenon, 66. 
12 Zayani, The Al-Jazeera Phenomenon, 7-8. 
13 Ibid, 35. 
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that the impact of the media had only been secondary in shaping US foreign policy.14 
The role of televised media was more tangible in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
however. In Eastern Europe, where the decay of communist regimes had reached its 
acme, cross border television played an influential role in catalyzing mass protests. 
Footage of vicious security measures in East Germany was aired on West German 
television and seen by East Germans, while images of the uprising igniting the 
Romanian city Timisoara and calling for the downfall of the ruling dictator Nicolae 
Ceausescu were broadcast on Hungarian television.15 The time lag separating 
Timisoara’s rising from protests in different parts of Romania proved the absence of a 
revolutionary scheme aiming to oust Ceausescu.16 It was thus thought that televised 
images of mass protests had successfully transmitted the popular fervor.  
The course of media evolution reached another peak during the 1991 Gulf War, 
as CNN’s reporting from Iraq marked the first live coverage of an international conflict. 
The channel screened unedited footage of the event, as if inviting the public itself to 
participate in interpreting the news and making its own judgments.17 For the first time, 
breaking news stories took the form of live audiovisual transmissions, and Middle 
Eastern audiences enjoyed uncensored coverage after years of reliance on state 
monopolized media. This audience, however, was limited to a narrow and elitist social 
stratum with access to satellite media at the time.18 Thereafter, CNN’s engaging 
coverage of crises and wars in the mid-1990s incited American action in several parts of 
the world, such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The term CNN effect came to mirror 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Philip M. Taylor, Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945 (London: 
Routledge, 1997b.), 108 - 115. 
15 Naomi Sakr, Satellite Realms (London: IB Tauris, 2002), 4. 
16 Victor Neumann, Between Words and Reality: Studies on the Politics of Recognition and the Changes 
of Regime in Contemporary Romania (Washington DC: The Council for Research in Values and 
Philosophy, 2000), 67.  
17 Sakr, Satellite Realms, 84. 
18 Ibid, 84, 85. 
	   14	  
the impression that the outlet was changing both, the projection of war onto television 
screens worldwide, and the rules of international relations as well.19  
The above highlight the impact of television on various political events in the 
20th century. Scholarly attempts to explain the representational power of televised media 
evolved with growing evidence that this power could contribute to altering social 
realities. The role of intellectual production via the media was not particularly 
underscored in this regard, however, nor were the mechanisms used to achieve social 
reality construction. In the past three decades, the relationship between media and social 
constructivism gained further significance in light of revolutionary advancements in the 
realm of telecommunications. Various contributions addressed the issue from a 
perspective of reality versus representation. In this context, David Harvey once argued 
that “power in the realms of representation [has become] as important as power over the 
materiality of spatial organization itself”20. Harvey was one of many advocates of social 
constructivism who emphasized the role of postmodern tools in compressing time and 
space and in establishing representational primacy over tangible realities.21 His inquiries 
in The Condition of Postmodernity serve as a general reference in this regard. 
Other examinations go beyond the general reference and specifically pertain to 
the role of media in drawing mass perceptions. The most important were those presented 
by Jean Baudrillard, whose valuable contributions have added a philosophical dimension 
to media studies, especially to the works examining media effect on collective cognition. 
Baudrillard rejects the idea that media output in the postmodern era is a mere reflection 
of reality. He rather thinks of it as an implosive space allowing for the collapse of 
meaning,22 one that has come to constitute a form of hyperreality, in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1992), 7. 
20 Sakr, Satellite Realms, 5.  
21 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1990), 284 – 325. 
22 Gary Genosko, McLuhan and Baudrillard: The Masters of Implosion (London: Routledge, 1999), 77 – 
99. 
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representations (or signs) undermine reality (or content) itself. Thus, due to this primacy 
of representation, media have gained further leverage in the scope of reconstructing the 
“real” by intensifying image production and massifying ideas and experience.23 In 
Baudrillard’s words, when compared to the imaginary, “the hyperreal represents a much 
more advanced stage insofar as it manages to efface even this contradiction between the 
real and the imaginary”.24  
The hyperreality discussed in this thesis relates to the output broadcast to 
millions of Arab spectators during the Arab uprisings. This does not imply, by any 
means, that the uprisings were not “real”, but that they were represented in ways that 
eventually facilitated their expansion. Building on Baudrillard’s thoughts, Kellner once 
argued that television “collapses critical distinctions, exhausts meaning, and volatizes 
reference”.25 In the same sense, media representations during the Arab uprisings have 
surpassed reality as a reference and have come to constitute a referential system of their 
own. Their reconfiguration of events, emphasis on some, and disregard of others have 
created a discourse mainly based on representations of reality.	  
The accounts abovementioned address the revolutionary impact of media on 
today’s world and their problematic relationship with reality. Prior to these contributions 
was Marshall McLuhan’s introduction of media (in the 1960s) as a form of message 
capable of reconfiguring social affairs, regardless of the content that the medium carries. 
Thus was McLuhan’s famous slogan “the medium is the message”, in which he (and 
later Baudrillard) placed “content and use as subordinate to form, and dialectical 
analysis as subordinate to technological determinism”.26 In this sense, media were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Douglas Kellner, “Baudrillard: A New McLuhan?”, Illuminations: The Critical Theory Project, UCLA 
Graduate School of Information Studies, accessed: March 3, 2012. 
http://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell26.htm. 
24 Jean Baudrillard, Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, ed. Mark Poster (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 
145. 
25 Genosko, McLuhan and Baudrillard, 67.  
26 Ibid, 84. 
	   16	  
thought to have gained an autonomous status that allowed them to impact social reality 
rather than to merely provide a space for exchanging ideas. McLuhan once argued that 
environments “shape their occupants” and that “the user or content of any medium is 
completely conformed to the character of this man-made environment”.27 During the 
uprisings, Arab media were operating in accordance with McLuhan’s definition of them: 
as an environment that “transforms our perceptions governing the areas of attention and 
neglect alike”.28 Yet al-Jazeera’s construction of meaning in the course of redesigning 
social realities presents a model whose role exceeded this function. The following 
chapters present illustrative evidence to support this claim. 	  
Theoretical and empirical contributions 
Despite the valuable attempts to conceptualize the interplay between media on 
the one hand and the public sphere and socially constructed realities on the other, 
references to the role of intellectuals in this matrix were generally absent, whether in the 
overall literature on media or that specifically pertaining to the Arab World. This thesis 
aims to fill this gap by examining the discursive patterns of social reality deconstruction 
that involved intellectuals and an influential media outlet during the Arab uprisings. By 
examining the triangular relationship between the media, intellectuals, and the public 
sphere, we construct a conceptual model that adds to conventional explanations 
involving the impact of image production and transmission on collective perceptions and 
cognition. The model presented highlights how meaning creation through intellectual 
articulations on a media platform plays a role in dismantling social facts. 
The theoretical contribution of this thesis revolves around two key issues. The 
first pertains to the idea that media institutions can operate as organic or class-bound 
intellectuals - a task that was performed by al-Jazeera during the uprisings: As an 
institutional platform, the channel banked on its guest intellectuals to produce ideas, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid, 4. 
28 Marshall McLuhan, “Education in the Electronic Age,” in H. The best of times/the worst of times: 
Contemporary issues in Canadian education, ed. Alexander Stevenson et al. (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston of Canada, 1967), 4. 
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construct meaning, and act as a “permanent persuader” of its spectators regarding 
matters of the discourse in question. The notion of an “institutional organic intellectual” 
has not been previously engaged with, whether in terms of connecting intellectual output 
to media or otherwise. This is one way in which the thesis differs considerably from 
existing accounts of media and its representational power. The second central issue 
relates to the idea that this form of mediated intellectual production is capable of 
redesigning social realities. The thesis shows how various forms of meaning 
construction through intellectual articulations, coupled with intense imagery and a vast 
influx of news material, could contribute to deconstructing social facts when 
instantaneously disseminated to large numbers of dynamic spectators. This is a novel 
approach regarding media, intellectual participation, and social movements alike.   
Accordingly, this thesis empirically illustrates how al-Jazeera’s intellectual 
output contributed to deconstructing regime institutions in Egypt and state institutions in 
Libya during the Arab uprisings. It conveys how the channel’s editorial policy was 
vocalized through its guest intellectuals as a means to further validate it and increase its 
impact on the political discourse in Egypt and Libya. The case studies to follow 
exemplify the processes of meaning construction that al-Jazeera and its intellectuals 
have introduced to systemically undermine the legitimacies of the regimes in question 
by disassembling their ideational constructs. Each case study uncovers how meaning 
construction was achieved through various modes of framing, and how the processual 
phenomenon involving mediated intellectual content and dynamic social movements has 
altered existing power structures and contributed to the reconfiguration of political 
elites.  
Methodology 
Applying the theoretical framework that the thesis proposes requires data 
collection and analysis. For that, this research uses primary and secondary sources of 
literature to form its empirical base. In terms of primary sources, the research mainly 
relies on tens of interviews that were conducted on al-Jazeera with its regularly hosted 
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intellectuals during the uprisings and were uploaded on YouTube. All available 
interviews that fall within the timeframe of this study are examined, before extracts that 
substantially relate to the thesis argument are selected and transformed into written 
transcripts. Following that, the transcripts undergo another process of selection for 
brevity purposes and are subjected to content analysis	   to uncover their meanings and 
implications before I translate them into English. The conceptual tools applied in this 
analysis are those provided by the literatures on framing and social movements on the 
one hand, and Searle’s model of social reality construction on the other (explained in 
Chapter 3), whereas references to the literature on intellectuals are made to place this 
analysis in the wider theoretical framework designed by this thesis.   
The research uses latent content analysis, as it aims to uncover the underlying 
meanings of terms used within televised texts (as opposed to manifest content analysis 
that does not go beyond the surface structure of the message).29 It also presents a form of 
inductive reasoning, as it seeks to interpret the implications of televised articulations and 
reintroduces them as meaningful abstractions (as opposed to deductive reasoning where 
research starts from theory rather than observations).30 The research could also be 
described as intertextual, as each of its texts “is always related to some preceding or 
simultaneous discourse”31. In this case, intertextuality is a result of the connection 
between a diverse set of televised texts that vary from imagery to verbal articulations 
and written material. It is worth noting that the term text in this research is used in its 
broader sense, as it stretches beyond conventional references to written material and 
covers all “meaningful matter” including technology supported social interactions.32  
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Subjecting the interviews on television to latent content analysis requires 
shedding light on the thematic uses of language by the channel’s guest intellectuals. For 
that, the concept of framing is used as a theoretical construct to explain the processes of 
narrative construction and deconstruction. In this context, emphasis is put on the 
intellectuals’ deployment of descriptive terms, figures of speech (especially religious), 
recurrent phrases, analytic constructs, and generalizing abstractions. The term narrative 
is used here to denote the textual “sequence and consequence”; i.e. the “events (that) are 
selected, organized, connected, and evaluated as meaningful for a particular audience”.33 
It is important to note, however, that the term is also characterized by “perspective and 
context”,34 as it relates to the standpoint of the narrator and is affected by exogenous 
factors present within the medium in which the narrator operates. In this research, these 
factors pertain to al-Jazeera as a medium with specific editorial policies by which the 
intellectual abides, and to Qatar as a partisan state with certain regional policies to which 
al-Jazeera adheres. Yet neither of these factors (al-Jazeera’s editorial line and Qatar’s 
regional policies) fall within the scope of our study.  
In its content analysis, the research also applies Searle’s model of social 
constructivism to address the process of regime delegitimation and the promotion of 
alternative political possibilities. Accordingly, the themes underscored in this regard are 
those pertaining to the propagation of new institutional facts with redefined status-
functions and to the efforts of modifying collective intentionality in order to serve this 
propagation. This is a form of discourse analysis that is identified with a “social 
dimension” whereby it “gets recruited on site to enact specific activities and social 
identities”.35 The “activities” that this research chooses to inspect are those falling within 
the platform having al-Jazeera on one end, and regimes and their systems of 
representation on the other.  
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Primary sources also include interviews that were conducted with several al-
Jazeera employees: a senior presenter who contributed on condition of anonymity, 
former al-Jazeera senior producer Osama Radi, former al-Jazeera reporter in Libya Ali 
Hashem, and former al-Jazeera reporter in Egypt Dina Samak. The research also 
involves an interview with Mahmoud Shammm, one of al-Jazeera’s guest intellectuals 
under study, a senior journalist having former ties with the Qatari ruling family and who 
spoke on condition of anonymity, in addition to personal observations and interviews 
that had previously been done with Libyan opposition figures during a field visit to 
Libya in the first few weeks of the uprising. 
As for secondary sources, the research engages with diverse bodies of literature, 
as it highlights the relationship between media and politics in general and in the Arab 
World in particular, the sociology of intellectuals, framing and social movements, 
Searle’s model for social constructivism, various academic and journalistic works on 
Egypt and Libya, in addition to other scholarly contributions that relate to one or more 
of the aforementioned. Thus, it involves a selection of academic works that enrich its 
interdisciplinary nature. On the other hand, gathering empirical material through 
secondary sources is obtained by referring to newspaper archives. This reference allows 
to recreate the context in which the uprisings evolved and al-Jazeera operated, and to 
draw a clear pattern of meaningful occurrences and a coherent succession of events. 
Since the thesis limits its study to the 18 days of the uprising in Egypt and to the first 33 
days of the one in Libya, the daily happenings within those two timeframes are revisited 
in two Arabic newspapers with different editorial policies (to ensure the obtainment of 
objective facts); the Saudi al-Sharq al-Awsat and the Lebanese al-Safir. This selection of 
two newspapers that have opposing editorial lines for the extraction of empirical data 
serves as a means for fact checking, since comparing between their coverage allows us 
to diversify our sources and thus to ensure the obtainment of objective facts and reliable 
news material. 
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Case Selection 
This research presents two case studies to demonstrate its argument. It begins 
with exploring al-Jazeera’s engagement with the Egyptian uprising before examining the 
channel’s coverage of the uprising in Libya. As earlier mentioned, each case represents a 
different context with distinct characteristic features and intervening variables. This is 
why al-Jazeera’s contribution to both discourses has accordingly differed in terms of 
nature and extent. The main differences stem from the regimes’ ideologies and 
structures. The variations in this regard, as shall later be explained, have impacted the 
authorities’ responses to protests in both countries, the nature and degree of foreign 
intervention, as well as al-Jazeera’s engagement with the popular discourse. 
The intellectuals whose role is examined in this research are those who have 
been regularly hosted on al-Jazeera to comment on its broadcast output (news and 
imagery). Azmi Bishara was the main figure performing this task followed by Sheikh 
Youssef al-Qaradawi. The former is a prominent Palestinian academic and politician, a 
founder of a major Arab political party in Israel, and a former member of the Israeli 
Knesset. Prior to 2007, Bishara was thought to be the leading figure in one of the “two 
schools of thought [that] were dominant among Arab intellectuals in Israel”, as he 
“embarked on a new political path” by founding “The Covenant of Equality”.36 
Through the latter, he advocated the principles of citizenship and egalitarianism 
amongst Jews and Palestinians in a binational state,37 and, to many, his political 
activism and intellectual output made him “undisputedly the most influential and 
fruitful political and cultural thinker in the Arab-Palestinian community in Israel in the 
last several decades”.38 Bishara headed al-Tajammu’ al-Watani al-Dimuqrāti (the 
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National Democratic Assembly), a party that was represented by a number of 
parliamentarians in the Knesset and whose main objective was to “halt the 
marginalization and Israelization of the Arab citizens in the Jewish state”.39  His 
thoughts “challenged the ideas of all Arab parties active in the Arab community” and 
“presented a new and systematic challenge to the dominant political thought of Zionist 
parties”.40 In terms of his ideological background, Bishara is an Arab nationalist of a 
Marxist background,41 yet in later scholarly contributions has presented a relatively 
positive account of some factions representing political Islam. His account was based 
on two main considerations: the first pertains to the active role of some factions in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict (the Lebanese Hezbollah being an example in this regard), and the 
second relates to the adaptation of some Islamist movements to the needs of a 
democratic system.42 Bishara is the writer and editor of a variety of scholarly and 
literary works that mainly address contemporary Arab issues of identity and politics.43 
Hosted by Qatar since 2007 after Israeli authorities threatened to sue him for his 
support of Hezbollah in the 2006 war on Lebanon, he was regarded as al-Jazeera’s 
main secular intellectual commenting on the uprisings. From 2010 onwards, Bishara 
founded and headed several multi-million dollar projects financed by Qatar including 
the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies based in Doha,44 al-Araby al-Jadeed 
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newspaper and al-Araby TV (both based in London).45 The amount of support that 
Bishara received from Qatar during the “Arab Spring” mirrored his close ties with the 
monarchy’s ruling family. Little wonder, then, was he regarded as “the [Qatari] Emir’s 
closest adviser”.46 
Al-Jazeera’s other main intellectual who was hosted on a regular basis, Sheikh 
Youssef al-Qaradawi, was a Sunni cleric of Egyptian origins and Qatari nationality. Al-
Qaradawi, widely viewed as the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
and the Arab World, was able to complement Bishara’s insightful interpretations with 
religious incentives and provocative oratory that was founded on Islamic grounds. The 
influential cleric was thought to be “by far the most prominent scholar and preacher in 
Sunni Islam at the beginning of the twenty-first century”.47 His contributions played a 
role in shaping contemporary Islamism,48 and his works as an `ālim (religious scholar) 
date back to 1960 when he published his first and most successful book “Lawful and 
Prohibited in Islam” (al-ḥalāl wa ’l-ḥarām fī’l-islām) which introduced him as a 
descendant of a “reformist” Islamic doctrine that emerged in the early twentieth 
century.49 Following the persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 
mid 1960s, al-Qaradawi moved to Qatar, and in the succeeding years, he gradually 
became recognized as an “international `ālim”50 and an “authoritative reference” 
(Marji‘iyya) “whose interpretations and opinions in various fields shaped the beliefs 
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and convictions of a large number of believers”.51 His influence, however, was 
considerably enhanced following his weekly appearance on al-Jazeera’s show “Sharia 
and Life” (al-Sharī‘a wa’l-Hayāt) starting 1996, as the programme elevated his stature 
to world prominence.52 Albeit his TV contributions date back to 1970 when he hosted 
his own show on Qatar’s national television, “Sharia and Life” introduced a lively and 
dynamic platform through which he had the chance to address tens of millions of 
viewers around the Arab World. Accordingly, al-Qaradawi’s “alliance” with al-Jazeera 
allowed him to “construct a Muslim public”, and his shift from the Qatari national 
television to al-Jazeera gave him a new role: “from primarily being an educator and 
informer, al-Qaradawi became an agenda setter”.53 
The Libyan case introduced other intellectuals to the list of regular commentators 
on al-Jazeera. This was mainly due to the intrusion of new variables distinguishing 
Libya’s uprising from the preceding ones in Tunisia and Egypt. These variables, mainly 
relating to the militarization of the uprising and the use of brute force by Libyan 
authorities, presupposed the need for additional efforts and further specialization in 
Libyan affairs to create a compelling narrative. Thus, three “local” intellectuals (as 
opposed to the two aforementioned transnational ones) took part in constructing al-
Jazeera’s narrative regarding the Libyan discourse. Two of them, Mahmoud Shammam 
and Sleiman Dogha, were political activists directly involved in the conflict, as they 
were members of the National Transitional Council (NTC) that seized power in Libya 
after the downfall of Gaddafi’s regime, whereas the third, Sheikh Ali al-Sallabi, was a 
Sunni cleric expelled from his homeland and hosted by Doha since the 1990s.  
Outline of dissertation 
The chapters to follow elucidate how the process of social reality deconstruction 
was attained through al-Jazeera by involving intellectuals. In the course of explication, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Motaz	  al-­‐Khatib,	  “Yūsuf	  al-­‐	  Qaradāwī	  as	  an	  authoritative	  reference”,	  in	  Global	  Mufti,	  p.	  86.	  
52	  Skovgaard-­‐Petersen,	  “Yūsuf	  al-­‐	  Qaradāwī	  and	  al-­‐Azhar”	  in	  Global	  Mufti,	  50.	  
53	  Ehab	  Galal,	  “Yūsuf	  al-­‐Qaradāwī	  and	  the	  new	  Islamic	  TV”	  in	  Global	  Mufti,	  149.	  
	   25	  
various conceptual tools are deployed and empirical data are analyzed. Chapter 2 
presents a literature review regarding the correlation between politics and media in 
general and the Arab World in particular, before highlighting the evolution of al-Jazeera, 
its role in reconstructing the Arab public sphere, and the partisan relationship joining the 
network to its sponsoring state, Qatar. Chapter 3 underscores several conceptual 
accounts of intellectuals and framing processes, then constructs a theoretical framework 
derived from three different bodies of literature. The framework connects intellectuals 
(as generators of meaningful articulations) to collective action frames (as mechanisms of 
meaning construction), and deploys Searle’s sociolinguistic model to explain the shift 
from linguistic practices to social reality construction. Chapter 4 presents the case of 
Egypt and analyzes the various framing processes that al-Jazeera’s intellectuals engaged 
with to delegitimize Mubarak’s regime and other relevant institutional facts. Chapter 5 
introduces the second case study, Libya, and explains how the characteristic features of 
its regime and its aggressive response to threat resulted in the deployment of different 
tools by the network and its intellectuals in their battle against Gaddafi and eventually 
lead to the deconstruction of the state’s institutions as a whole. Finally, chapter 6 
presents a brief comparison between the two case studies and their outcomes, before 
highlighting the findings of the research as well as its shortcomings and limitations. 
Following this introduction, the next chapter provides a thorough review of the literature 











Ever since its advent in 1996, the Qatari channel al-Jazeera has been 
reconfiguring background assumptions of Arab audiences. The network has played a 
pivotal role in reconstructing the Arab public sphere, as it challenged existing taboos and 
redefined the landscapes of political debate. Banking on its provocative rhetoric that was 
passed on to tens of millions of Arab spectators, al-Jazeera emerged as an unorthodox 
Arab medium, critical of regimes and conventional political restraints. The network’s 
dynamic engagement with controversial issues and events introduced a platform for a 
vibrant media discourse, and served as a “de facto Pan-Arab opposition and a forum for 
resistance”.54 Its maverick output was a groundbreaking contribution to an evolving 
Arab mediascape and a promoter of alternative political representations in the Arab 
World.   
This chapter engages with key conceptual accounts of media and representation, 
as well as with the main literature on al-Jazeera and news media in general (on the 
international stage and in the Arab World). It opens by examining the interplay between 
media and politics, and by highlighting the reciprocal impact in this interchange as 
several historical junctures suggest. The chapter then surveys the evolving mediascape 
in the Arab World prior to the outburst of the Arab uprisings before tracing al-Jazeera’s 
pioneering experience in this regard. It then unpacks the role of the network in 
reconstructing the Arab public sphere, as it reconfigured the discursive patterns of 
debate and contested long-sustained political establishments in the Arab World. The 
chapter concludes by highlighting the partisan relationship between al-Jazeera and its 
sponsoring state, Qatar, thus placing the channel’s output in the context of regional 
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politics. In the course of these examinations, the chapter discusses the absence of 
theoretical and empirical contributions underlining the role of intellectuals in amplifying 
media impact on political discourse and in altering social realities. Accordingly, it 
provides an all-inclusive review of the literature, as a means to identify the gaps that this 
thesis aims to fill. 
Revisiting the pubic sphere 
As earlier explained, the term public sphere was introduced by Habermas to 
denote a space for communicative discussion amongst citizens regarding issues of 
shared concern. In democratic societies, these discussions are capable of impacting state 
policy formation, as they help formulate a pressure on policy makers when the latter’s 
decisions contradict with powerful public trends. This research shows how the media’s 
role during the Arab uprisings involved the public sphere as a virtual field of 
communication where public dissent was verbalized regarding Arab regimes. Due to the 
lack of democratic institutions that allow for transforming this dissent into political 
pressure, its material manifestations took the form of popular uprisings.  
Habermas has expressed his skepticism regarding the role that media play in 
shaping the public sphere. To Habermas, the ideal form of a public sphere is that which 
is unaffected by exogenous pressures that limit the scope of public interaction.55 This is 
not the case in today’s world, as the infiltration of mass media by interest groups often 
leads to manipulating the public, thus deforming the evolution of the sphere itself.56 
Some scholars proposed to further dissect the term by distinguishing between various 
kinds of publics. Schulz, for example, differentiates between interactive publics (in the 
sense initially proposed by Habermas before the sphere’s reconstruction in Europe, i.e. 
where individual social actors communicate through direct interface) and media publics 
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(where the interaction occurs through media platforms).57 Today, Habermas and his 
descendants and critics alike accent that media publics have become predominant over 
interactive publics due to the vast information technology revolution. In fact, since 
media have become the primary sources of information, even interactive publics have 
become reliant on them, since they provide them with necessary means to substantiate 
the debating viewpoints they entail.58 
The public sphere we refer to in this research is that which is necessarily linked 
to media output and the resulting discourse between participant individuals, or that 
involving a media public. Hence we rely on the definitions accentuating not only the 
centrality of the public, but also of the media as an element giving the term its full 
meaning. Today’s public sphere has developed to involve a participatory process 
between media outlets and their spectators. Our research addresses this participatory 
process, as it constitutes a prerequisite for shaping mass perceptions regarding 
inflammatory events on different Arab stages. In the course of doing so, however, the 
research emphasizes the role of intellectuals in amplifying certain frames that have 
served in revolutionizing the Arab public sphere. It explains how the Arab media public 
was not only involved in a dynamic interchange of ideas via media platforms, but was 
also receptive of mediated intellectual articulations that contributed to deconstructing the 
public’s social context itself.   
Reality and its parallel world  
In his understanding of hyperreality, Baudrillard does not deny the presence of a 
material world.59 Instead, he presents the concept of vital illusion through which he 
explains the logic of coexistence between reality and illusion, the latter being part of the 
former. Baudrillard defines the Real as “an origin, an end, a past and a future, a chain of 
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causes and effects, continuity and rationality”. He contends that there is “no Real 
without these elements, without an objective configuration of discourse. And its 
disappearing is the dislocation of this whole constellation”.60 Having defined his 
conception of the Real, as a rational discourse enclosing cause and effect, he moves on 
to present his assumption regarding the illusion created by the media through various 
degrees of intensification, distortions and repetitions – all constituting a disruption of the 
aforementioned constellation. This illusion, according to Baudrillard, becomes an 
intrinsic part of reality itself. It is true that broadcast images are not “there” (in the real 
world) in the same way they appear to an audience, but just by reaching this audience, 
they constitute a hyper form of reality coexisting with the latter and impacting it at the 
same time. 
The idea of having a hyperreality and a vital illusion is of epistemic significance. 
It relates to constructed perceptions and conceptions through the power of image 
representation. Baudrillard thought of it as being analogous to the illusion of a star’s 
existence: due to the colossal distance separating the star from planet Earth, its light 
could still be perceived by the human eye even though it might have actually ceased to 
exist. Baudrillard uses this example to explain the instability of objects in the “real 
world”, hence denying the presence of objective encounters of actual events. He argues, 
however, that this illusion created in this regard is vital because it represents a primary 
source of knowledge, albeit imprecise in its implications. The media’s establishment of 
vital illusions is important in this sense. These illusions are essential for our knowledge 
of “the world out there”, yet are not reflective of it as it is. Rather, the media’s image 
representations are constitutive of a parallel world (hyperreality) and are illuminators of 
the world being represented (through vital illusions), both at the same time.   
The account abovementioned could be projected on the discourse involving al-
Jazeera and the Arab public sphere during the uprisings. In a similar way, despite the 
distortions it comprised, the hyperreality that the channel’s representations constructed 
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(regarding the uprisings) was vital for shedding light on reality itself. Nevertheless, the 
notion of hyperreality discussed here does not suffice to explain the process of reality 
construction that this thesis engages with, as it primarily pertains to imagery rather than 
intellectual content. And although image production has the ability to shape mass 
perceptions and accounts of reality, it is incapable of playing the role that intellectuals 
could, precisely with regard to strategizing, guiding action, and imagining alternative 
political possibilities.  
The same could be said about McLuhan’s understanding of media effect on 
collective cognition. Highlighting the media’s role as an environment that shapes its 
occupants was an interesting contribution that nevertheless lacked any reference to the 
intellectual component we discuss here. John Culkins, further discussing McLuhan’s 
ideas, once emphasized the media’s reciprocal nature: “we shape our tools and thereafter 
they shape us”.61 The idea was that communication is necessarily transformative of the 
interlocutors it comprises. Its dialogical character allows for mutual impact to occur 
between the actors it involves. During the uprisings, those interlocutors were political 
activists shaping the discourse in public space. They were highly interactive with their 
media environment, impacting its output and subject to its effects at the same time. The 
element of intellectual participation, however, helped them make sense of events and 
therefore shape this interchange accordingly. This element was neither addressed in 
McLuhan’s contributions nor in Baudrillard’s later on. 
Examining media effect on Arab discourse starts from establishing a well-
rounded view of the relationship between broadcast images and the real world. In this 
regard, constructed realities reconfigure actual ones, thus founding a base for popular 
incitement and mass mobilization. Thereafter, as we later examine, different forms of 
framing contribute to shaping public discourse, as in the case of al-Jazeera’s engagement 
with the popular uprisings through its guest intellectuals. However, this thesis, albeit 
acknowledging that media coverage of events results in constructing a form of 
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hyperreality, does not presume the subordination of content to form as both Baudrillard 
and McLuhan hypothesize. The hyperreality we refer to here is that which is 
reconstructive of reality. It is that pertaining to representation versus the represented 
rather than to form versus content, because the existence of an intellectual aspect 
provides al-Jazeera’s representations with content and meaning. We shall highlight that 
in the next chapter as we discuss the intellectual constituent in the network’s coverage 
basing on Searle’s understanding of social constructivism.  
Media and politics: a mutual impact 
It is often argued that the nature of news coverage can effectively draw the limits 
of the audiences’ involvement with reported events, as it either creates a sense of 
concern or one of passivity.62 In other words, constructed depictions of reality play a 
major role in shaping the audiences’ interaction with this reality, thus influencing the 
trajectory of actual events. It should be born in mind that the notions of objectivity and 
neutrality are relative in the field of media, and this renders news industry porous to 
subjective drives and various forms of agenda setting. In this regard, Sakr quotes Peter 
Golding who “argued in the 1970s that, since all media institutions are wedded to social 
and political processes, the Western professional ideal of impartiality in communication 
was probably unattainable”.63 Media depictions of social realities are thus constructed 
through sophisticated forms of broadcast imagery and storytelling, and, as Philip Taylor 
contends, “media perception is not necessarily a picture of the world as it is, but a 
flawed construct created by the distortion, compression, and manipulation”.64 In this 
respect, personal experiences also intervene in creating inaccurate depictions of reality, 
and individual perceptions often distort objective encounters of events. Moreover, media 
practitioners have a tendency to be absorbed by micro narratives, sometimes on the 
expense of macro ones. In Taylor’s words, “because journalists are neither sociologists 
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nor historians, their concern is more with the detail rather than the overall picture”.65 
Media output is therefore a result of this entwined process of individually and 
institutionally constructed accounts of reality.  
The interplay between media and politics, however, generates an impact in both 
directions. On the one hand, news media usually deploy politicized rhetoric in their 
coverage, and journalists often interfere in shaping news content through various 
degrees of direct or indirect bias and manipulation as discussed above. The result of that 
could be understood in terms of the media’s representational power earlier explained. On 
the other hand, the impact of politics on media is often sensed in terms of restrictions 
placed on the media’s sphere of action, whether regarding their ability to freely express 
and communicate political ideas and stances, or concerning the technical and logistic 
challenges imposed on them in times of war. These restrictions take different forms. On 
various occasions, for example, journalists were victims of conflicts and war 
correspondents were treated as combatants rather than civilians.66 NATO’s deliberate 
bombing of Radio Television Serbia (RTS) during the 1999 war on Yugoslavia serves as 
a good example in this regard. The attack was justified on the premise that the network 
was acting as a propagandist mouthpiece for Belgrade’s regime.67 Later, other media 
crews were persecuted in times of war, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, after the US 
lead “War on Terror” was launched in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The Qatari channel 
al-Jazeera was the most targeted in both conflicts. The same could be said regarding the 
channel during the uprisings of Egypt and Libya as shall be shown in the chapters to 
follow.  
At different junctures, concerns were raised regarding the weaponization of the 
media and its impact on both, the media’s ability to sustain a level of objectivity on the 
one hand, and to gather and disseminate news content, precisely in combat zones, on the 
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other.68 By the dawn of the new millennium and the rise of transnational jihadist 
insurgency following the 2001 attacks in Washington D.C. and New York, new 
controversies arouse in light of contemporary political and security challenges. It was 
argued that journalistic norms were shaken after the 9/11 attacks due to subjective 
encounters of the event in Western media.69 Controversial issues relating to speed versus 
accuracy in news coverage were raised in academic and professional debates alike, 
whereas deployment of emotions on the screen was commonly disputed.70 In this regard, 
it was widely believed that market competition played a substantial role in outlining 
editorial policies and sensationalizing news coverage, especially in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Accordingly, “just as CNN tailored the domestic version of its broadcast to be 
more “patriotic” in response to its losing market share to Fox News, Arab satellite 
television stations increasingly took market pressures into account” as well.71 
Controversies relating to the weaponization of media outlets were strictly 
relevant to their conventional forms of coverage, however. The role of mediated 
intellectuals in the process of framing deliberations and creating meaning was neither 
addressed in debates on Arab nor on international media. The weaponization of al-
Jazeera as understood by this thesis, on the other hand, was resultant from a different 
form of engagement with political discourse; one that capitalized on intellectual output 
to delegitimize the rationale of ruling elites and guide anti-regime action. The lack of 
this missing ingredient could be especially noticed in the following subtopic, as we go 
beyond the general accounts on media and politics, and shed light on the evolution of 
news media in the Arab World and the correlation between these media and political 
developments on domestic and regional arenas.  
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News media in the Arab World 
Arab satellite broadcasting emerged in 1990, after the Egyptian satellite channel 
began transmission. A second attempt shortly followed, when Saudi Arabia launched 
MBC (Middle East Broadcasting Center) in 1991. The channel that broadcast from 
London was regarded as a pioneering venture in the Arab media world in terms of 
technology and content. In addition to its high quality production compared to other 
Arab outlets, MBC covered Pan Arab issues pertaining to politics, society, 
entertainment, and sports. After MBC, two networks owned by Saudi entrepreneurs 
were launched from Italy. ART (Arabic Radio and Television - 1993) and Orbit (1994) 
represented similar projects, as they encompassed various aspects of life.72 This 
“offshore democracy”, as termed by former Jordanian Minister of Information Nasser 
Judeh, created the first partial breach of traditional media monopoly and announced a 
gradual proliferation of satellite channels and an increasing fragmentation of the Arab 
audience.73 
By the end of 1996, Qatar launched al-Jazeera, the first twenty-four hour 
dedicated news service in the Arab World. The network, broadcasting from Doha, made 
use of the former staff of BBC Arabic, which had marked an unsuccessful joint venture 
between BBC and Saudi owned Orbit. The British Arabic speaking network did not even 
have the chance to reach a full day broadcasting schedule. It lasted less than eighteen 
months before it stopped broadcasting after KSA pulled out from the project in reaction 
to airing a documentary that shed light on human rights violations in the Kingdom. Al-
Jazeera employed BBC’s well-trained staff and introduced a new trend in Arab media; 
one that aimed to reproduce the British corporation’s open and interactive style with the 
audience.74  
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In the following years, Arab satellite stations rapidly increased in number. The 
most serious attempt was the launching of Saudi funded and sponsored al-Arabiya. The 
latter was established in 2003 to counterbalance al-Jazeera’s effect on Arab masses, and 
to protect KSA from attacks in the media, precisely those launched on al-Jazeera’s 
platform. Al-Arabiya officials promised “a wise and balanced alternative to al-Jazeera” 
that would refrain from what they described as a “deliberate provocation on al-Jazeera’s 
part”.75 Thereafter, hundreds of other Arabic speaking channels mushroomed, yet few 
were news oriented. The main news networks were extensions of regional or 
international powers aiming to promulgate their respective state policies. Among those 
were the Iranian al-Alam (2003), the American al-Hurra (2004), Moscow’s Russia 
Today (2006), London’s relaunched BBC Arabic (2008), Paris’s France 24 (2010), 
Ankara’s TRT (2010), the outlet mirroring the alliance between Iran and Syria, al-
Mayadeen (2012) and the Arabic version of Sky News hosted by Abu Dhabi (2012). 
Before examining the media’s effect on the Arab public sphere, precisely al-
Jazeera’s, we shall briefly highlight their impact on interstate as well as intrastate affairs 
in contemporary times. The impact of Arab media on Pan Arab and domestic arenas was 
partially a result of its overlap with international media trends on the one hand, and 
partly stemming from distinctive features characterizing the Arab mediascape on the 
other, as many contributions to the literature reveal. 
On the level of interstate relations, the accelerating process of globalization has 
vastly undermined state sovereignty and the giant leaps achieved in cross border 
communication have created new venues for media platforms. This increase in state 
permeability was a global phenomenon and the Arab World marked no exception in this 
regard. With time, deterritorialization signifying the departure between territory and 
culture gained de facto recognition by the state, thus allowing the media to invest in a 
widening communicative space. 76 In the Arab World, this investment was achieved by 
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fusing the local information marketplace into a broader regional one. The fusion of 
information markets expanded the platform of commonalities and highlighted shared 
interests between Arab audiences regarding political affairs. Satellite media were thus 
thought to be radically transforming “the sense of distance among Arabs and Muslims, 
bringing them together in real time and in a common language alongside intense images 
and a shared political discourse”.77 Al-Jazeera operated within this regional market and 
invested in this deterritorialization during the Arab uprisings. Its intellectuals, especially 
Azmi Bishara and Sheikh Youssef al-Qardawai, enjoyed wide access to a transnational 
Arab audience via the network’s platform. The linguistic and cultural ties binding Arab 
communities helped maximize their impact on the Arab political discourse. This 
intellectual element that the thesis addresses had not been discussed in previous accounts 
regarding the issue in hand.  
The media’s intrastate effect, on the other hand, was hardly noticed in the Arab 
World despite its significance in Western mediascapes (the CNN effect being an example 
of that). In the West, the political decision making process is the product of a complex 
web of interactions between state bureaucracy, multi-national corporations, media 
institutions, interest groups, and individuals.78 This entwined model more or less 
illustrates the modern state apparatus and explicates state behavior in liberal 
democracies, and media conglomerates are part of the interactive process that this model 
entails. In the Arab World, however, the media’s intrastate effect was not governed by 
the same dynamics. This is because Arab news media had several characteristics 
distinguishing them from their Western counterparts. These distinguishing features - 
underscored by several scholarly contributions and listed below - have restrained the 
media’s aptitude to counter local power structures in the Arab World: 
 First, profit making criteria and the public/private dichotomy did not hold the 
same significance as they did in Western countries, and states rather than market forces 
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were the main players in this field.79 In this regard, Sakr contends that television 
licensing was instrumentally used to expand the power base of ruling elites, “by 
accommodating milder critics while pushing harsher ones beyond the margins of power 
and influence”.80 The proliferation of satellite networks, albeit creating a more pluralistic 
media platform, did not solve the problem of political constraints traditionally exercised 
on terrestrial outlets. On the contrary, Skar argues that, “by opening safety valves for the 
expression of dissent that national media controls kept closed, transnational television 
could even be said to have weakened the build-up of pressure for the removal of bans on 
private terrestrial television ownership”.81  
Second, and in consequence to the aforementioned, news media rhetoric was 
generally government-controlled. Mellor contends that Arab authorities “sought to use 
the media as a means for mobilizing Arab public opinion” and that “journalists were 
regarded as new mouthpieces of Arab regimes”.82 Monopolizing news content, direct 
censorship, and various forms of repressive measures (on satellite as well as terrestrial 
networks) largely defined the Arab mediascape. Albeit grounded on “ethical” 
allegations, these measures veiled a “sense of duty to state authorities”.83 Ethics 
codification was thus closely associated to power structures,84 and the term 
professionalism denoted “a code word for political compliance”.85 In this context, and 
apart from very few exceptions, maintaining tight control over state media meant that 
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employees had to be trained by government-run institutions.86 Although challenged by 
an “investigative” form of journalism, mainly represented by Qatar’s al-Jazeera, this 
conventional viewpoint was dominant in the Arab World and has hampered attempts to 
deploy journalism for cultivating a culture of accountability and expanding the platforms 
of political debate.  
Third, a process of indigenization was noticed in Arab satellite realms, whereby 
Western talkshows were replicated and reinvented locally. Notwithstanding, non-
conventional practices were adapted and put in line with the editorial policies and 
priorities of Arab satellite networks. This form of hybridization was restrictive of critical 
engagements with intrastate affairs, as most Arab networks avoided raising sensitive 
issues that Western political talkshows addressed and settled for a mere reproduction of 
their formats.87 Accenting form rather than content was thus another distinguishing 
feature often detected in Arab news media.    
These shortcomings that distinguish the Arab mediascape from its Western 
counterpart explain why news media in the Arab World had little impact on state 
policies. Major governmental decisions were not subject to change in reaction to media 
criticism and scrutiny in Arab states. On the contrary, private media institutes often 
reconfigured their editorial policies in accordance with the interests and preferences of 
ruling elites. The infiltration of Western ideals noticed on Arab media platforms was of a 
rather technical nature, and little did it revolutionize the Arab media output in terms of 
content. Al-Jazeera was an exception in this regard. Yet even this exception was thought 
to be limited to an Arab regional context, as the Qatari channel did not highlight its 
partisan state’s controversial domestic affairs. Moreover, no matter how critical al-
Jazeera was of different Arab regimes, it was widely thought to be disadvantaged by 
their control of national media outlets, as the latter enjoyed more accessibility to 
domestic audiences whose priorities were local rather than Pan Arab. Our thesis, 
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however, demonstrates how this gap was partially bridged by al-Jazeera’s intellectual 
articulations, precisely in the case of Libya - where national intellectuals complemented 
their transnational counterparts in creating collective action frames that specifically 
addressed the priorities of Libyan spectators.  
Despite the aforementioned deficiencies, some scholars believed that the Arab 
mediascape was developing in ways that elevate its role in shaping public discourse. In 
this regard, Seib argued that news media in the Arab World “can help to galvanize 
activism and construct an intellectual framework that gives coherence to reform 
efforts”.88 This optimism was based on the assumption that open venues for debate 
nourish discursive practices and expand the parameters of popular engagement with 
social and political affairs. Thereafter, political reform becomes an issue of public 
concern, and alternative approaches to political problems could be proposed. The 
intellectual aspect that al-Jazeera’s output conveyed during the Arab uprisings and shall 
be underscored in later chapters was of a revolutionary nature, however, as it constituted 
a central element in the channel’s efforts to reinforce anti-regime discourse and mobilize 
protesting masses. Contrary to that, Seib’s account of this factor was more of a 
traditional one, as it accentuated the role of intellectual output in boosting reform efforts 
on the long run, and not in reconstructing social realities in revolutionary contexts. 
In the following, we shall briefly exhibit al-Jazeera’s advent and evolution 
throughout the 15 years preceding the outburst of the Arab uprisings. Shedding light on 
the network’s evolutionary pattern helps comprehend the various stages it had passed 
through and the experience it had accumulated before reaching its peak in 2011. It is 
also important to show that, despite the powerful discourse that al-Jazeera has managed 
to create during the course of its evolution, the intellectual ingredient that was later 
exhibited throughout the uprisings was minimal at times and inefficient at others. 
Contrary to that, the eruption of upheavals and the subsequent crystallization of dissident 
social movements provided the network with the fertile grounds it needed to absorb its 
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intellectual output. After examining al-Jazeera’s evolutionary pattern in the following, 
we highlight its immense impact on the Arab public sphere and its instrumental 
deployment in the context of regional politics as discussed in several scholarly 
contributions.  
Al-Jazeera’s evolution  
Al-Jazeera rose from the ashes of BBC’s Arabic service end of 1996. Its 
provocative rhetoric magnetized popular as well as official curiosity in a short span of 
time. The channel’s first tangible effect was sensed during its coverage of Operation 
Desert Fox in 1998 and the following protests in various Arab countries against 
American and British air strikes targeting Iraq.89 
In parallel to its seemingly anti-American rhetoric, the Qatari network introduced 
a critical voice of Arab regimes. It was therefore banned on several occasions in 
different Arab states. One of the most well-known and early bans was imposed by 
Jordanian authorities in 1998 after harsh criticism of the Kingdom’s regime and its 
regional policies was voiced on its prominent show al-Ittijah al-Mu’akis (The Opposite 
Direction - a replica of CNN’s Crossfire).90 Prior to that, Doha received official 
complaints from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait regarding al-Jazeera, following an episode of 
al-Sharia’a Wal Hayat (Religion and Life - a show regularly hosting Sheikh Youssef al-
Qaradawi), in which a caller attacked the Emir of Kuwait on air. Consequently, the 
network’s correspondent was prohibited from reporting in Kuwait and his credentials 
were revoked. 
On later occasions, further pressures were exercised on the channel and its 
partisan state Qatar, due to the former’s style of coverage and editorial language. The 
Palestinian authority blamed the channel for tarnishing its image because of an interview 
with the leader of Hamas, Libya withdrew its ambassador from Doha after a Libyan 
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dissident described Gaddafi as a dictator on one of the network’s shows, Tunisia 
downgraded diplomatic relations with Doha after Islamic opposition figures criticized 
the country’s human rights record, Morocco recalled its ambassador from Qatar and 
accused al-Jazeera of leading a campaign against its “democratic evolution” and a 
diplomatic crisis almost broke out with neighboring Bahrain after the channel hosted a 
Bahraini opposition figure. Concomitantly, many Arab state officials favored boycotting 
the channel over participating in its on air debates with political dissidents.91  Of those 
were Egyptian and Algerian officials, who regularly declined from appearing with 
“Islamic extremists” on the network’s talk shows.92  
Arab authorities used various methods to ensure the interception of al-Jazeera’s 
programs. Not only did they harass the network and persecute its staff, nor did they just 
threaten to cut diplomatic ties with Doha, but some also deployed unconventional means 
to guarantee this interception. In January 1999, for example, Algerian authorities shut 
down the electric current supplying the capital and several major cities for ten minutes 
to prevent Algerians from watching an episode of al-Ittijah al-Mu’akis. These 
procedures proved to be inefficient, however. In an interview with Hugh Miles, former 
al-Jazeera manager of media relations Jihad Ballout undermined state policies of that 
sort, deeming attempts to ban the network as “detrimental, more so to the state or 
government or authority itself than to the media”. Media “can always get access”, 
according to Ballout.93 The influx of information had various means of delivery to Arab 
audiences, even before the introduction of social media tools years later. 
Critics of al-Jazeera accused the channel of a wide array of political charges. As 
Miles explains, it was claimed to be “pro-Iraqi, pro-Israeli, pro-militant Islamists, an 
agent of the British and pawn of the Qatari government”,94 all at the same time. The 
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channel adopted a form of “media normalization”, as Israeli officials were invited to 
appear on its shows. This was thought to be “a de facto form of communication between 
the Arab World and Israel”.95 The network’s normalization policy formed a base for the 
conspiracy theory associating it to an alleged Qatari scheme that aims to gradually 
weave ties with Israel and create a tolerant Arab environment in this regard. 
On the other hand, al-Jazeera was accused of sympathizing with Baghdad’s 
regime because of highlighting the humanitarian consequences of UN sanctions on Iraq 
in the 1990s. The network was also linked to Islamic extremists, a charge that dated 
back to its exclusive interview with Osama Bin Laden in 1999, which was then deemed 
offensive by the main targets of Bin Laden’s criticism; Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Before 
conducting the interview, al-Jazeera’s staff was persistently denied access to KSA, but 
following Bin Laden’s exclusive appearance, a fatwa was issued by prominent clerics in 
the kingdom prohibiting Saudis from taking part in any of the channel’s programs.96  
Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the second Palestinian Intifada that erupted in 2000 
marked another milestone in its evolution. The channel’s extensive coverage of the event 
and its sympathetic tone regarding Palestinians gained it wide credence amongst Arab 
viewers. Its numerous field reporters on Palestinian territory, around the clock coverage, 
dynamic engagement with the event, advanced technical abilities and provocative 
editorial line placed it ahead of all other stations. Notwithstanding, the 9/11 attacks and 
their aftermath were thought to constitute a turning point in the channel’s history. 
During the 2001 war on Afghanistan, launched to oust Taliban from power and chase al-
Qaeda’s command chain, al-Jazeera had access to various parts of the country, whereas 
leading international channels were denied this access and were thus compelled to 
broadcast footage carrying the al-Jazeera’s logo. Zayani contends that “the broadcasting 
of the Bin Laden videotapes and the airing of graphic images made al-Jazeera part of the 
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news it covered”.97 This was precisely true after US air strikes hit the network’s Kabul 
office in November of that year, making this incident the first of several others to follow. 
Al-Jazeera’s monopoly of information in Afghanistan (which was reliant on 
Taliban’s consent) gave it a dominant position with respect to all other regional and 
international networks. Contracts for sharing footage were signed with the world’s most 
reputable media corporations including CNN and ABC, and Western officials showed 
high interest and concern to appear on the channel in order to enhance their public 
opinion campaigns. The first major interview on al-Jazeera that set this trend was that 
conducted with then British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a month following the 
September 11 attacks.98 
The 2003 war on Iraq presented another opportunity for al-Jazeera to elevate its 
status on the international media scene. Shortly before the war broke out, the network 
saturated Iraq with reporters, and when American President George W. Bush advised 
journalists to evacuate Baghdad for safety purposes, the correspondents of all major 
networks including CNN, ABC, NBC, CBS and Fox News, either left Iraq or were 
thrown out by Iraqi authorities, leaving the country almost exclusively for al-Jazeera’s 
coverage (in addition to Abu Dhabi channel, sponsored by the United Arab Emirates, 
that presented an extensive coverage almost equivalent to that of al-Jazeera and was 
allowed to operate outside the constraints of the Iraqi Ministry of Information)99. Al-
Jazeera also had correspondents in the White House, the Pentagon and the UN, in 
addition to reporters embedded in the Coalition’s military units. Its coverage was critical 
and skeptic of the narrative of all state actors engaged in the conflict. However, this 
skepticism was mainly centered on Washington’s allegations promoting military action 
against Iraq (mainly the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and connections 
joining the Iraqi regime to al-Qaeda). Its general stance was also critical of the overall 
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American policy in the Middle East, precisely that relating to the Iraqi event. 
Acknowledging its influence, several key figures from the Bush administration gave 
extensive interviews to the network. Among those were Secretary of State Colin Powell, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza 
Rice. Al-Jazeera was keen on capturing the scene through a wide-angle lens and to 
present a pervasive overview of the war. Yet the network generally adhered to the 
political partialities and preferences of its Arab audience. The channel’s coverage of the 
war was intense and captivating, as it aired around the clock images of Baghdad under 
fire, and frequently left the footage running without commentary, leaving room for its 
spectators to figure out the images’ symbolism.100 The war on Iraq was burning the 
country to ashes, and al-Jazeera’s coverage aimed to highlight this as an underlying 
message. 
Towards the end of the war on Iraq, al-Jazeera lost one of its staff members, 
Tarek Ayyoub, after an American missile hit his room of residence in Baghdad’s 
Palestine Hotel. The Americans announced that the incident was an unfortunate mistake. 
Al-Jazeera’s staff faced further difficulties and harassments in the months to follow. 
After the war ended and coalition troops settled in Iraq, al-Jazeera’s office in Baghdad 
addressed Paul Bremer (head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq) complaining 
of maltreatment, death threats, confiscation of material and numerous arrests of 
members in its reporting team. In September of that year, Tayseer Alluni, al-Jazeera’s 
famous reporter during the war in Afghanistan, was arrested in Spain on the charge of 
being a member of al-Qaeda. In 2005, he was sentenced to seven years in jail for 
collaborating with Bin Laden’s network, a charge mainly based on the interview he 
conducted with al-Qaeda’s leader following the 9/11 attacks.101 
 US officials accused al-Jazeera of acting as a mouthpiece for al-Qaeda and other 
militant groups targeting Coalition and local Iraqi forces after the invasion. The channel 
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aired provoking tapes of Bin Laden, his right hand man Ayman Zawahiri, the 
overthrown Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, in addition to insurgencies and videos of 
hostages taken by Islamist militants in Iraq. The complaints drove Qatari Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabr Al Thani to promise his American 
counterpart Colin Powell that al-Jazeera would be subject to review. Following that, 
head of the channel’s bureau in Iraq, Waddah Khanfar, was appointed general manager, 
and a “code of ethics” was issued outlining the network’s journalistic standards in 
pursuing and broadcasting news. The code was similar to that of BBC and was the first 
of its kind in the Arab World. Notwithstanding, the network’s editorial policy did not 
change with regard to its reporting of events in Iraq. On the contrary, its coverage of the 
battle of Fallujah between coalition forces and Iraqi militants triggered further American 
criticism. The channel was the only international news corporation in Falluja, and US 
officials accused it of inciting Arab viewers through its inflammatory coverage. In April 
2004, President Bush mentioned the idea of bombing al-Jazeera’s headquarters before 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, as UK’s Daily Mirror uncovered the following year. 
The new authorities in Iraq showed discontent regarding al-Jazeera’s performance as 
well. In mid 2004, the Iraqi government passed a security law after which the channel 
was banned from operating in Baghdad.102 
 The 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon and 2008-2009 war on Gaza were also 
landmarks in the channel’s evolutionary pattern, precisely because the network mirrored 
a general Arab popular fervor in favor of Hezbollah and Hamas during both wars. 
However, it was the popular uprisings sweeping the Arab World in 2011 that elevated 
al-Jazeera’s status and placed it as a potent actor on the Arab stage. It was thus said that 
“the battle of hearts and minds in the Middle East [was] being fought not on the streets 
of Cairo, Tunis, Manama or Sana’a, but on the newscasts and talk shows of al-
Jazeera”.103 
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 Reconstructing the Arab public sphere 
The Arab public sphere was shaped by a variety of factors. The main ones relate 
to the presence of a common Arab narrative of core regional issues and a shared 
negative stance towards Arab regimes, the domestic political pressures in different Arab 
states and the popular desire to circumvent them, and the rise of new information and 
communication technologies as tools for public debate. Al-Jazeera banked on these 
factors to create a transnational virtual space for public deliberation.  
Lynch believed, however, that the discourse generated within the Arab public 
sphere does not match Habermas’s model of a rational discourse earlier discussed. 
Sensationalism was rather a defining feature of the public’s engagements with political 
affairs in the Arab World. Nevertheless, the newly emergent sphere represented a 
significant alteration of preceding public platforms. Although the rational element in its 
discourse was deficient, al-Jazeera’s introduction of an interactive and participatory 
venue gave a voice to public dissent and criticism, and allowed for vocalizing questions 
of legitimacy regarding existing political orders in the Arab World.104  
Lynch thought of the Arab public sphere as “a subordinate, dominated 
counterpublic” that was “challenging the dominant narrative and terms of discourse 
within American and global media”.105 Thus, the discourse it entailed was centered on 
issues pertaining to Pan Arab and Pan Islamic identities, and was often founded on 
parochial accounts of global politics. Mellor presented a similar account, as she argued 
that “the content of the Pan Arab media is usually elitist in that it focuses on foreign 
policies rather than on immediate social problems and needs in local societies”.106 Al-
Jazeera’s depictions of regional and international affairs demonstrated Lynch’s idea of a 
counterpublic clearly, as it frequently emphasized a partisan rhetoric in its coverage of 
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Arab events, and was critical – overtly or covertly – of America’s policies in the Arab 
World. Adel Iskandar and Mohammed el-Nawary, on the other hand, approached the 
issue of the channel’s politicized representation from a different perspective. Grounding 
on the assumption that “the journalistic standards applied require some form of 
contextual objectivity”, they argued that although the medium should reveal all angles of 
a given story, it should retain “the values, beliefs, and sentiments of the targeted 
audience”.107 Seib added that most of the channel’s spectators, albeit valuing credibility 
as an important attribute, want “news that is gathered independently for Arabs and by 
Arabs and that sees events through their eyes”.108 William Rough’s analysis of anti-
Americanism on Arab Television suggested similar conclusions, as he contended that 
“in every country, television and other media are shaped by the political, social, cultural, 
and historical environment in which they function”.109 This meant that al-Jazeera, as a 
channel voicing its audiences’ concerns, was bound to vocalizing certain convictions 
that this audience holds, and one could argue that this form of partial representation - in 
the sense discussed above - does not differ much from Western media depictions of 
events, precisely those that spark patriotic fervor. 
This thesis illustrates in detail how al-Jazeera voiced anti-regime sentiments 
(rather than anti-American ones) and represented the convictions of protesters calling for 
fundamental change during the Arab uprisings. This illustration, although partly 
overlapping with the aforementioned, serves in explaining the mechanisms through 
which the network influenced public discourse, rather than merely describing the 
outcomes of this discourse as these contributions do. Al-Jazeera’s intellectual output was 
created by its guests’ regular commentaries on the uprisings’ daily events. Their 
powerful framing activity constituted the channel’s means to deconstruct regime 
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legacies and promote the establishment of alternative social facts. These means are 
anatomized and analyzed in the following chapters with an aim to present a more 
compelling approach instead of one restricting its examination to the results of the 
discourse.  
Al-Jazeera’s coverage of Middle Eastern affairs promoted a Pan Arab and Pan 
Islamic discourse. American and Israeli wars on Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestinian 
territories between 1996 and 2010 caused wide public discontent in the Arab World. The 
Qatari network accordingly escalated it tone against American and Israeli policies in 
order to meet the expectations of tens of millions of its dissatisfied viewers. Many 
observers described its coverage of Arab affairs as maverick. According to Iskandar and 
Nawari, the channel has “revolutionized the media environment in the Arab World by 
broadcasting what no other Arab news organization dared to: the harsh, often hard truth 
of Arab life, culture, and politics”.110  
In a similar context, Rinnawi used the term McArabism to describe the channel’s 
means of identification with its audience. He explained that McArabism is “a pan-Arab, 
regional expression of Arab identity”.111 It is an “outcome of new media technologies 
interacting with local trends and powers”.112 Rinnawi drew on Benjamin Barber’s 
account in his famous article Jihad vs. McWorld, in which Barber thinks of the Muslim 
World as a field magnetized by two opposing forces of globalization: Jihad denoting a 
form of retribalization, and McWorld referring to an open space with high tech culture 
and capitalist interests. Rinnawi contended that the outcome resulting from the merger of 
these forces, or what Barber termed McJihad, is analogous to al-Jazeera’s McArabism, 
or to the process bolstering Arab bonds through media technology - the latter being 
postmodern tools of globalization. Accordingly, al-Jazeera has successfully invested in 
its advanced technical capabilities to transmit Pan Arab (and Pan Islamist) fervor 
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throughout the Arab World. Its transnational rhetoric expressed an Arab identity based 
on cultural and sectarian common grounds, in addition to shared political accounts of 
core regional issues. Rinnawi added that McArabism was driven by a variety of factors. 
The most important pertain to the Arab media’s aim to expand their market and their 
need to avoid censorship apparatuses. Satellite transmission facilitated both issues, as it 
allowed the Arab media to criticize state policies while broadcasting from abroad and to 
the Arab audience at large.113 Rinnawi’s account, however, was also lacking reference to 
al-Jazeera’s intellectual ingredient and an explanation of the mechanisms through which 
the channel creates meaningful ideational constructs.   
The Arab uprisings revealed al-Jazeera’s ability to voice dissent and therefore to 
construct, through intense framing processes that the channel and its guest intellectuals 
engaged in, a potent rationale delegitimizing Arab regimes. Al-Jazeera had previously 
been described as an “instrument for both marginal and silenced voices”.114 Iskandar and 
el-Nawari compared the network’s mission to that of Voice of America and Radio Free 
Europe, both aiming to promote democratic values during the Cold War.115 Lynch, on 
the other hand, drew a comparison between al-Jazeera and Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Voice 
of the Arabs, which was the leading propaganda audio tool used by Nasser to promote 
Arab Nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s. To Lynch, both media outlets define their era. 
However, Voice of the Arabs was driven by ideology and was meant to mobilize masses 
through Nasser’s fiery speeches and Ahmad Saeed’s stimulating comments (Saeed was a 
leading media figure at the time), whereas al-Jazeera was able to create a space allowing 
an interactive public sphere to evolve rather than trying to directly interfere in shaping 
its discourse.116 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Ibid, 7 – 25. 
114 Iskandar and El-Nawary, Al Jazeera, p. 50. 
115 Ibid, 40. 
116 Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 36-41. 
	   50	  
Iskandar suggested that al-Jazeera is “potentially a verbalization of Arab publics’ 
critiques of government”.117 In an interesting note, however, he discussed whether the 
network represents a form of alternative media or a mere redefinition of the existing 
mainstream. He argued that for al-Jazeera to be alternative, it would have to affirm its 
“responsibility towards, and relationship to, social movements”.118 It would also have to 
disseminate “mobilizing information”119 that allows it to engage with social movements 
and incite political change. In the course of his argument, he presented Downing’s 
account which explains that alternative media “become specialized additions to the 
established media” when they act “within the general spectrum of established 
politics”.120 He then built on that to conclude that al-Jazeera’s politicized news 
production is an “example of alterity mainstreamed”,121 as it presents a 
counterhegemonic form of information monopoly rather than an alternative to 
mainstream media. This, however, proved to be imprecise during the Arab uprisings, as 
al-Jazeera’s engagement with events did not dismiss the social movements calling for 
change. Rather, its reporting was intentionally meant to provide its audience with forms 
of motivational framing, as shall be explained and discussed in later chapters.  
Al-Jazeera’s ability to impact the Arab public sphere stemmed from various 
factors. The first relates to the interplay that the channel has managed to create with its 
audience. Zayani argued that Arab viewers have developed “interactive habits which 
(made) them more than mere passive recipients”.122 Al-Jazeera played a substantial role 
in developing these habits. In this regard, Miles asserted that the channel has 
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“significantly expanded the parameters of debate (even) within families”.123 One could 
accordingly assume that the reconstruction of the Arab public sphere was a natural 
consequence of this interactive process, as the sphere’s evolution was mainly reliant on a 
vibrant discourse regarding current political affairs. 
A second factor is that relating to the channel’s highly developed technical 
capabilities and well established journalistic standards. As mentioned earlier, al-Jazeera 
was the first network to issue a code of ethics in the Arab World, following American 
pressures and criticism regarding its coverage of post-Saddam Iraq.124 The network often 
emphasized its distinction in this regard, as notions of objectivity were employed to 
advertise its output and to promote its coverage as being more reflective of reality than 
that of others. 
However, the aforementioned is undermined by the third factor expanding al-
Jazeera’s leverage within the Arab public sphere: its tendency to adhere to the Arab 
public opinion and to the latter’s accounts of grand regional issues. Al-Jazeera’s 
engagement with the Palestinian cause has demonstrated this fact ever since the 
channel’s advent. The same goes for the outlet’s reporting on the siege of Iraq and the 
subsequent American war and occupation. In the professional sense, this is problematic 
because mirroring public opinion usually comes on the expense of applying journalistic 
standards. Asserting this idea, Fandy argued that many of the channel’s reporters and 
anchors often cross the line separating journalism from political activism.125 After 
analyzing the content of several shows broadcast on al-Jazeera, Fandy concluded that the 
“national origins and ideological leanings of Arab journalists shape the way the stories 
are reported to audiences”.126 Yet this inclination was not only an individual 
phenomenon, but also an institutional one. In this regard, Fandy thought of al-Jazeera as 
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“the voice of the alliance between Arab Nationalists and Islamists”.127 The channel’s 
editorial policy accordingly followed a Pan Arab and Pan Islamist line.  
A fourth factor with a similar counter effect on objective journalistic standards 
relates to al-Jazeera’s inflammatory tone regarding controversial issues. Providing the 
audience with inciting coverage has destabilized the channel’s equilibrium on various 
occasions. Zayani, for instance, explained how the network’s coverage of 
demonstrations opposing Arab governments was often of a reductionist nature, as such 
protests were frequently portrayed as representative of the public opinion at large.128 
Others underscored the distortions resulting from the channel’s sensational coverage of 
events and its tendency to “create a background with subtle binaries indicating who the 
wrong and right parties are”.129 Yet many observers and spectators have hailed the 
channel’s unconventional means of raising contentious issues. Sakr emphasized the 
advantages of al-Jazeera’s breach of established norms as she argued that the network 
“made few concessions to sensitive egos worried about tarnished images or ridicule”.130 
In the same context, Miles quoted the network’s veteran anchor Faisal al-Kasim saying 
“I like de-iconizing icons” in his justification of the often provocative tone he uses on 
his weekly show al-Ittijah al-Mu’akis.131 This policy of de-iconizing and of breaking 
taboos established al-Jazeera’s reputation as an outlet that offers alternative depictions of 
reality and that defies existing structures of power. The Qatari network successfully 
invested in this policy for years before deploying it as a potent tool for deconstructing 
authoritative regime representations during the Arab uprisings. This policy was 
amplified by its guest intellectuals; a factor that none of the abovementioned 
contributions engages with.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Ibid, 130.  
128 Zayani, The Al-Jazeera Phenomenon, 22. 
129 Rinnawi, Instant Nationalism, 123. 
130 Sakr, Satellite Realms, 130.  
131 Miles, Al Jazeera, 40. 
	   53	  
The views aforementioned highlight the role of televised media in shaping public 
discourse and in constructing certain representations of reality and promoting them on 
the expense of others. A realist perspective adds to this account a dimension that relates 
media outlets to regional power discourse. In this regard, and despite substantial 
differences in style and news content, the main Arabic speaking news networks were 
generally viewed as extensions of regional power structures promoting individual state 
policies. In the following, we examine the relationship between al-Jazeera and its 
sponsoring state, Qatar, as well as the forms of investment in al-Jazeera’s output that 
serve Doha’s foreign policy, as seen by several scholars. 
Al-Jazeera as a Qatari investment 
This research investigates the processes of meaning construction via al-Jazeera 
and does not primarily reflect on the network’s relationship with its sponsoring state and 
its deployment in regional power discourse. Nevertheless, and for the purpose of 
understanding the political context in which the outlet operates, we present this 
background of al-Jazeera’s relationship with its partisan state, Qatar, and its role in 
interstate conflict, as portrayed by several accounts. This presentation also helps explain 
the chain linking al-Jazeera’s intellectuals to the network itself, and the latter, as an 
institutional intellectual, to its partisan state, Qatar. It furthermore helps underscore the 
limitations of existing accounts regarding the issue, as none of them involves the 
possible deployment of individual intellectuals on al-Jazeera to mediate messages that 
mirror Qatar’s regional policies.   
The proliferation of satellite news networks introduced new means for political 
debate and enhanced the public’s ability to imagine alternative political possibilities in 
the Arab World. Notwithstanding, most news outlets, as shown earlier, were extensions 
of regional players or reliant on their sponsorship. Fandy contends that most Arab 
televisions “are state constructions superimposed on the societies over which they 
rule”.132 Sakr adds that the “arrival of satellite channels did not in itself rupture the 
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relations of patronage that had previously dominated the region’s television output”.133 
Al-Jazeera marked no exception to this form of patronage. Yet the network’s editorial 
style and margin of independence on the one hand, and the immense political outcomes 
of its coverage on the other, distinguished it from all of its Arabic speaking counterparts. 
After years of accumulating leverage in terms of shaping public opinion, al-Jazeera 
proved to be a potent Qatari investment, as it vitally engaged in formulating public 
discourse during the Arab uprisings. 
Qatar’s sponsorship of al-Jazeera was remarkably different from any other form 
of partisan relationship joining other Arab states to their official media outlets. This 
difference was established since the network’s very early days. Upon the launching of 
al-Jazeera, the Qatari government abolished the Ministry of Information that was 
responsible for censorship. Its bold step constituted a precedent in the Arab World and 
was praised by many observers,134 as it was thought to be part of the Emir’s progressive 
reform of the state after seizing power in a bloodless coup against his father in 1995. 
The Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, particularly stated that the government’s 
decision conformed to his scheme of transforming the state into a parliamentary 
democracy.135 Fandy contests this claim as he argues that al-Jazeera “is simply Qatar’s 
Information Ministry with a new name and a new agenda”.136 His argument is based on 
two facts; the first pertaining to the network’s managerial structure and means of 
administrative control, as it was headed by Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani, a key 
figure in the Qatari ruling family and former Ministry of Information, and the second 
relating to the network’s financial support, as its budget was provided by the Qatari state 
itself. Zayani presents a different viewpoint as he suggests that the channel has relative 
autonomy in terms of outlining its editorial policies, albeit it is sponsored and financed 
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by Qatar.137 Nevertheless, he asserts that Doha instrumentally deploys the network for 
its own long-term projects. Accordingly, he thinks of al-Jazeera as “a showpiece of the 
Emir” that symbolizes his modernizing strategy and his aim to enhance the Emirate’s 
profile on the regional and international arenas.138  
Olivier Da Lage presents an interesting approach in which he relates al-Jazeera’s 
intended outcomes to the disadvantages of Doha’s strategic alliance with Washington. In 
this regard, Da Lage suggests that al-Jazeera and the United States “can be considered 
the twin pillars of Qatar’s diplomacy”:139 the highly credible and reputable network in 
the eyes of a wide Arab audience was meant to counterbalance the side effects of 
hosting America’s largest military base in the Middle East on Qatari soil. This duality 
enabled Qatar to broaden its margins of political maneuver and to elevate its bargaining 
position in regional affairs, as it banked on its ability to formulate an Arab public 
opinion critical of its regional foes to divert the public’s attention from its own sensitive 
issues. This deployment of al-Jazeera, however, was thought to be a two edged sword, 
as it used costly tactics to enhance Doha’s strategic position. Thus Da Lage argued that 
“while in the long run al-Jazeera serves the diplomatic interests of Qatar well, in the 
short run it complicates the tasks of the diplomats of this small emirate”.140 Nonetheless, 
he asserted that such deliberate contradictions in Qatar’s foreign policy strengthen the 
Emirate’s status in terms of regional power discourse, as they result in a double gain; on 
the one hand, they allow the Emirate to protect its security by hosting American troops, 
and on the other, they enhance its soft power capabilities and its ability to harass its 
regional counterparts through al-Jazeera. 
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Oifi added to the aforementioned that Qatar aims to gain political advantages by 
capitalizing on pan-Arab and pan-Islamic sentiments to serve its interests,141 yet he 
believed that al-Jazeera’s impact on the Arab mediascape “is unlikely to give Qatar 
long-lasting political advantages”.142 Yet he underscored the immense impact of al-
Jazeera on the Arab political system as a whole – which could be thought of as a Qatari 
objective in itself. In this regard, the network has breached conventional standards of 
compliance with the notion of “Arab solidarity”, which, like ethics codification, actually 
denote adherence to political restraint. Al-Jazeera was thus a means to penetrate the 
Arab state system by emphasizing the presence of a public sphere independent of Arab 
state policies and their formal relations. In Oifi’s words, “playing public opinion against 
the solidarity of Arab diplomacy, Qatar has managed to disturb in irremediable ways the 
nature and logic of Arab relationships”.143  
 Al-Jazeera’s output has also been examined in the context of Doha’s need to 
deter foreign threats and balance against tendencies to establish regional hegemony. In 
this regard, Fandy presented a pervasive overview of Arab media discourse to suggest 
that satellite networks serve as tools for proxy wars, in the sense that their 
“programming is driven by intra-regional conflicts, including rivalries between state 
actors”.144 Accordingly, Fandy argued that Qatar deploys al-Jazeera to promote a 
dissident Islamist discourse. By hosting prominent Islamic figures affiliated with the 
Muslim Brotherhood like Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi, both as residents and frequent 
guests on its media outlet, the small emirate tries to balance the Islamic credentials of 
neighboring Saudi Arabia and Iran.145 Thus, through al-Jazeera, it maintains strong 
relations with popular Islam without jeopardizing its connections with the United States. 
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The role that al-Jazeera played during the Arab uprisings by far exceeded all its 
previous contributions to Arab political discourse. Its sympathetic tone regarding 
political Islam enhanced the leverage of its framing processes as mentioned above and 
shall further be explained later. Yet the active engagement of its intellectuals with the 
discourse to construct alternative social realities in accordance with Qatar’s visions 
emerged in the wake of the uprising in Egypt. Hence, it was only normal that this form 
of engagement was not addressed by any of the scholarly studies on al-Jazeera previous 
to the uprisings, nor was the intellectuals’ instrumental use by Qatar in the course of 
achieving geopolitical goals. 
Fandy once argued	  that the network’s ability to harshly criticize Arab regimes is 
“a result of Qatar’s breakaway from the Arab regional security system and its complete 
dependence on the United States”.146 He added that the channel’s rhetoric is primarily 
affected by Doha’s rivalry with Riyadh;147 a standpoint that was shared by Oifi who 
related al-Jazeera’s identity and editorial line to its assigned role in strengthening the 
Qatari regime and consolidating its regional status particularly in opposition to KSA, in 
addition to affirming its international presence and its recognition by Washington as a 
main regional ally.148 It was no wonder, then, that Qatari-Saudi relations improved after 
al-Jazeera toned down its criticism of Riyadh’s royal family starting 2009.149 Doha’s 
profitable investment in al-Jazeera has also driven some scholars to compare the 
network’s influence with Qatar’s actual capabilities in terms of human resources and in 
the context of regional geopolitics. In this regard, Iskandar and el-Nawary suggest that 
the power held by the network in the Middle East is “asymmetrical to Qatar’s actual 
leverage in the international arena”.150 Nevertheless, the gulf emirate was able to expand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Ibid, 53. 
147 Ibid, 58. 
148 Oifi, The Al-Jazeera Phenomenon, 69. 
149 Robert Booth, “Wikileaks cables claim al-Jazeera changed coverage to suit Qatari foreign policy”, the 
Guardian, 6 December, 2010. 
150 Iskandar and El-Nawary, Al Jazeera,32. 
	   58	  
its soft power by banking on al-Jazeera’s outreach to millions of Arab viewers. The 
Qatari network has thus allowed Doha to maximize its benefit of the massive financial 
wealth it possesses and to compensate for its limited human resources and lack of 
heritage regarding active participation in regional power discourse.  
Understanding the relationship between Qatar and al-Jazeera is important for any 
research that aims to examine the network’s engagement with public discourse in the 
Arab World. Whether this relation is merely instrumental or fairly balanced, its outcome 
involves both, the network and its partisan state. Due to its administrative structures and 
means of financing earlier discussed, al-Jazeera’s role cannot by any means surpass 
Qatari national interests nor can it be autonomous from Doha’s regime calculations. 
This, for example, explains why Arab regimes targeted by al-Jazeera’s coverage during 
the uprisings often accused Qatar of conspiring in response to the network’s provocative 
coverage. Yet apart from few references to the regimes’ reactions toward al-Jazeera and 
the role that the outlet’s personnel played in connecting Libyan dissidents to Qatari 
officials, we do not dissect the relationship between the network and its partisan state 
further in the following chapters. This is because our research examines al-Jazeera’s 
forms of engagement with events during the Arab uprisings rather than its instrumental 
deployment by its sponsoring state and the latter’s political benefits from this 
deployment. 
 Conclusion 
 The relationship between media and politics has grown in terms of complexity 
and mutual impact, as cross-border communication underwent revolutionary 
advancements in the digital age we live in today. The impact of televised media on 
politics has been of a domestic and international nature. Often, it has resulted in shaping 
a public opinion that pressured governments to alter their policies. This has proven to be 
the case in democratic societies on various occasions. In states ruled by autocratic 
regimes, media outlets broadcasting from abroad have sometimes been able to promote 
the public’s urge for change and to play a role in mobilizing masses under this pretext. 
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The Arab World, however, was governed by a set of conditions and particularities that 
distinguished it from other regional contexts. Its political permeability and linguistic 
commonalities allowed Arabic speaking satellite media outlets that emerged in the early 
1990s to address Arab audiences residing in different states yet carrying shared 
concerns. Nonetheless, it wasn’t before al-Jazeera’s advent in 1996 that the Arab 
mediascape witnessed a radical turn in terms of output, as the Qatari sponsored channel 
engaged in promoting an unconventional media discourse critical of Arab regimes and 
sympathetic with dissident political claims.  
 Al-Jazeera’s ability to construct an Arab public sphere where controversial 
political concerns were addressed in an unprecedented manner did not come without a 
price, as the channel faced various forms of harassment by different Arab authorities as 
shown in this chapter. However, it is precisely this vital engagement with public affairs 
that broadened the channel’s scope of visibility in the Arab World and allowed it to 
attain international recognition. Al-Jazeera’s leverage in terms of shaping an Arab public 
discourse was gradually achieved throughout the 15 years prior to the outburst of the 
Arab uprisings and has often been placed in the context of Qatar’s desire to enhance its 
soft power capabilities vis-à-vis other regional players, KSA being the first and foremost 
until 2009. Thereafter, the channel’s engagement with the popular uprisings that erupted 
late in 2010 marked the peak of its leverage. Various forms of framing and narrative 
construction were presented throughout its coverage. Articulate intellectuals who 
introduced a potent and engaging rationale with the popular discourse carried out this 
task, as shall be demonstrated in our case studies in chapters 4 and 5. This intellectual 
engagement had not been previously addressed in any of the scholarly contributions on 
al-Jazeera. In the next chapter, we shall present the theoretical framework that we intend 








This chapter aims to construct a theoretical framework based on three bodies of 
literature; the first pertaining to the sociology of intellectuals, the second to framing and 
social movements, and the third to language and social constructivism. The first of these 
bodies underscores the relationship between intellectuals and social classes and 
classifies intellectuals under distinct categories for that matter. This taxonomy shall 
outline our understanding of al-Jazeera’s intellectuals as being class-bound, or 
organically connected to the demonstrating masses during the Arab uprisings. It 
identifies the relationship between the third element in our matrix (intellectuals) and the 
first two (the media and the public). The second and third bodies of literature highlight 
the processes of interaction between the three elements aforementioned; one of them 
introduces the concept of framing and the various modes of engagement with social 
movements under this theoretical framework, and the other explicates how social 
realities are created through linguistic practices. Both serve in providing us with a 
conceptual tool for understanding how the processes of regime delegitimation took place 
in Egypt and Libya, as shall later be demonstrated. 
As previously shown, the relationship between media and social realities has 
been approached in different ways by scholars belonging to various schools of thought 
and fields of social sciences. Televised media, our subject of study here, has mainly been 
depicted as a form of message production, transmission, and propagation through image 
and text representations. News coverage was accordingly thought to be a distorted 
narration of reality rather than a mere dissemination of information. However, the 
impact of media representations on the public, as shown by Habermas and later relevant 
contributions as well as by McLuhan and Baudrillard, was rarely associated with 
intellectual content. The literature on framing and social movements partially fills this 
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gap, especially the one explaining how collective action frames are delivered to 
audiences via media platforms. Yet even this theoretical framework was short of 
explicating how intellectual contributions pertain to the construction of social realities. 
John Searle’s sociolinguistic theory, on the other hand, adequately addresses the issue of 
social reality construction, only irrespective of the tools used to achieve that. In our 
thesis, the tools used in this regard during the Arab uprisings were a media outlet (al-
Jazeera) and its regularly hosted intellectuals. This chapter engages with all the 
aforementioned complementary explanatory models as a means to unpack the matrix 
comprising a powerful media outlet, articulate intellectuals, and protesting masses. 
The chapter thus opens by presenting a taxonomy of intellectuals basing on the 
nature of their relationship with different social classes. Al-Jazeera’s intellectual input 
and that of its guest commentators is associated with one of these taxonomies. It then 
unpacks the literature on framing and social movements, and highlights the various 
framing processes that influence public behavior regarding inflammatory political 
issues. Finally, it presents a sociolinguistic explanation of social constructivism. This 
explanation is used in later chapters as a means to expound how al-Jazeera’s intellectuals 
capitalized on image representations of the Arab uprisings to deconstruct regime 
narratives and empower an opposing rationale. In the following, we introduce the 
different kinds of intellectuals and their relationship to social sectors, as a means to 
classify al-Jazeera’s intellectual output and to further clarify its contribution to the 
popular uprisings. 
Al-Jazeera’s organic intellectuals  
As this research tackles the complex process of narrative construction and 
promotion presented by al-Jazeera during the Arab uprisings, it elucidates the interplay 
between the network, the ideational constructs presented by its guest intellectuals, and 
the protesting masses acting within a dynamic public sphere. The research highlights the 
interactive process between those three fields in the course of answering its principle 
question: How did al-Jazeera’s intellectual engagements with the Arab popular uprisings 
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contribute to the deconstruction of social realities and to the promotion of alternative 
political possibilities? 
The question presented above introduces an element of intellectuality to the 
mediated content of the network under study. This intellectual ingredient reveals a new 
way of understanding media effect on politics. The argument here is that al-Jazeera was 
performing some sort of intellectual activity using various framing techniques. This was 
achieved by hosting articulate intellectuals to regularly comment on broadcast news, 
interpret its hidden implications, and introduce alternative possibilities to existing 
political realities. These intellectuals have performed an organic role, as we shall later 
explain and demonstrate. They have actively engaged with the popular discourse and 
have acted as producers and propagators of potent oratory that sought regime 
delegitimation. Their task could not have been carried out transnationally had it not been 
for their televised interplay with tens of millions of Arab spectators. They have built 
their constructs on powerful broadcast images, and this has allowed them to maximize 
their impact on mass perceptions and collective cognition. If one were to draw on 
Baudrillard’s	  ideas regarding image creation, one could think of televised intellectuals as 
agents capitalizing on al-Jazeera’s hyperreality to deconstruct authoritative legacies and 
legitimize an opposing rationale.  
Not much work has been done regarding media and intellectuals. The 
contributions in this regard have merely touched on the subject without presenting a 
novel inquiry. In the 1990s, Kellner argued that “intellectuals who wish to intervene in 
the new public spheres need to deploy new communications media to participate in 
democratic debate and to shape the future of contemporary societies and culture”.151 
This brings us back to the distinction earlier presented between interactive publics and 
media publics. Such associations between intellectuals and the public sphere, however, 
did not introduce thorough elaborations on the subject. The case of al-Jazeera that this 
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research explores, on the other hand, constitutes an expressive demonstration of the 
additions that intellectuals can give to media texts and imagery as a means to increase 
their effect on the public. It goes beyond earlier scholarly works regarding the matrix 
joining media, politics, and intellectuals, whether in general theory or within the context 
of Arab mediascapes. 
When introducing the element of intellectuality, one should define what is meant 
by the term, what types of intellectuals relate to the aims of this research, and what 
should be ruled out in terms of meaning and classification. It is also important to discuss 
the aforementioned organicity of intellectuals, since the term organic intellectual is 
initially a Marxist description that Antonio Gramsci introduced to explore a certain kind 
of intellectuals who take part in intrastate class conflict.  
In The Sociology of Intellectuals, Kurzman and Owens provide a broad definition 
of intellectuals. They describe them as “producers or transmitters of culture or ideas, or 
members of either category who engage in public issues”.152 They follow that by 
presenting a taxonomy that emerged in the 1920s, in which intellectuals were sorted into 
three categories: as an independent class, as class-bound, and as class-less. Gramsci’s 
recognition of the intellectuals’ organic role stemmed from this trinary taxonomy: he 
viewed them as class-bound individuals having a social function. This function was 
contingent on social class dialectics, as each of the bourgeois and the proletariat 
produced its own intellectuals who actively took part in promoting the interests of the 
class they identify themselves with.153  
The assumption that intellectuals form an independent class, on the other hand, 
was introduced by Benda then developed by further contributions to the topic, including 
Bourdieu’s account of intellectuals as “free floating” and as forming their own 
autonomous sphere. Bourdieu’s reference to an “intellectual field” binding intellectuals 
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and their activity was totally dismissive of Gramsci’s idea of social organicity. It was 
rather focused on their “independence of religious, political, economic or other 
powers”.154 
The third category of intellectuals that neither of the first two accounts 
conformed to was that of class-less intellectuals. This account, celebrated by Mannheim, 
Shils and others, discarded the assumption that intellectuals are bound to their class of 
origin as well. Yet it portrayed them as moderators of social debate whereby they 
transcend divisional lines rather than constitute a self-defining class. As such, they were 
thought of as “people concerned with the meaning of symbolic systems rather than with 
the interaction and contention of social groups”.155  
The classification of intellectuals mentioned above is based on the presence or 
the lack of social class contingency. Another way of looking at intellectuals is by 
categorizing them according to their representational power. In Intellectuals: Aesthetics, 
Politics, Academics, a number of scholars presented useful contributions regarding the 
intellectual’s role, its limitations, and its representational validity. The book highlights a 
range of understandings including those of Habermas, Gramsci, Foucoult, and Deleuze. 
In the presented works of Habermas, the role of intellectuals in inducing change 
and crafting its instruments is understood with relevance to a vibrant public sphere. The 
latter frames the debate between communicators whose critical engagement with their 
current affairs allows them to act as catalysts for social transformation.156 Habermas’s 
ideas regarding intellectuals mainly serve in highlighting their role in the public sphere 
formation earlier discussed. However, they do not present a significant insight regarding 
their representational powers. 
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Gramsci’s thoughts, on the other hand, present an interesting approach that this 
research deploys, although they preceded the emergence of new media. His portrayal of 
intellectuals distinguishes between traditional and organic intellectuals. The former are 
not representative of particular social interests, yet they are bound to the institutions of 
the established order, whereas the latter act as “historical agents” that articulate the 
concerns of hegemonic or counterhegemonic classes.157 Gramsci emphasizes the role of 
organic intellectuals as “functionaries”158 of the social fabric they interact with, and as 
“persuaders” who bear historical and political liability.159 In his proposed mode of 
intellectual participation, each historical agent acts as a “constructor, organizer and 
permanent persuader”, rather than “just a simple orator”.160 Accordingly, the organic 
process is “bound by an intellectuals-mass dialectic”.161 Gramsci’s organic form of 
intellectual output is thus representational, since the functions of a class-bound 
intellectual in terms of narrative construction and organization involve representing the 
needs and demands of the social class in question.  
Gramsci’s account of intellectuals diverges from that of Foucault and Deleuze 
since the latter stress postrepresentational politics, undermining representation and 
condemning universal intellectuals for being archaic. In their view, the vanguardist role 
of intellectuals has been replaced by collective discourse with local needs and 
imaginations. Accordingly, the masses no more need to rely on mediators to project their 
thoughts and demands in the form of representation. Rather, they are capable of directly 
transforming their thoughts into action and, subsequently, of replacing theory with 
practice and of acting as specific intellectuals, as opposed to the traditional (and 
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representative) universal intellectuals.162 Foucault thus explains that specific intellectuals 
are individuals who lack representational power and rather enact their local demands 
with no reference to universal guidelines. If we were to project this view on the Arab 
uprisings, we would think of intellectual participation as that pertaining to the role of 
activists on the ground. This view would disarm al-Jazeera’s intellectuals of any role in 
shaping popular discourse through representation.  
Foucault’s notion of the intellectual, like that of Gramsci, thus falls under the 
category of class-bound intellectuals, since his specific intellectuals are involved in the 
discourse as part of the active public. Nevertheless, his notion does not serve the purpose 
of this study, as our research highlights the role of mediated content, whereas Foucault 
decelebrates representational forms of intellectual output. Hence, this rules his model 
out, since media (and intellectuals using media platforms) - by definition - are 
representational. 
This research underscores the role played by al-Jazeera’s intellectuals in shaping 
public discourse during the Arab uprisings, and thus tackles their engagement with 
protesting masses. Deploying Gramsci’s account of the intellectual in this regard could 
be quite problematic, however. One could argue that using Gramsci’s notion of 
organicity in our explanatory model restricts us to a traditional Marxist understanding of 
the relationship between intellectuals and social classes. This does not serve our 
purpose, as al-Jazeera’s intellectuals engaged with class transcendent protests and 
addressed demonstrators regardless of their class of origin. They served in constructing a 
narrative conforming to al-Jazeera’s editorial policies that changed from one country to 
another depending on the calculations of the network’s partisan state, Qatar. An altered 
version of Gramsci’s model is hence useful for the aims of this research, as shall briefly 
be explained in the following. 
Gramsci introduced the idea of class-bound intellectuals as he argued that “every 
social group creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals 
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which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function”.163 Thus, intellectuals 
act as the “group’s deputies” 164 whether in the course of maintaining its social 
hegemony and political domination or in the process of countering both. Yet his Marxist 
account was thereafter developed or reinvented by other philosophers and scholars. In 
this regard, some views stressed “authenticity” rather than “social class” as a theme to 
which intellectuals are bound to regarding their relationship with society. Such accounts 
underscored national, ethnic, and cultural considerations instead of economic ones, 
especially in postcolonial literature. Other views, like those of Ron Eyerman and 
Andrew Jamison, linked intellectuals to social movements in general, thus freeing them 
from identification with static social groups in the first place.165 Accordingly, Gramsci’s 
formulation was “turned on its head: Instead of groups producing their own organic 
intellectuals, intellectuals may be producing their own organic groups”.166 The term 
movement intellectuals was used in this regard to denote the individuals “who through 
their activities articulate the knowledge interests and cognitive identity of social 
movements”.167 Movement intellectuals were therefore class-bounds producers and 
transmitters of ideas - as classified by Kurzman and Owen - and the notion was a 
reinvention of Gramsci’s initial account of organic intellectuals, as it related intellectuals 
to social movements rather than social classes. Our research intends to use the term 
organic in this sense; as one denoting a relation to social movements. What interests us 
here is the agentive function of intellectuals proposed by Gramsci; the fact that they 
engage in a process which is “active rather than descriptive” and where “analysis is 
guided towards strategy”.168 This creative tendency to interact with the public and to 
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counter hegemonic narratives reflects the role played by al-Jazeera’s intellectuals. Their 
organicity is hence a functional one rather than a Marxist social class form of 
identification. 
In summary, the category of class-bound intellectuals having representational 
power best defines the intellectuals that this research wishes to examine. The latter 
performed a televised interplay with demonstrating masses. They were mediated to the 
audience and were thus part of al-Jazeera’s representational output. They acted as 
vanguardist figures reflecting on the discourse from a macrological perspective rather 
than practically engaging with it, which rules Foucault’s model of specific intellectuals 
out. They were also class-bound because they engaged with the uprisings’ mass activity 
and its aspirations, and, subsequently, with the “class” of protesting activists themselves, 
or the counterhegemonic social movements opposing existing regimes in various Arab 
states. The intellectuals thus performed an organic role in the sense that they acted as 
“permanent persuaders” advocating a certain narrative of the uprisings. Their 
contribution impacted mass perceptions and introduced provocative accounts of an 
unfolding popular discourse in the process of delegitimizing regime rationales. The 
mode of narrative construction and deconstruction they presented added to the 
persuasive leverage of al-Jazeera, as it gave further meaning to its broadcast 
hyperreality. It was thus a potent tool for revolutionizing the Arab public sphere. 
Al-Jazeera’s mediated intellectual output can be thought of as a process 
performed by individual figures and their medium as well. This research underscores the 
interplay between those intellectuals and a revolutionary public discourse. The 
intellectuals, acting as “experts in legitimation” (as Gramsci described organic 
intellectuals),169 were constructing narratives that legitimize the need for change, and 
this creative engagement with events was by no means far from Qatar’s foreign policy 
considerations. We base on that to claim that this form of organic intellectuality can be 
stretched further to describe al-Jazeera’s function as a whole. In a sense, the Qatari 
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outlet presented a new form of organic mediation. The network itself, as a collective 
entity, engaged in a complex process of image creation, narrative construction, and 
vibrant interaction with protesting masses. It could thus be thought of as an institutional 
organic intellectual. This concept is similar to Gramsci’s understanding of the collective 
intellectual that he uses in reference to revolutionary parties. It could also be associated 
with Kai Hafez’s description of al-Jazeera as “one of the most important de facto Arab 
political parties”,170 except that political parties are actors in a power struggle whereas 
media are supposedly interactive spheres reflecting and affecting this struggle without 
taking part in it as power seeking actors. Al-Jazeera’s interchange with the Arab public 
sphere and its intellectuals’ ability to “make sense” of events and fuel them with 
political and moral (or religious) incentives presented a new mode of intellectual 
participation in public discourse. The performance of al-Jazeera as an institutional 
organic intellectual will be further clarified in light of our discussion of Searle’s model 
of social constructivism. Yet prior to that, we present the notion of framing and its 
relevance to social movements that we shall later use in analyzing our two case studies.  
Framing and social movements 
The term framing signifies the process of meaning construction. To social 
movement scholars, it is a phenomenon characterized by four main attributes: it is 
active, processual, agentive, and confrontational. It is active because it is based on 
initiative; processual because it entails an evolving process; agentive since it involves 
activists or social movements; and confrontational due to its challenge of other existing 
frames.171  
Because objects have no intrinsic meanings, as Robert Benford explains, 
“meaning is negotiated, contested, modified, articulated, and rearticulated. In short, 
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meaning is constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed”.172 In this context, the process 
of framing involves an interpretive function, as it renders events meaningful by 
“condensing aspects of the world out there”173 and pointing out their significance. The 
outcome of this framing activity is known as collective action frames. These frames are 
“action-oriented sets of beliefs” that “legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social 
movement organization”.174 
Collective action frames are carried out by those who endorse altering existing 
social or political conditions, and are usually challenged by their antagonists through an 
opposing process called counterframing. They enclose three complimentary phases that 
begin with highlighting the causes for dissent in a certain setting and build on that to 
provoke action. During the first phase of this process, activists or social movements 
calling for change in their community diagnose what they believe are problematic 
conditions and identify their sources of causality (players to be blamed and held 
responsible), a step which is known as diagnostic framing. Diagnostic framing allows 
for drawing the line between the protagonists and antagonists of the movement in 
question; the former advocating change and endorsing the diagnosis presented, and the 
latter opposing it and defending the existing order. This step is usually followed by a 
second one termed prognostic framing, in which activists propose solutions for such 
problems, set strategies to engage with them, and design plans to “fix” them. It usually 
includes “refutations of the logic or the efficacy of solutions advocated by opponents as 
well as a rationale for its own remedies”.175 Following that is the third step that 
constitutes a call for collective action, known as motivational framing. This step bases 
on the diagnosis and prognosis presented to incite social mobilization in pursuit of the 
desired change. In this regard, social movement protagonists often amplify (and 
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exaggerate) opportunities that a specific context offers in order to provoke popular 
action.176 The concept of political opportunity is central in understanding and analyzing 
framing processes, as it constitutes a “variable that shapes how challenging groups 
perceive the likelihood of successes”.177 The phase of motivational framing involves 
constructing and articulating vocabularies of motive and thus entails an element of 
agency.178 The articulators acting as agents in our thesis are al-Jazeera’s regularly hosted 
intellectuals. 
As mentioned above, this social activity aiming to alter political realities is rarely 
carried out without facing resistant forms of counterframing. The latter is presented by 
societal sectors endorsing the maintenance of the status quo, and the end result of this 
dialectical process illustrates the extent and forms of change undergone by the society 
concerned. The contentious nature of framing and counterframing forces the 
protagonists and antagonists of social movements to constantly develop their diagnoses 
and prognoses as a means to defend the legitimacy of their demands. During the Arab 
uprisings, the protagonists of demonstrations calling for political change labelled their 
movements as “uprisings” or “revolutions” carried out by “young rebels” aiming for 
“reform”, “democracy”, “social justice” etc. Whereas the counterframes promoted by 
their antagonists claimed that the movements in question were a form of “chaotic 
disorder” resulting from a “conspiracy” and carried out by “thugs” or “extremists” etc. 
In parallel to those diagnostic framing debates, the proposed strategies or prognoses 
offered by both sides changed in accordance with the evolution of the discourse: 
whenever authorities felt they had the upper hand, they withheld or minimized their 
offers for concession; and whenever activists thought their movement was advancing 
and the regime was weakening, they accented their demands and radicalized their tone. 
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The outcome of this discourse is contingent on the potency of the framing 
activity carried out by each side. In this regard, frame resonance is of central 
importance. By frame resonance we mean the significance and impact of articulated 
frames on the targets of mobilization. Frame resonance is measured with reference to 
two main factors: credibility and relative salience. Credibility in turn is dependent on 
three complimentary factors. The first is frame consistency, which means that the beliefs 
and claims of the social movement in question (or its antagonists in the case of 
counterframing) should not be contradictory. The second factor relates to the frame’s 
empirical credibility, which means that the social movement’s applied tactics should be 
consistent with the beliefs and claims articulated. The third factor concerns the 
credibility of frame articulators who, in our case, are al-Jazeera’s guest intellectuals. In 
this regard, the more credible the articulators are, the more persuasive leverage they 
have and, thus, the more potent and outreaching their promoted frames become. As for 
the relative salience of collective action frames, it is measured with reference to the 
targets of mobilization: the more significant the social movement’s beliefs and claims 
are for those targets, the greater possibility there is to mobilize them. This is why 
whenever collective action frames are abstract and detached from everyday experiences, 
their significance for the targets of mobilization decreases, whereas the more relevant 
and applicable they are to their daily lives, the more salient they become. This is referred 
to as the experimental commensurability of collective action frames, or their degree of 
relevance to the actual experiences of individuals or social sectors.179 
Al-Jazeera’s intellectuals deployed various framing techniques in the course of 
their engagement with the Arab uprisings. They used diagnostic framing to point out the 
deficiencies of the contested regimes and to assign blame and responsibility in this 
regard. In each of our case studies, the network’s commentators argued that the whole 
regime is in need of change rather than merely the government or other parts of the 
executive branch. The degree of change promoted varied between Egypt and Libya in 
accordance with the different contextualizing variables and the evolving discourse in 
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each setting. This is why the prognoses suggested ranged from appeasing the military 
and advocating a peaceful resignation of the president in the case of Egypt, and calling 
for defection from the army and for the assassination of the “Leader” in the case of 
Libya. The processes of motivational framing also differed between Egypt and Libya as 
the prognosis diverged, albeit pushing for a full-fledged uprising in both cases.  
Al-Jazeera’s intellectuals engaged in strategic processes through frame bridging 
and frame amplification. Through frame bridging, the network’s guest intellectuals drew 
links between frames pertaining to two different cases having similar attributes. Their 
frequent references to the uprising in Tunisia in the course of commenting on the 
Egyptian uprising serve as a good example in this regard. The aim of this bridging was 
to highlight similarities that would help legitimize the frames they promote basing on 
past experience. Frame amplification, on the other hand, was a technique used to accent 
certain issues and condense their meaning in brief expressions of symbolic implications. 
Slogans such as “the people want to overthrow the regime” were often highlighted in the 
framing processes that al-Jazeera’s intellectuals carried out. Such forms of frame 
amplification served to pinpoint the primary objectives of the social movements in 
question as imagined by al-Jazeera’s intellectuals and to place these objectives under 
strategic guidelines.  
Al-Jazeera’s intellectuals sometimes performed frame disputes whereby they 
argued with other protagonists of the same social movements about the diagnoses and 
prognoses of certain issues. These disputes resulted from divergent viewpoints within 
the same camp regarding the causes of problems that the social movement aims to 
remedy and the proposed forms of action in response. This was especially evident in the 
case of Egypt, where the network’s guest commentator Azmi Bishara engaged in such 
disputes with local Egyptian dissident elites. The disputes primarily revolved around the 
question of whether the uprising should aim to reconstruct the whole regime or whether 
it would suffice to accept partial or gradual change instead.     
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However, the contentious feature of al-Jazeera’s collective action frames was a 
result of inter-movement rather than intra-movement disputes. In this regard, al-
Jazeera’s intellectuals often engaged with counterframing processes in response to 
regime propaganda. In turn, both Egyptian and Libyan authorities targeted the channel 
nonstop in order to undermine its narrative and promote counterframes celebrating their 
policies. This discursive contest was a daily practice that involved various forms of 
framing. Its aim was to construct a potent narrative that delegitimizes that of the 
opponent, proposes solutions, and calls for action.    
The literature on framing and social movements has evolved considerably since 
the mid-1980s. Yet it still suffers from various shortcomings that pioneering scholars in 
the field have confessed. In his critique of the social movement framing perspective, for 
example, Benford points out the abundance of conceptual elaborations on the topic as 
opposed to the scarcity of systematic empirical studies, precisely in terms of 
comparative research,180 a gap that this research partly contributes to filling by 
empirically examining two different cases involving social movement framing with 
varying outcomes. In addition to that, even the existing body of empirical research lacks 
a pervasive understanding of the role of the intellectual-media “alliance” in creating 
collective action frames. Such was the case, for example, in Frames of Protest: Social 
Movements and the Framing Perspective, in which a number of scholars addressed a 
selection of case studies from across the globe that illustrate framing and mobilization 
processes, non-movement framing via the media (rather than social movement framing), 
and framing and political opportunities. 181 On the other hand, the literature that does 
address the role of intellectuals fails in comprehensively situating this role in a media-
related context, and, when it does, it dismisses the element of social construction as a 
potential outcome of meaning construction; an issue that we address in this thesis by 
integrating Searle’s paradigm of social constructivism explained next. This shortcoming, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Benford, “An Insider’s Critique”, 411. 
181 Johnston and Noakes, Frames of Protest. 
	   75	  
for example, could be noticed in the volume on Popular Intellectuals and Social 
Movements.182 
This thesis analyzes the framing processes carried out by al-Jazeera’s guest 
intellectuals with an aim to crystallize a narrative that serves in delegitimizing existing 
regimes and discrediting their policies. Various forms of framing and counterframing 
were employed in this discourse by the social movements’ protagonists and antagonists 
in Egypt and Libya. Our reference to the concept of framing is meant to explicate the 
modes of meaning construction in this regard. However, it falls short of linking the 
creation of meaning to social reality construction. In the following, we present John 
Searle’s account of constructed social realities and deploy it as a theoretical framework 
to explain how the intellectuals’ articulations on al-Jazeera served in both, 
deconstructing regimes institutions and promoting alternative political possibilities.  
The construction of social realities  
Our research aims to interpret the complex relationship between media, 
intellectuals, and political discourse in the Arab World during its recent popular 
uprisings. The fact that media representations were established through broadcast 
imagery and linguistic practices suggests the need to deploy an explanatory model that 
highlights their significance in relation to political realities. We have already engaged 
with the literature pertaining to the power of broadcast imagery. In the following, we 
introduce John Searle’s model explaining how realities are socially constructed to 
further unravel this matrix and systematically engage with the linguistic practices (that 
take the form of intellectual articulations) it comprises. 
In The Construction of Social Reality, Searle distinguishes between brute facts 
and institutional facts. The former are independent of human constructs of 
representation whereas the latter’s existence is contingent on human made institutions - 
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particularly the institution of language.183 Searle’s account stresses “the logical priority 
of brute facts over institutional facts”,184 since brute facts constitute the basic building 
blocks of every institutional fact. Brute facts, as defined by Searle, are ontologically 
objective. They do not rely on external factors to satisfy their characteristic features 
since they exist regardless of any form of representation. They are subjects with self-
defining characteristics that social descriptions do not construct nor alter. A rock, for 
example, does not fulfill its definition as such through representation. Its properties are 
rather ontologically “real”.  Institutional facts, on the other hand, are ontologically 
subjective even though they are generally epistemically	  objective. They are ontologically 
subjective due to their dependence on (subjective) human constructs of representation, 
without which they have no social meaning. At the same time, they are generally 
epistemically objective because the meaning “imposed” on them by such representations 
does not vary with the variance of the individuals perceiving them. This is because their 
meaning, even though a human construct, is acquired through collective social 
recognition.185 
One could further understand the distinctions aforementioned through the 
following illustration: the existence of a piece of wood is a brute fact. It is ontologically 
objective. It exists regardless of socially constructed definitions of it. The fact that 
several pieces of wood constitute a table is a social	  fact (or institutional fact). This fact is 
ontologically subjective: we choose to call it a table due to the meaning we impose on it 
and the function we give it in a social context. It is not a table by mere existence. It is 
also epistemically objective, as, due to the collective social recognition of it as a table 
acquiring a certain function, it does not bear any other meaning or form of 
representation. Thus, a table is an ontologically subjective yet epistemically objective 
fact, as most other institutional facts are.  
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To Searle, the linguistic element, which is a form of representation, is partly 
constitutive of social (or institutional) facts, as it provides these facts with meaning. The 
idea here is that “the capacity to attach sense, a symbolic function, to an object that does 
not have that sense intrinsically is the precondition (…) of all institutional reality”.186 
Language, thus, gives birth to meaning, and the latter establishes social realities that 
would never have been existent had it not been for certain “symbolic devices, such as 
words, that by convention mean or represent or symbolize something beyond 
themselves”.187 
A more complex example of an institutional fact created through the institution 
of language is that of declaring war. Such a declaration, mainly resulting from linguistic 
performances, is constitutive of reality - that of war - and has consequences in terms of 
casualties, destruction, and other ontologically objective brute facts. As Searle explains, 
“a very large number of institutional facts can be created by explicit performative 
utterances”.188 War is one of them. The government declaring war is an institutional fact 
itself. It is a collective expression of a staff of ministers. During the crisis, each minister 
acts after the declaration of war in accordance to the power given to him or her. This 
power results from the meaning imposed on another institutional fact - that of being a 
minister - and the function assigned to this socially constructed reality. Accordingly, the 
Minister of Defense, basing on certain constitutional provisions (that also constitute 
institutional facts themselves), can issue decrees relating to the state’s security. Decrees, 
usually taking the form of documents, are institutional facts as well because the power 
they have results from the meaning assigned to them that has gained social acceptance. 
We can further deconstruct the elements in this example until we reach the very basic 
brute facts of which such institutional facts and their less complex institutional 
compositions are made up of. This account introduces a useful method to uncover the 
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very basic elements that have been socially redefined (or represented), in a structural and 
hierarchical order, thus giving birth to institutional facts that frame social relations.  
The abovementioned example demonstrates a central idea introduced by Searle, 
through which he emphasizes that, in order to produce meaning, “institutional facts 
cannot exist in isolation but only in a set of systematic relations to other facts”.189 He 
accordingly asserts that the “structure of institutional facts is a structure of power 
relations”.190 In this sense, institutional facts form the building blocks of society. Their 
mere existence results from the meanings assigned to brute facts or other less complex 
institutional facts which - in turn - follow the same mechanism of meaning imposition to 
attain their own existence. Accordingly, the meaning imposition on facts, rendering them 
institutional, is creative of social order and constructive of its hierarchies and relations. 
Searle sums up his argument by asserting that the “decisive step in the creation of social 
reality is the collective intentional imposition of function on entities that cannot perform 
those functions without that imposition”.191 This statement is represented by the formula 
of X counts as Y in c; X being the entity in question, Y being the human constructs of 
representation assigning a status and a function to this entity, and c being the context in 
which this entity functions. Thus, in Searle’s words: 
“Humans, through collective intentionality, impose functions on phenomena 
where the function cannot be achieved solely in virtue of physics and chemistry, but 
requires continued human cooperation in the specific forms of recognition, acceptance, 
and acknowledgement of a new status to which a function is assigned. This is the 
beginning point of all institutional forms of human culture, and it must always have the 
structure of X counts as Y in c”.192 
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Searle’s model emphasizes the role of language in constructing social realities, 
yet it does not repudiate realist arguments. The discussion pertaining to social 
constructivism versus realism does not concern us here. However, his methodology for 
explaining the process of reality construction in the social world is beneficial for the 
purpose of this study. As previously explained, to Searle, institutional facts are language 
contingent,193 and the “move from the brute to the institutional status is a linguistic 
move, because the X term now symbolizes something beyond itself”.194 Language is thus 
a form of representation that attaches meaning to facts, making them institutional or 
socially constructed. This imposition of function requires collective intentionality or 
social acceptance.195 And when the status-functions imposed on a certain set of facts are 
no more collectively recognized, institutional facts simply lose meaning and therefore 
collapse. The disintegration of the Soviet Union is a large-scale illustration of this 
argument. According to Searle, the communist model collapsed because the system of 
status-functions imposed on institutional facts no more bore collective recognition.196 In 
other words, a whole regime of symbolic representations was gradually hollowed until it 
lost its social significance. This research highlights a similar process of regime 
delegitimation that took place during the Arab popular uprisings. And by regime, we 
mean both senses of the word: a system of representations, and a governing body that 
has for long maintained manufactured social consent regarding its own perceptions and 
representations of reality. 
In the course of the uprisings, mediated intellectual output played a significant 
role in verbalizing the meanings and implications of daily transformations and in 
injecting the active masses with further incentives to pursue political change. It 
incorporated two simultaneous processes of narrative construction and deconstruction. 
The first suggested an alternative mode of legitimacy, and the second conveyed 
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delegitimizing rhetoric of the established order. In this mediated war of representations 
between the uprisings’ protagonists and antagonists, the legitimacy of certain conceptual 
schemes was questioned. The promotional narratives presented by Arab regimes to 
protract their status quo were challenged by graphic illustrations of brute facts that 
discredit this narrative and by powerful oratory that serves to propose alternative 
institutional facts to existing ones. The expansion of protests proved that the regimes’ 
authoritarian propaganda and rhetorical constructs of suppression were weaker than the 
various forms of articulations promoting these alternative political possibilities. 
The rhetorical constructs promoted by al-Jazeera’s intellectuals were meant to 
void the narratives of the regimes in question and prove their falsity. Various techniques 
were deployed in this regard to attain this intended goal. One could accordingly identify 
a number of linguistic categories that serve to clarify the techniques used by al-Jazeera’s 
intellectuals. The first involves mockery and ridicule whereby the regimes and their 
leading figures were targeted by contemptuous language in order to demean them in the 
eyes of the public involved in the revolutionary discourse. This method contributed to 
deconstructing the authoritative image that the regimes had managed to create and 
sustain for decades, and was therefore used to counter the authorities’ tools of 
intimidation and to “break the wall of fear” that had handicapped large portions of the 
population in Egypt and Libya. In the case of Egypt, al-Jazeera and its commentators 
used satire to mock the president’s account of constitutional legitimacy and his 
depictions of the uprising as a form of conspiracy. Through ridicule, they also 
disparaged his status-function as a president with absolute political power. The tone used 
regarding president Mubarak’s deputy Omar Suleiman was demeaning as well, precisely 
when it came to his “lack of charisma” and his propagation of the “misleading” 
dichotomy of chaos versus stability that was meant to prolong the regime’s status quo. 
The same applies to Libya, only with more intensity, as Mo’ammar Gaddafi, or the 
Leader, was depicted as an insane character whose arguments lacked logical rigor. His 
ideology, attitude, and language were overtly demeaned on multiple occasions as a 
means to de-iconize his stature and delegitimize his authority.  
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The second technique used was that which involved demonizing the foe. This 
was especially evident in the case of Libya, as the vocabulary deployed to describe 
events was meant to serve a narrative of “good versus evil”. This was not hard to attain 
given the regime’s unconcealed aggression in terms of language and action alike. Thus 
was the usage of terms like mercenaries and warlords by al-Jazeera’s guests to depict 
Gaddafi, his sons, and their loyalists, as opposed to the recurrent emphasis on terms like 
the Libyan people in the course of describing armed rebels and political dissidents in 
order to legitimize their narrative and forms of action, and to present them as coinciding 
with a collective intentionality aiming to uproot the existing political order. The same 
goes for the commentators’ emphasis on Gaddafi’s character as one reflective of 
megalomania and narcissism.  
The third linguistic category involves the usage of imperative verbs that were 
meant to reinforce action as part of the guests’ motivational framing processes and to 
restrict the protesters’ forms of action to certain desired means. This was especially 
obvious in the commentaries of both Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi and Sheikh Ali al-
Sallabi. In the case of Egypt, for example, al-Qaradawi used a deterministic tone 
accenting the certainty of triumph yet insisted on peaceful means to achieve that. Thus 
was his emphasis that damaging public and private property and resorting to violence 
were religiously forbidden or haram. Things were different, however, in the case of 
Libya, as not only did al-Qaradawi and al-Sallabi hail protesters for their endurance, but 
also called for defection from the regime’s political, diplomatic, military, and security 
institutions and for resisting the regime’s use of force. Al-Qaradawi also issued a fatwa 
that called for the physical extermination of Gaddafi as a means to dismantle the 
regime’s institutional facts by using forceful means.  
The fourth category of linguistic devices used is relevant to the abovementioned, 
as it involves the clerics’ glorification of martyrdom in the course of resisting the Libyan 
regime’s use of brute force. For that, al-Qaradawi and al-Sallabi deployed citations from 
the Quran as well as Islamic litanies to lift the spirits of the rebels and to extol the 
utmost price that one could pay in the quest for freedom. Motivational frames were 
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accordingly used to emphasize the worthiness of sacrifice in the process of 
deconstructing social realities, as its outcomes comprise of a worldly progression of the 
Muslim community as a whole, and of heavenly returns for individual martyrs.  
In the course of the aforementioned, this research applies Searle’s conceptual 
framework in order to demonstrate how the Egyptian and Libyan regimes’ institutional 
facts targeted by al-Jazeera and its intellectuals were voided from their persuasive 
leverage through simultaneous mechanisms of meaning construction and deconstruction. 
It explores the means through which the status-functions of certain regime institutions 
were demeaned and pictured as irrational, archaic, unethical, and conflicting with 
collective social interests. The aim was to disarm them from the element of collective 
intentionality. A parallel process was presented in which alternative institutions having 
different status-functions were proposed and propagated. The research accordingly 
presents an analysis of the language used by al-Jazeera’s guest intellectuals in this 
regard. It examines this language, its implications, and its relevance to political 
transformations during the uprisings in the states concerned.  
Searle’s model thus complements the conceptual tools provided by the literature 
on framing and social movements. It helps explain how the deconstruction of Arab 
social realities was achieved through processes of meaning construction. It expounds 
how linguistic articulations served in voiding regime institutional facts (in the case of 
Egypt) and state institutional facts (in the case of Libya) from their previously 
recognized social statuses and functions. The concept of framing and its derivatives, on 
the other hand, clarify the methods applied in the course of constructing this meaning, 
and the means through which constructed meanings were negotiated, contested, and 
articulated by al-Jazeera’s intellectuals. This thesis thus deploys a multi-faceted 
theoretical model to explain the intricate process that al-Jazeera has engaged in through 
its guest intellectuals to deconstruct social realities. It builds on this analysis to introduce 
two main theoretical contributions. The first pertains to the role that a media outlet could 
play - as an institutional organic intellectual – in connection to social movements, and 
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the second to the ability of mediated intellectual articulations to deconstruct existing 
social realities.   
 Conclusion  
This chapter constructs a theoretical framework for our research. It addresses the 
process of framing and social reality construction through intellectual articulations on a 
potent media platform during the Arab popular uprisings. The chapter opens by outlining 
the different categories of intellectuals and their relationship with social classes and 
movements. The notion of organicity and the process of framing are presented to define 
the role of al-Jazeera’s intellectuals - as individuals - and the channel - as an institution – 
in addition to the forms of both their engagements with the popular uprisings. The 
theoretical frameworks relevant to framing and social movements serve to illuminate the 
methods used for meaning construction and mass mobilization. Next, John Searle’s 
account of social reality construction is introduced to relate the various forms of 
meaning creation to the actual dismantling of institutional facts, and the propagation of 
alternative political realities in the phase following the expected downfall of Arab 
regimes.  
This theoretical framework thus associates the recreation of social realities with 
articulations of organic intellectuals who use language to provide facts with meaning 
and base their articulations on image representations of the Arab discourse. Needless to 
say, the social realities this research addresses are of a political nature, whereas the link 
it aims to draw is that relating al-Jazeera’s intellectuals to the social movements calling 
for change. This link lies in an imagined sphere in which the audience is a group of 
potential political actors protesting on the ground, whereas the audience constitutes a 
media public that acts within the space comprising communicative and interchanging 
processes of social debate. In the next chapter, we introduce our first case study, Egypt, 
and explain how al-Jazeera contributed, through its intellectual output, to the 
deconstruction of the country’s regime and the promotion of alternative political 
possibilities. 
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Chapter 4 
Al-Jazeera’s Intellectual Output 
and Redesigning the Egyptian Regime 
	  
This chapter explains how al-Jazeera’s two regularly hosted intellectuals, Azmi 
Bishara and Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi, combined various forms of framing in order to 
accent the revolutionary character of the Egyptian uprising and its pursuit of 
fundamental change rather than mild reform. However, the degree of change advocated 
by al-Jazeera’s intellectuals and the means to achieve it were in need of clarification all 
throughout the discourse. Thus, it was necessary to define the regime whose downfall 
the network was propagating and to anatomize its constituting elements and distinguish 
them from those of the state. This chapter argues that al-Jazeera’s guest intellectuals 
promoted the deconstruction of institutional facts legitimizing the regime, particularly 
the constitution, yet called for collaboration between protesters and other institutional 
facts that maintain the presence of the state, especially the army and judiciary, in order 
to achieve the social movement’s desired change. It also argues that this process of 
meaning construction was achieved through al-Jazeera’s overall output that comprised 
of intellectual articulations as well as a clear editorial line and around the clock coverage 
of events, all which rendered the channel an institutional organic intellectual bound to 
the class of protesting masses.   
The chapter highlights al-Jazeera’s engagement with the Egyptian uprising 
following Friday 28 January 2011. The mentioned date has been chosen as a starting 
point for our analysis since it marks a critical juncture in the course of Egypt’s uprising 
(that started on 25 January 2011), after which al-Jazeera’s coverage intensified and its 
tone clearly escalated. Our examination of the subsequent days allows for a thorough 
engagement with the network’s output, as the latter’s biases were more blatant than they 
had been during the first three days. The timeframe for our examination ends with 
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former President Hosni Mubarak stepping down and the outlet’s attention shifting to 
other parts of the Arab World experiencing a surge in popular unrest.  
 Al-Jazeera interacted with protesters in Egypt all throughout their upheaval, as a 
giant screen broadcast the network’s output to hundreds of thousands of demonstrators 
in Tahrir Square. This, according to Foreign Policy, “underscored the new reality facing 
Arab regimes: They no longer control the message”.197 The chapter specifically aims to 
analyze the network’s promotion of collective action frames. Azmi Bishara’s live 
commentaries are the main objects of interpretation in this regard, as his contributions to 
promoting certain frames of the uprising were presented on al-Jazeera on a daily basis. 
Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi’s commentaries, despite their scarcity, hold high 
significance as well, as they offered a potent religious complement to Bishara’s 
“scientific” intellectual engagements. However, because Bishara’s output outweighed 
that of al-Qaradawi in terms of time on air, his commentaries are offered the bulk of this 
chapter’s analysis. 
 The engagements of Bishara and al-Qaradawi with the uprising in Egypt 
involved various framing processes that aimed to discredit the regime’s narrative and 
hold it responsible for the country’s deteriorating political, economic, and security 
conditions. In their presented arguments, both intellectuals were keen on charging the 
whole regime rather than merely the government when assigning blame and 
responsibility. The strategies they proposed to counter the regime’s policies and the 
motivational framing they presented were accompanied by various forms of frame 
bridging and frame disputes, the former aiming to draw parallels between the cases of 
Tunisia and Egypt to imply that similar preludes and contexts would lead to similar 
results (i.e. ousting the president), and the latter to encourage Egyptian protagonists of 
the uprising to engage in a full-fledged battle with the regime instead of submitting to 
partial or nominal solutions. 
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At some points, there seemed to be a lack of consistency regarding the event’s 
representation. This was manifested in Bishara’s usage of the term revolution to depict 
the protests very early on, and his reluctance to deploy the term when the regime seemed 
to be gaining momentum later. One of the reasons for this inconsistency was the fact that 
motivational frames require imagining and promoting the best possible scenario as a 
means to further inspire and incite the protesting masses, and these scenarios are 
sometimes exaggerated forms of the real possible solutions (the exaggerations in this 
regard relate to the concept of political opportunity earlier explained). Thus, the 
inconsistencies, albeit scarce, resulted from oscillations between the desired results and 
the attainable ones. Another reason was the fact that Egypt’s state institutions, namely 
the army, did not fight the battle of preserving the president till the very end, and this 
had not been obvious before the last days of the uprising. Some inconsistencies were 
thus resultant of obscurities in identifying the institutional facts serving as antagonists of 
the social movement in question and that accordingly need to be challenged along with 
the regime’s institutions in order for the social movement to achieve its goals. In this 
regard, one should bear in mind that there’s only so much that one can speculate when in 
the midst of events, whereas, in retrospect, things seem much more coherent to the 
assessor after the events’ occurrence. Hence, some discrepancies are almost an 
inevitable outcome of speculations regarding the evolution of social discourse. The 
chronological display of Bishara’s commentaries that this chapter provides, despite its 
generally thematic approach, helps underscore the evolution of his (and al-Jazeera’s) 
perspective on events, with all the framing processes it entailed. One should note, 
however, that Bishara has managed to remain rational and flexible when following up 
with the uprising’s daily happenings and commenting on them, as he altered his tone in 
accordance with the evolving discourse and its changing conditions, thus maintaining his 
image as a credible frame articulator in the eyes of his audience. 
Yet apart from the evolution of the discourse communicated through al-Jazeera, 
the main argument of this chapter is that both of the network’s intellectuals, along with 
the channel as a whole, based their collective action frames on two main pillars. The first 
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is a call for transformative change that surpasses regime figures and governmental 
bodies and that targets the regime’s institutional facts as a whole instead, whereas the 
second implicitly emphasizes the need to distinguish between the state’s institutional 
facts and those of the regime. The latter issue was a delicate one, as it involved 
proposing strategies to engage with state institutions that were associated with the 
regime but were not integrally part of it (army and judicial authorities). This represents a 
major difference between the case of Egypt and that of Libya, and this difference 
allowed al-Jazeera and its intellectuals in the latter case (Libya) to expand their 
parameters of engagement as shall be discussed in our next chapter. 
In the following, we start by analyzing the intellectual output of al-Jazeera (as an 
institution) in the case of Egypt, before moving on to anatomize the framing processes 
that each of its two intellectuals engaged in. This serves in contextualizing the discourse 
involving individual intellectual articulations and in locating it within a grander 
perspective. Al-Jazeera was the platform without which the interchange between its 
commentators and the protesting masses would not have occurred on a massive scale. It 
was the creator of news content and the disseminator of this content along with powerful 
imagery and intellectual output. These elements combined allowed the channel to 
perform the role of an institutional organic intellectual. We shall begin by casting light 
on the performance of the network as a complex generator of meaning in terms of 
coverage and intellectual articulations alike, regardless of the uprising’s chronology. 
Following that, we go back to the first days of the uprising to unpack the discourse and 
examine the commentaries of the network’s two guest intellectuals individually, in a 
manner that situates our thematic approach in a rough chronological order that helps the 
reader understand the evolution of the discourse in hand.  
Al-Jazeera as an institutional organic intellectual 
On Tuesday 25 January 2011, tens of thousands of Egyptians demonstrated in 
Cairo and various other governorates in demand for political and economic reform. 
Cyber activists firstly took the initiative by calling for a “Day of Rage” on this national 
	   88	  
holiday commemorating the police. Although not licensed by the government, their call 
triggered unprecedented participation in comparison to all previous rallies during 
Mubarak’s thirty-year rule.198 Many political opposition figures joined the protests and 
warned of further escalation. Some even expressed a belief that the popular movement in 
Egypt is similar to that of Tunisia, from the very first day.199  
Eleven days earlier, Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was forced to 
step down after weeks of protests that initially erupted over corruption, unemployment, 
and soaring food prices. The repercussions of Tunisia’s events were evident in the 
chants of Egypt’s first demonstrators. Slogans like “thawra thawra hatta an-nasr; thawra 
fi Tunis; thawra fi Masr” (revolution until victory; revolution in Tunisia; revolution in 
Egypt)200 and “ya Mubarak ya Mubarak; as-Su’diyya fi intizarak” (oh Mubarak, oh 
Mubarak; Saudi Arabia is awaiting you)201 drew on the fresh Tunisian example that was 
crowned with Ben Ali’s overthrow and his flee to Saudi Arabia.  
The first day of rallies witnessed clashes between the police and protesters. 
According to the Ministry of Interior, three demonstrators and a security officer were 
killed,202 whereas dozens were wounded. Yet it wasn’t until Friday the 28th of January 
(fourth day of protests) that the trajectory of events took a serious turn, with the scope of 
participation vastly increasing, security conditions severely deteriorating, and numbers 
of casualties multiplying. On that day, and in a preemptive effort to contain the tide of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198Amira Nowaira, “Egypt's Day of Rage goes on. Is the world watching?,” The Guardian, January 27, 
2011, accessed 20 Jan. 2014, accessed January 20, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jan/27/egypt-protests-regime-citizens.   
199“Alāf al-Miṣriyīn yahtufūn ḍid Mubārak fī yawm al-ǧadab”, [Thousands of Egyptians chant against 
Mubarak in Day of Rage] CNN Arabi. February 24, 2011. Accessed February 1, 2014. 
http://archive.arabic.cnn.com/2011/middle_east/1/25/Egypt.Protests/. 
200 Randa Ali, “Egypt’s revolution continues: One chant at a time” Ahram Online, January 23, 2012, 
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202 “Timeline: Egypt’s revolution” Aljazeera, February 14, 2011, accessed January 28, 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html. 
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protests following Friday’s prayers, Egyptian authorities cut off the Internet and 
disrupted mobile text messages. Reports by Agence Presse claimed that counterterrorism 
forces were deployed in sensitive areas around Cairo,203 whereas various news outlets 
confirmed that army troops were dispersed in several cities, yet did not engage in 
confrontations with protesters. By nighttime, eleven civilians were reported dead and 
more than a thousand wounded.204 Several headquarters of the ruling National Party, 
including its main base in Cairo, were put on fire, and riots expanded to comprise all 
major cities, despite a curfew announced in Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez.205 In 
consequence, President Mubarak issued his first televised statement since the outburst of 
demonstrations. He warned of a “scheme” to destabilize the country and defended his 
government, saying it has abided by his directives that prohibit the use of force against 
protesters. Nonetheless, he asked the cabinet to resign and announced that a new one 
shall be formed to “deal with the priorities of the new era”.206   
Following Friday’s Day of Rage and President Mubarak’s first statement, Egypt 
witnessed an escalation in events that al-Jazeera met with intense coverage and 
inflammatory oratory. The processes of framing and counterframing that Bishara and al-
Qaradawi took part in were intrinsically linked to the network’s rhetorical engagement 
with the Egyptian uprising. Many of the channel’s reports presented critical accounts of 
the regime’s narrative rather than merely providing “objective” coverage of events. We 
shall start off by exhibiting extracts from a sample report and subjecting them to brief 
content analysis, before we move on to analyze Bishara’s and al-Qaradawi’s 
engagements with the uprising that illuminate al-Jazeera’s role as an outlet providing its 
viewers with an intricate form of intellectual content. The sample report was aired one 
day after Mubarak’s second statement on the 1st of February 2011 (8th day of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Kassas, Jamal. “Miṣr tahtaz wa Mubārak yuhaḏḏir” [Egypt is shaking and Mubarak warns] al-Sharq al- 
Awsaṭ, January 29, 2011. Accessed February 2, 2014. 
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uprising), in which he announced that he would not be running for the next presidency 
and that being a candidate “had not been his intent” in the first place. Mubarak 
expressed his wish to work on “securing a peaceful transition of power” during the 
remaining months of his term, and called upon the parliament to discuss the amendment 
of articles 76 and 77 of the constitution, with regard to the conditions of candidature and 
to setting a limit to the number of presidential terms. The president also criticized the 
opposition “for transforming the demonstrations from a civilized form of freedom of 
expression to acts of vandalism against the public sector that threaten the security of the 
country”.207  
Displaying this report serves in showing how al-Jazeera’s guest intellectuals 
engaged with discursive framing practices as part of a complex media production. Their 
engagements reinforced the channel’s rationale, yet by no means were they independent 
of its overall output. Out of several other similar reports that were aired on al-Jazeera, 
this one was chosen for two main reasons. The first pertains to its length and 
pervasiveness, as this offers more room for analysis,208 whereas the second relates to its 
considerable relevance to our point in question, as the report is meant to ridicule 
Mubarak’s accounts of constitutional legitimacy on the one hand, and his views of the 
uprising on the other. There was no need for analyzing more than one sample, as the aim 
here is to place our following analysis of al-Jazeera’s intellectual output in the context of 
its general editorial line, and not to analyze its reporting per se. Thus, we intend here to 
highlight the substantial similarity between the content and message conveyed through 
the report aired on the ninth day of the uprising (February 2nd) and the framing 
techniques principally deployed by Bishara, and to a lesser extent by al-Qaradawi.  
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 Sample report: 
Had the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had the chance, amidst his 
isolation and confusion, to pose a question to the demonstrators in Tahrir 
Square and in every Egyptian city that protested against him, perhaps the 
question would have been: Are you revolting before I give you 
permission? The President’s question might be perfectly valid, as nothing 
has occurred in Egypt during the past thirty years without his consent. 
And he might even have the right to protest against them [the 
demonstrators]: Do I not own Egypt according to the constitution? Do I 
not own the parliament and control it with my party’s majority? Do I not 
modify them both to satisfy my sincere desire to serve you, one term after 
the other?  
Are you replacing stability with chaos? Do you not know that I am the 
guarantor of Egypt’s stability and its people’s welfare?  
But history’s open book says that the revolution is the only action that 
occurs against the ruler’s desire and without his permission.   
Ever since the outburst of that cry calling for its downfall, the regime has 
been living in a state of denial. Denial took the form of lengthy silence 
before Mubarak decided to address the people with a speech in which he 
said that he’s aware of the legitimate demands of the demonstrations. 
The verb aware could be associated with the verb understand that was 
used by Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali [Tunisian president] during his ordeal.
  
But the rebels continued to protest, echoing the call once more: the 
people want to bring down the regime. So Mubarak presented another 
concession, saying that neither he nor his son want to run for the next 
[presidential] elections, yet he [stressed that he] wishes to fulfill his term. 
The protesters replied: We want you to leave.  
The President resorts to silence. So his deputy, Omar Suleiman, and his 
Prime Minister, Ahmad Shafik, issue statements promising further 
reform. This reform is under the pressure of the revolution, and it is the 
worst kind of reform, because it comes from people who have been 
forced to implement it.209 
The report above is a demonstration of al-Jazeera’s critical tone (sarcastic in this 
case) through which it aims to undermine Mubarak’s stature and question his legitimacy 
as President. In its deliberately exaggerated account of reality, it aims to stress the idea 
that the power offered to Mubarak by the constitution is exaggerated in turn. In this 
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context, the constitution operates as the institutional fact that gave Mubarak his status-
function as an ultimate ruler of the country.210 In Searle’s model of social construction, 
status-functions can be divided into four broad categories. The main one, which is 
roughly inclusive of all others and that interests us here, is that of status-functions 
“having deontic powers to regulate relations between people”, and this includes rights, 
responsibilities, and obligations.211 Mubarak’s status-function that outlines his rights and 
responsibilities as a president with absolute powers is disparaged in this report and is 
rather depicted as unreasonable.    
The report also mocks the regime’s dichotomy of chaos versus stability, the 
former allegedly being the outcome of change and the latter the result of maintaining the 
status quo. The satire used demonstrates an implied form of counterframing, as it 
signifies a response to the regime’s frames diagnosing the problem as that of disorder 
caused by protests. Frame extension is also used towards the end of the report, as the 
social movement in question is linked to that of Tunisia, and both regimes are diagnosed 
to be sharing the symptom of denial. Mubarak claimed he is “aware” of the demands of 
protesters in the same way his Tunisian counterpart announced that he “understands” the 
calls of demonstrators. Yet neither of them, according to the report, has truly grasped the 
essence of the social movement in question and its aspirations, as the uprising in Egypt 
aims to uproot the existing political order starting from its leading figure, in the same 
way the Tunisian one has done.  
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Al-Jazeera’s engagement in this framing process was challenged by state 
sponsored and regime allied Egyptian networks. Yet the channel’s output vastly 
outweighed the latter’s in terms of credibility, rendering it more capable of shaping the 
public sphere and impacting its general stance regarding the uprising. In principle, there 
are three factors that usually impact the credibility of any framing process: frame 
consistency, empirical credibility, and the credibility of frame articulators,212 and in all 
three, al-Jazeera had the upper hand. 
First, al-Jazeera’s frames were relatively consistent and served the same rationale 
all throughout the uprising whereas those promoted by the regime along with 
collaborating media outlets were baffled and lacked logical rigor. The coverage of al-
Mihwar, a pro-regime private outlet owned by a group of businessmen,213 serves as a 
good example: During the uprising, the network changed its programs in order to “face 
the lies of al-Jazeera”. While doing so, it accused Qatar, Iran, the United States, and 
Israel - all together - of aiming to destabilize Egypt, and interviewed a young woman 
with face obscured, “confessing” she was a foreign agent trained by Americans and 
Israelis in Qatar to disrupt the country’s social order. Not only was it absurd to accuse a 
number of state actors that were literally on opposite ends of the political spectrum of 
collaborating to produce a “conspiracy” of that sort (Iran on the one hand, and Israel and 
the United States on the other) but the interviewee on al-Mihwar’s “special” report 
confessed she had fabricated the story only few days later, after her identity got 
exposed.214  
Second, the Qatari network’s promoted frames had much more empirical validity 
than those of the Egyptian National Television and other local networks aligned with the 
regime. The National Television’s decision to turn the blind eye to hundreds of 
thousands of demonstrators in Tahrir Square in the first few days proved to be of high 
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costs. The decline in the network’s credibility even pushed some of its employees to 
resign. One of those was a prominent anchor who said she left the studio minutes before 
airing, as she refused to read a bulletin that reduces the number of protestors “to less 
than five thousand troublemakers who were on a looting and killing spree”.215 
Third, al-Jazeera invested well in its frame articulators. Azmi Bishara and Sheikh 
Youssef al-Qaradawi were high profile guests whose output ranged from thorough 
intellectual analysis to potent religious incitement. This output proved to be a powerful 
compliment to the network’s journalistic coverage of the uprising. Little wonder, then, 
was al-Qaradawi the first cleric to deliver a sermon on the Friday following Mubarak’s 
downfall before tens of thousands of activists in Tahrir Square after years of exile.216 Al-
Jazeera’s then reporter in Egypt Dina Samak explains that the cleric’s motivational 
frames were so potent during the uprising that even leftist activists highly regarded them 
and that some went to the extent of comparing his televised messages through the 
network to the famous Liberation Theology endorsing leftwing social movements in 
Latin America.217 This motivational role of al-Qaradawi was amplified by al-Jazeera’s 
presenters whose questions were meant to orient the discussion towards further 
incitement, as in the following cases:  
(Presenter asking al-Qaradawi about his assessment of the situation: 
“You’ve seen what happened in Tunisia, and how the Tunisian people 
were able to change their regime in few days. Today, before this great 
scene in Egypt, how do you assess the current events? How do you asses 
this moment that the Umma is living in general?”) 
Al-Qaradawi: God does not mislay the earnings of workers [cites a 
Quranic verse]. The blood of those who left their homes sacrificing 
themselves and holding on till the last moment cannot go in vain. This 
does not get wasted. This is great work. And this proves the [nature] of 
the pharaonic taghouti Egyptian regime. [The regime] could have shown 
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understanding regarding the demands of these young people. It could 
have listened to them and gotten closer to them. Instead, it closed its 
ears. I always think of these regimes as blind that do not see, deaf that do 
not hear, and stupid that do not understand [cites a Quranic verse]. 
There is a proverb in Egypt that says “make more scandals while you 
leave”. Those [i.e. the regime] are leaving and are causing more scandals 
on their way. It is known that God almighty gives respite but never 
neglects. I am positive that those youngsters will triumph and that the 
[regime] will be beaten. 
(Presenter asks about the meaning of victory in Egypt) 
Al-Qaradawi: Victory in Egypt means the removal of Mubarak, his 
regime, his thoughts... 
(Presenter interrupts to ask about the impact of that on the Umma) 
The impact on the Umma is all good. This regime has retarded Egypt 
politically, economically, and socially...218  
 This excerpt demonstrates the role of al-Jazeera’s presenters in outlining the 
discourse that their guest, Youssef al-Qaradawi, engages in. The questions that presenter 
Ali al-Dafiri poses are reflective of the network’s editorial policies regarding the 
uprising, and the terms he uses serve in amplifying the Sheikh’s framing of the 
discourse. Al-Dafiri’s portrayal of the uprising as a “great” event and his deployment of 
terms carrying religious significance, like Umma, reinforce his guest’s depictions and 
enhance the motivational framing that the latter presents. The term Umma, for instance, 
delineates the ideological framework of the discussion above. It depicts the social 
movement in question as transcendent of Arab state borders, thus introducing a form of 
frame extension.     
Al-Qaradawi’s proponents and religious descendants have described him as 
Sheikh al-Umma, or the “Sheikh of the whole Muslim community”.219 His stature as one 
of the most prominent religious scholars in the Islamic World has given him an 
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overarching influence on Muslim populations around the globe. This impact was rather 
enhanced due to his dynamic understanding of Islam, for he thinks of the ulama 
(religious scholars) as reliable for “preserv(ing) the belief of the Umma unified and 
coherent”.220 The Umma is the community of Muslim believers, a term with religious 
implications that dates back to the birth of Islam. It is thought to be a platform for action 
for all devout Muslims. In this excerpt, al-Qaradawi is indirectly asked to stretch the 
meanings and themes of the event in Egypt to other realms of the Umma, particularly the 
Arab part of it. This, as abovementioned, serves as an extension of the framing process. 
Al-Qaradawi’s motivational framing is evident in his deterministic tone that shall 
further be discussed in the following excerpts. The certainty in which he expresses his 
speculations regarding the “triumph of protesters” is meant to boost the morale of those 
who highly regard him. His continuous reference to the supernatural (example: God 
almighty gives respite but never forgets) is yet another investment in the religious 
leverage he has on wide Muslim sectors. In his diagnosis of the issue in hand, al-
Qaradawi blames the regime and its head, President Hosni Mubarak, demeaning both 
and holding them responsible for “retarding Egypt” on all levels. Al-Qaradawi invests in 
Quranic descriptions and analogues in his diagnostic framing, as he accuses the regime 
of being taghouti and pharaonic. Taghout (adjective taghouti) is an Arabic term often 
used in the Quran referring to the oppressor, those who have crossed the limits, or those 
who are worshiped instead of God. It is deployed here along with another description of 
religious significance and symbolic relevance - that which relates Mubarak to ancient 
Pharaohs who have ruled Egypt and were mentioned in Islamic holy texts as examples 
of oppressors on multiple occasions. 
The framing processes that al-Qaradawi engaged in were thus part of al-Jazeera’s 
overall output. His contributions were an amplifier of the network’s narrative 
construction and an inciter of further mass mobilization. The previous excerpt exhibits 
the complementary role of al-Jazeera’s presenters in accenting religious sentiments for 
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motivational purposes and in outlining the course of discussion in a way that best serves 
these purposes. In a different commentary, few days later, al-Qaradawi was even left to 
cite a prayer on air, asking God to support “those who are protesting against the ruler”. 
He similarly referred to Quranic narratives highlighting the example of the Pharaoh 
subjugating his people. The presenter, who happened to be al-Dafiri as well, commented 
on the Sheikh’s litany saying “it directly reaches all those who have led the protests in 
Egypt”, and, in a statement meant to address religious convictions and assert al-
Qaradawi’s prayer, added that “no barriers exist between earth and the heavens these 
days”.221  
The intellectual contributions of Azmi Bishara, on the other hand, banked on al-
Jazeera’s daily broadcast of events and enhanced the quality of meaning construction 
that the network was offering to its audience. On multiple occasions, he asserted that the 
outlet’s broadcast material provides him as well as other protagonists of Egypt’s social 
movement with essential means to discredit the regime’s narrative. His contribution on 
the last day of the uprising, for example, emphasized al-Jazeera’s role - as an institution 
- in constructing a maverick narrative, as the following excerpt demonstrates: 
Bishara: We had the chance to sit here, help in analyzing events, and 
further direct the Arab public opinion. We hope we’ve [had] the same 
[effect on] the Egyptian public opinion. Al-Jazeera has allowed this 
opportunity. Thanks to you, this was done. Not every place allows for a 
rational analysis to take place in such circumstances.  
First, let’s assert that the revolution has achieved what it aimed for, i.e. 
negating the existing. It hasn’t crystallized yet what has to be. The first 
phase is the revolution. The second is what ought to be, and this requires 
an agreement on the practical principles of a democratic transformation 
that sets its own laws and acquires the consent of everyone, regardless of 
ideologies… There is also the issue of purging institutions, not 
necessarily of people but of the mentalities, the culture, and the values 
that were predominant, and this needs a long time.  
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I believe that the first day witnessed an uprising. We sat here and used 
words like revolution and rebels, whereas, in fact, it was an uprising 
against injustice. It began changing into a revolution from the second day 
on, after it had introduced [the demand for] overthrowing the regime.	  
When a popular movement introduces [the demand for] overthrowing a 
regime, and when it’s simultaneous and popular in the way we’ve seen, 
we should pause [to reflect]… So we paused and said this is a revolution 
and should be treated as such, even if those taking part in it do not 
recognize that.222  
On the seventeenth day of the uprising, one day before his downfall, Egyptian 
President Husni Mubarak delegated his constitutional powers to his deputy Omar 
Suleiman and asserted his intention to execute a package of reforms in conformity with 
popular demands.223 Suleiman, on the other hand, asked the protesters to “return home” 
and promised to “maintain the youth revolution and its accomplishments”.224 However, 
it was too late for any vows to make an impact on protesting masses. The latter were 
already preparing for their million-man march to the presidential palace on the day to 
follow, as tens of thousands assembled on the route to Mubarak’s residence more than 
twenty hours in advance.225 Meanwhile, the army gave its first sign of abandoning the 
president, as the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF) headed by Minister of 
Defense Hussein Tantawi issued a statement asserting its recognition of popular 
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http://classic.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11763&article=607805&search=%E3% 
D5%D1&state=true#.U63dAzmXJD0. 
224 “Sleiman fī bayān: ata‘ahhada bi-l-ḥifāẓ ‘alā ṯawrat al-šabāb” [Sleiman in a statement: I commit to  
maintain the revolution of the youth] February, 11 2011. Accessed June 9, 2014. 
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[Egyptian army convince thousands of protesters to break siege on presidential palace] al-Sharq al-Awsat,
 February 11, 2011. Accessed 10 June, 2014. 
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demands and declaring it will remain in permanent session.226 The army’s shifting stance 
vastly accelerated the process of the uprising: On the eighteenth and last day, Deputy 
President Omar Suleiman announced Mubarak’s resignation and his decision to assign 
the SCAF to “manage the country’s affairs”, whereas the latter issued two more 
statements, one of which hailed the “martyrs who have sacrificed their lives during the 
protests”.227   
The relationship between the regime and the military, the latter being the state’s 
most powerful institutional fact, had been problematic for years. Various indicators 
suggested a growing rift between the two regarding the issue of Tawreeth (Mubarak’s 
son succeeding him in power), at a time when Mubarak’s son, Gamal, was gradually 
gaining power in the ruling National Democratic Party. In September 2010, four and a 
half months prior to the outburst of the uprising, The New York Times alleged army 
officers were expressing concerns that “Gamal Mubarak might erode the military’s 
institutional powers”, adding that “much of the military’s distrust of [Mubarak’s son] 
stems from his ties to a younger generation of ruling party cadres who have made their 
fortunes in the business world”, whereas the military “is tied to the National Democratic 
Party’s old guard”.228 One month later, the intelligence firm Stratfor quoted sources 
saying that commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army Mohammed Hussein Tantawi 
expressed his opposition of succession “on behalf of the military” and “reminded 
Mubarak that the army supported him and his predecessors because they were members 
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of the armed forces”.229 Two months after (and one month prior to the uprising), cables 
released by Wikileaks uncovered US doubts regarding the ability of Mubarak to 
convince the army of the option of succession. Former American ambassador in Cairo 
Francis Ricciardone was cited saying, “A key stumbling block for a Gamal candidacy 
could be the military”.230 This deviance between the army and the President illustrates 
the difference between the state’s institutional facts and those of the regime. Egypt’s 
military, like its judiciary (as shall later be shown), did not completely adhere to the 
country’s regime policies albeit being the corner stone of the regime’s security.  
 Bishara’s commentary came within a context in which Egypt’s uprising 
successfully reached its desired end after the army declared a neutral stance. In the 
excerpt above, he illuminates the complementary role that he played, as a class-bound 
intellectual analyzing daily events and commenting on them, on the one hand, along 
with al-Jazeera, the media platform that has allowed him to communicate with its 
audience, on the other. The “rational analysis” that he hopes to have presented was 
delivered to protesting activists in Tahrir Square through a giant screen displaying al-
Jazeera’s coverage. This coverage included airing footage that comprised of material 
provided by citizen journalists, testimonials of activists, standpoints of political 
opposition figures, and interpretations of casual as well as regular commentators 
(Bishara and al-Qaradawi). This intricate process of meaning construction presented a 
powerful and persuasive end product to millions of spectators in Egypt, of which at least 
hundreds of thousands were active on the ground.231 
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230 “Army ‘could block’ Egypt succession”, Al Jazeera, December 15, 2010. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/12/201012158103985404.html. 
231 Al-Jazeera’s reporter in Egypt during the uprising, Dina Samak, describes in a personal interview how 
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 The abovementioned matrix allowed Bishara to promote alternative political 
possibilities all throughout the uprising. On the last day, as the extract shows, Bishara 
explains his belief that the uprising has “achieved what it aimed for”, and that is 
“negating the existing”. However, he stresses that it hasn’t crystallized an alternative yet. 
In Searle’s model of interpretation, “negating the existing” is equivalent to 
deconstructing existing institutional facts, whereas “crystallizing what ought to be” 
pertains to constructing alternative ones. Bishara accents, however, that this creation of a 
new social order requires time, as it involves attaining the consent of all social sectors, 
regardless of their diverging ideologies. Put differently, a collective intentionality was 
needed to impose a new set of status-functions on the newly emerging social facts.  
 Bishara’s frame articulations, as well as al-Qaradawi’s, in addition to their calls 
to deconstruct existing institutional facts and their promotion of others, were part of al-
Jazeera’s overall output. The Qatari network acted as an institutional organic 
intellectual, as the meaning construction it presented was resultant of a complex matrix 
of intellectual communication and audiovisual transmissions, all promoting collective 
action frames in favor of the social movement calling for political change in Egypt. 
Towards the end of the excerpt above, Bishara refers to his account of the upsurge as a 
revolution, and through a brief frame articulation, he explains how the protesters’ 
demands have shifted from reform to fundamental change, thus giving what first began 
as an uprising calling for limited alterations within the regime a revolutionary character 
whose aim is to establish a new social order. The rest of this chapter shall extensively 
explain how this evolution in demands has occurred following the Day of Rage, and how 
al-Jazeera’s intellectuals, precisely Bishara, engaged with this discourse, as the uprising 
expanded and advanced.  
The social movement calls for change, not reform 
On the fifth day of demonstrations, one day after Friday’s Day of Rage, Bishara 
presented thorough analysis of the underlying meanings of Egypt’s protests. He 
distinguished between the performance of “spontaneous” demonstrators and that of 
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organized opposition factions, deeming the latter as hesitant and as late responders to the 
widespread popular urge to uproot the existing order of power relations. Bishara’s 
analysis came with the growing popular need to define the uprising’s aims and to clarify 
its future possibilities. It was part of the effort made by the social movement’s 
protagonists to face the regime’s attempts to absorb the social movement and moderate 
its demands. 
Regarding the state’s power structures, Bishara emphasized the idea that the 
regime had reached a point where it lost the ability to maintain its mere existence, and 
that the extent of expected change had surpassed all its tactical attempts to maneuver and 
to circumvent the powerful popular discourse. Based on that, he critically engaged with 
the rhetoric presented by opposition factions, as he thought they were short of capturing 
the moment and expanding the limits of political demands: 
Bishara: This is the moment that political forces should seize. Up until 
yesterday, the demands of these forces were less than those of the masses. 
The streets were calling for the downfall of the regime, whereas some 
parties were calling on Mubarak to change his government... 
(Breaking news displayed: Omar Suleiman appointed as Vice President) 
(Commenting on the breaking news) I think this is meant to absorb the 
anger. He [i.e. Mubarak] is now saying there shall be no Tawreeth. This 
is also meant to be a message for the West revealing [Mubarak’s] 
willingness to step down and [affirming] that his replacement belongs to 
the camp that maintains peace with Israel… I think the issue of Tawreeth 
was over the moment the masses took the streets simultaneously, in 
numerous cities, vast in number, and [their movement] sustained its 
permanence. It is no more an issue of Tawreeth now. It is that of the 
regime’s future. 
Alternative political parties should propose an alternative political agenda 
so that the debate does not revolve around individuals. The latter is not 
the [real] question because the replacement could come from within the 
regime and adopt the same policies… The demands should be of a 
political/constitutional nature, ones that the regime cannot absorb by 
appointing a deputy or through nominal changes pertaining to certain 
individuals.  
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(Presenter asking Bishara to comment on news about Mubarak’s sons 
leaving the country) 
Bishara: We can summarize the last four days as follows: The regime’s 
first pillar, i.e. the ruling family, is over. The second pillar, i.e. the 
National Party, I believe, is over as well. In other words, [the National 
Party] shall return to its normal size - as a small party that is - if it were to 
survive in the first place, as this is the party of state employees, interests, 
and businessmen. What remains is the security apparatus. 
It should be born in mind that the regime is a cluster of forces and 
intertwined complexities: [First, there are] the circles surrounding the 
ruling family and old politicians, like Safwat al-Shereef, Zakaria Azmi, 
and others. Then you have the party, then the security. As for the 
businessmen, they will side with the next regime in order to sustain their 
businesses.232  
In the excerpt above, Bishara engages in a frame dispute with Egyptian 
opposition figures advocating the social movement in question. He frames “the demands 
of the masses” as “calls for the downfall of the regime”, and contrasts them to those of 
“some parties” that limit their goals to a mere change in government.233 Framing popular 
demands as calls for the downfall of the regime serves in drawing a clear-cut distinction 
between calls for “reform”, that he believes are ostensible, and calls for radical change, 
that he deems necessary. This is explained by his insistence that the demands “should be 
of a political/constitutional nature”. 
A frame dispute, as defined by Benford, is an intramovement framing contest or 
a “dispute over reality” between the adherents of the same social movement.234 In this 
case, Bishara’s critique of the performance of opposition figures illustrates a framing 
contest within the anti-regime milieu. His critical reference to traditional opposition 
factions serves in underscoring their propensity to submit to the regime’s framing of 
Egypt’s political situation. Moreover, it suggests that their demand for a change in 
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government does not defer much from the president’s appointment of a deputy: they are 
both insignificant adjustments that do not alter the regime’s ruling power structures. 
Consequently, they both serve in rejuvenating the regime and polishing its image, thus 
helping it maintain its existence instead of undergoing substantial transformations in 
structure and identity.     
In the course of this framing dispute, Bishara presents a form of diagnostic 
framing as he interprets the situation in hand. By emphasizing that the “debate shouldn’t 
revolve around individuals”, he identifies the problematic condition in need for remedy: 
the problem does not lie in some of the regime’s second-class personnel, but in the 
regime itself, as an oligarchic hierarchy, a matrix of power relations, and a platform 
legitimizing certain decision-making processes. This diagnosis delineates the defining 
lines of the revolution, a term that was extensively used in Bishara’s commentaries and 
al-Jazeera’s reports, as shall later be demonstrated. The diagnostic framing thus aims to 
identify the enemy as the regime rather than certain individual officials, or as Bishara 
explains, the “cluster of forces” comprising various circles of power and interest. This 
identification serves in highlighting the battle-lines in this discourse and clarifying the 
end goals of the social movement as well as the political translation of its rhetorical 
demands.  
The frame dispute that Bishara engages in also involves a refutation of the 
regime’s rationale. As previously stated, the “real question”, according to al-Jazeera’s 
guest, is of a “constitutional nature”. This account entails dismissing the regime’s 
framing of the problem, in which it merely stresses the need for minimal alterations in 
the configuration of its ruling elites. Bishara accuses Egypt’s ruling elites of deploying 
illusive tactics to manipulate the popular discourse and reorient its trajectory towards 
different ends, as he explains that “the replacement could come from within the regime 
and adopt the same policies”. In the course of refuting its frames, Bishara also tries to 
uncover the underlying motives behind the regime’s rhetorical allegations. In this regard, 
he claims that the president aims to bargain “mild reform” for “guaranteeing the security 
of Israel”, in order to legitimize his regime’s permanence in the eyes of the “West”.  
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Following this line of argument, al-Jazeera’s guest stresses that the issue in 
question is that of the regime’s future and mere existence. Accordingly, the appointment 
of General Omar Suleiman (head of Military Intelligence) as Vice President aims to 
absorb the momentum of popular protests and hamper the conditions for their growth 
and evolution. In other words, the regime’s steps are framed as defensive acts that aim to 
sustain its legitimacy. Underscoring this defensive nature fuels the assumption that the 
regime is weakening and is, thus, more susceptive to retreat. This interpretation, in turn, 
serves in the construction of motivational frames that encourage further escalation. 
Bishara’s mention of a “moment that political forces should seize” fits this description. 
It constitutes a “call for arms”, as it constructs propelling vocabulary of motive and 
incites the opposition to invest in the popular discourse and take advantage of the 
regime’s weakness.  
In the course of his argument, al-Jazeera’s intellectual also presents a brief 
anatomy of the regime’s power structures. To Bishara, those structures are the targets of 
change desired by the sweeping majority of protesting masses. His emphasis on the need 
to induce constitutional amendments presents an early suggestion that the uprising 
should primarily aim to disarm the regime of its legitimacy.  The regime, according to 
Bishara, is founded on three main pillars: the ruling family, the National Party, and the 
security apparatus. Bishara asserts that the first pillar (Mubarak’s family) has fallen due 
to the regime’s proposed concessions regarding Tawreeth. To a lesser extent, this also 
applies to the National Party, as the latter is expected to automatically shrink when state 
employees (approximated by six million) are freed from the pressures of the existing 
clientalistic infrastructure, and when businessmen reestablish their interests in 
accordance with the new system of power relations.   
In short, Bishara believes that dismantling the regime’s power structures requires 
producing change of a constitutional nature. In Searle’s paradigm of socially constructed 
realities, the constitution is the institutional fact that offers the regime its legitimacy. 
This is its agentive function. On the other hand, its status, as a constitution - with the 
authority that this status entails - was acquired through collective intentionality (or social 
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acceptance). Bishara (as does al-Jazeera’s other guest, al-Qaradawi, on later occasions) 
aims to discredit the regimes’ accounts claiming that this acceptance is based on free 
will. He is rather keen on emphasizing that social acceptance had been obtained through 
coercive practices that the regime had exercised throughout its rule. In order to amplify 
this account, he engages in a process of counterframing, in which he opposes the 
regime’s narrative and framing of events. This shall be scrutinized and subject to further 
elaboration in the course of our chapter’s analysis. We next present another excerpt from 
the following day, in which the question of what makes the movement a revolution is 
presented.  
What makes it a revolution? 
The sixth day of protests witnessed further escalation by the state in parallel to its 
governmental change. The crackdown of protests resulted in scores of casualties (more 
than 150 deaths and 2000 injuries).235 In response, groups of activists in Tahrir Square 
issued a declaration that called for drafting a new constitution and electing “a legitimate 
president”,236 whereas others went further in their demands, as they called for banning 
the National Party and prosecuting its leaders along with the security officers 
responsible for killing demonstrators.237  
Al-Jazeera was a target of this escalation as well. Egypt’s Ministry of 
Information issued a decision to close the network’s bureau in Cairo, revoke its license, 
cut off its access to the state owned satellite, NileSat, and ban its employees from 
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working in the country.238 Albeit of limited effect due to the network’s broadcast on 
other satellite providers (Saudi-based Arabsat and France-based Hot Bird), these 
retaliatory acts revealed the government’s concern regarding al-Jazeera’s impact on the 
popular discourse. 
In this context, Azmi Bishara engaged in promoting prognostic frames, as he 
proposed strategies for dealing with the situation in hand. Banking on fresh news from 
Tahrir Square regarding the activists’ high morale, Bishara stressed the opposition’s 
need to agree on “a clear and decisive political project after debating it amongst its 
constituents”, one that is up to the expectations of young protesters who “don’t want to 
go home without an accomplishment” (see below). For that, he urged for the creation of 
a communicative body whose role is to mediate between governing elites, the army, and 
protesters in order to reach a settlement regarding a transitional phase. Bishara’s 
emphasis on the need to establish a body representing the uprising’s standpoint was 
accompanied with advice regarding the forms of communication with existing state 
bureaucracies and the nature of demands that ought to be proposed to each (such as the 
need to differentiate between the way to address the judicial body and that of addressing 
the army). Bishara’s prognostic framing was thus dependent on his differentiation 
between the state’s institutional facts. His promoted version of change was inclusive of 
the president, the government, the parliament, the National Party (as a clientalistic 
infrastructure), the security apparatus, and, ultimately, the constitution – the latter being 
the primary institutional fact legitimizing all others. Those, in his former statement, were 
identified as the main pillars of the regime (financial elites were excluded as they were 
thought to be willing to side by the winner in any case). The judicial and military bodies 
– both being institutional facts functioning within the governing system of power 
relation - were not included in Bishara’s definition of regime institutions in need for 
change or deconstruction (they were rather identified as state institutions). In the 
following excerpt, however, the main issue that Bishara engages in is that of defining the 
popular upsurge: Is it a revolution? And what makes it one? The answer to this question 
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helps in further clarifying Bishara’s diagnostic framing of the regime as the social 
movement’s antagonist. It also serves in providing counterframes to the regime’s 
narrative and, thus, in discrediting its allegations. 
Bishara: There are two definitions of the opposition at this point. The first 
pertains to the popular opposition on the streets. This has been given 
many [condescending] descriptions, yet I believe it represents the full 
spectrum of the Egyptian people. There are men and women. There are 
the employed and the unemployed. There are [those who come from] the 
middle, upper, and lower classes of society. There are the religious and 
the non-religious. There are Muslims and Christians despite all the 
conspiracies aiming to sow the seeds of discord between Egyptians. I 
believe that we have an authentic popular revolution that emulates the 
great revolutions of the world because it is simultaneous, extensive, and 
representative of the whole Egyptian spectrum. Had it not been so, it 
would have failed.  
We’ve been through a depressing era in the Arab World, one that seemed 
to have no horizon. President Mubarak, for instance, is one of this 
period’s representatives. Regardless of what could be said about his pros 
and cons, it is of no doubt that he came to power by mere coincidence, 
and that someone who came by coincidence should not remain there for 
thirty years, especially that he had no charisma nor competence nor a 
vision nor projects, and we’ve seen [how bad] his foreign policy [was]…  
The opposition must agree on a [unified] political project. This should be 
debated amongst all its constituents. The project should be clear and 
decisive, because those youngsters that you see do not want to go back 
home without an accomplishment… There ought to be a leadership with a 
[clear] political stance. It should not yield and should know how to 
address [others]. For example, the judges aren’t supposed to be addressed 
in the same way the army is… There should exist a mediator that can 
communicate with the governing elites as well as with the masses and the 
army so that a transition occurs. It is necessary to create this body now 
and agree on it.  
(Presenter asking about the availability of a mediator and the possibility 
of choosing a figure to negotiate with the government) 
Bishara: It seems we have to get used to something new in our modern 
world: revolutions with no leader. I think we hang on [to leaders] because 
we’re used to dictatorships and autocratic regimes. The revolution did not 
produce a leader. There is a group of leaders. The people led themselves 
with a great self-regulatory power, and then came political elites. In 
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Tunisia, we are now witnessing a process of bargaining [term used in 
English] with political elites. You [i.e. the leaders] represent us [i.e. the 
masses] but there are certain conditions that you have to fulfill. So the 
starting point was to refuse an individual form of representation: no more 
unconditional charisma, no more charming leaders that we submit to as 
we had done during the revolutions of the 1950s. This is over.239    
In the abovementioned, Bishara’s definition of the popular opposition is meant to 
counter regime frames that aim to tarnish and discredit the popular movement in Egypt. 
The movement that has been portrayed in negative light is authentic, according to 
Bishara. It is highly representative, as it comprises diverse communal strata: the activists 
are from both genders, belong to different social classes, include the working and 
unemployed, and have various religious (or non-religious) identities. 
Two days earlier, President Mubarak warned of a plot to destabilize the country. 
Public television, along with several private networks owned by pro-regime 
businessmen, engaged in a campaign that aimed to undermine the movement’s 
significance, void it from serious political meaning, reduce the participation in it to 
certain factions, and raise skepticism regarding its “real aims”. Attempts to disparage the 
movement were evident on National Television, as the latter quoted “security sources” 
on Friday’s “Day of Rage” saying there is “no need to be bothered and misled by rumors 
and media exaggerations”.240 The network focused its coverage on riots resulting from 
security vacuum, and refrained from reporting on mass protests.241 In terms of reducing 
the movement to certain factions, pro regime media echoed statements by the Ministry 
of Interior, that primarily blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for catalyzing protests, and to 
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a lesser extent the “6th of April Movement” and the “National Association for Change” 
lead by Nobel Peace laureate and former head of UN’s nuclear watchdog Mohammad el-
Baradei.242  
 In the course of countering the regime’s narrative, Bishara frames the popular 
movement as a revolution. He identifies some defining features that render it as such: it 
is highly representative, extensive, and simultaneous. The elements aforementioned 
serve in distinguishing the case of protests calling for minor reforms from that of a 
revolution whose goal is to substantially transform the system of existing power 
relations. Bishara aims to assert that the movement is inclusive of various social 
constituents and that it transcends their defining borderlines.  
Bishara’s framing of the movement as a revolutionary one is thus based on the 
movement’s characteristic features. This, in itself, is quite controversial, because events 
are generally labeled as revolutions due to their consequences rather than certain 
defining elements. According to Jeff Goodwin, a revolution “denotes a relatively rapid 
process in which a society’s state structure, economic institutions, and transnational 
relations are fundamentally transformed; these changes, furthermore, are initiated and/or 
propelled, at least in part, by mass mobilizations, including armed movements, strikes, 
and/or demonstrations”.243 This definition, much like many others in theories of 
revolution, focuses on the outcomes instead of the features defining the processual 
phenomenon in question, albeit elucidating the process itself. 
The case of Egypt is particularly problematic because it was labeled a revolution 
very early on. Historian Joel Beinin, for instance, refrains from terming it as such, as he 
doesn’t think its outcomes had been transformative.244 In his contribution on the 
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Egyptian uprising, De Smet explains that Beinin’s “consequential historical perspective 
echoed Theda Skocpol’s classical definition of a revolution as a process that entailed 
rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures”. Accordingly, a 
process “can only be discerned as a revolution post factum”. De Smet adds that 
protagonists, not social scientists, were the ones who defined the Tunisian and Egyptian 
uprisings as revolutions, and that, by doing so, have shifted “the focus of analysis from 
outcomes to agencies”.245 This is mainly due to the protagonists’ engagement in 
motivational framing, as their account of the event as such would give further incentive 
to protesters to fulfill the requirements of a revolution and accordingly reconfigure the 
structure of power relations. In Social Movement Theory, Gamson and Meyer expressed 
this idea by saying that if “movement activists interpret political space in ways that 
emphasize opportunity rather than constraint, they may stimulate actions that change 
opportunity, making their opportunity frame a self-fulfilling prophecy”.246 
Further research, however, shows that Bishara’s viewpoint overlaps with some 
observations and accounts of previous revolutions. In Theorizing Revolutions, John 
Foran, for instance, examines the discourses and social forces on several revolutionary 
platforms. In the course of his study, he stresses that the revolutions of Eastern Europe in 
1989 “consisted of mass demonstrations by men and women across all classes, no more 
accepting the legitimacy of the state”.247 This account is substantially similar to 
Bishara’s emphasis on the element of representation in Egypt’s mass movement - that 
which allowed for its definition as a revolution.  
Bishara’s labeling of the movement as a revolution aims to accent its 
transformative character. Again, this helps in bolstering his vision of change as a 
fundamental one that stretches out to the cluster of forces and interests governing 
Egypt’s political platform. The comparison he draws between the case of Egypt and that 
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of Tunisia serves the same purpose, as it implies that both social movements operate 
within similar contexts and are bound to achieve similar goals. Bishara’s reference to the 
Tunisian uprising when assessing the absence of leading figures in the Egyptian 
upheaval is a form of frame bridging or a frame alignment process. 
Frame bridging refers to the “linking of two or more ideologically congruent but 
structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem. It can occur 
between a movement and individuals, or across social movements”.248 Bishara’s 
comparison between the two cases aims to draw a link across two distinct social 
movements having similar political claims. A central political theme of both movements, 
according to Bishara, relates to their detachment from individual forms of leadership. 
This is part and parcel of the activists’ rejection of autocratic regimes, as both (existing 
regimes and the individual leadership of revolutions) reduce representations to mere 
idiosyncracies. The alternative mode of conduct that expresses itself in the form of 
protests in open spaces is one that conforms to political agendas rather than submitting 
to unconditional individual charisma. This is why, according to this account, both 
“revolutions did not produce a leader”. Instead, they had “a group of leaders”, or “people 
with a great self-regulatory power”.  
Bishara’s intellectual output on a potent media platform was meant to provide 
Egypt’s social movement with supporting frames. As previously explained, his outreach 
to millions of spectators through al-Jazeera elevated his status as an influential 
protagonist of the social movement in question. The collective action frames that he and 
others presented were forms of representational intellectual participation. In the case of 
Egypt, their primary goal soon crystallized in the form of calls for ousting the president 
Hosni Mubarak.  
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The regime retreating: aim at the President! 
The seventh day of protests witnessed a shift in the approach of state sponsored 
media regarding the inflammatory events. Government newspapers blamed former 
Minister of Interior (in the dissolved government) Habib el-Adli, a leading figure in the 
ruling National Party, for failing to adequately deal with the situation. In parallel, the 
parliament affirmed it will submit to court verdicts annulling the victory of several of its 
members,249 the vast majority of whom were members of Mubarak’s National 
Democratic Party.250 Bishara’s following reference to the regime’s “retreats” relates to 
this context. The withdrawal of Tawreeth, the appointment of a Vice President, the 
dissolution of the government, and the willingness to accept annulments in the 
parliament were all signs of a weakening regime. 
Bishara: I think we have entered a phase that all revolutions go through, a 
phase where the regime starts to retreat whereas the revolution begins to 
progress. The day before yesterday, we saw a withdrawal of Tawreeth 
and an appointment of a Vice President. Today, another series of retreats 
have begun regarding the Parliament and otherwise.  
The issue now is who should be entrusted with the transitional period. Of 
course, former elites should be included, like parts of the political 
institution, the judiciary system, and the army. But the demonstrators in 
the streets must be part of [the process] as well, as they take credit for 
stirring the whole issue in the first place.  
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There’s [a process of] shifting [term used in English], a continuous 
dynamic process, and the [standpoint of the] army is transforming in 
accordance with it because it wishes to preserve the country… If the 
masses’ movement becomes directed against Omar Suleiman, this will 
drive the army to lower its demands until we reach the phase necessary to 
preserve the country’s security, and I think this [is represented by] a 
transformative democratic process secured by the army.      
(Presenter: Could there be blood baths when the demonstrators approach 
the Presidential Palace?) 
Bishara: When a million demonstrate, it’s over. Guns will fall silent. 
Everyone will as well… The army is part of the people. It made it clear 
that it will not shoot at the people and it’s clear that this is a green light 
for a million to demonstrate.251 
Basing on the influx of political developments, Bishara presents a prognostic 
framing whereby he proposes a strategy to engage with the army’s “shifting” stance 
towards the upheaval. According to him, the army wishes to maintain the country’s 
stability and, for that purpose, is aiming to formulate an understanding with international 
players that share with it the same goal. If the movement’s demands become directed 
against the newly appointed Vice President, Omar Suleiman, the army will then have to 
bear in mind that its acceptance of Suleiman’s persistence in power will higher the 
stakes of further instability. A popular pressure in the direction of refuting Suleiman’s 
mandate will propel the army to redesign its policy in accordance with the demands of 
protesters, thus leading to an overthrow of the regime’s main symbols (President, Vice 
President, ministers…) and the initiation of a “transformative democratic process”.  
Bishara’s argument thus begins to focus on the transitional period itself, as the 
“regime retreats” and the “revolution progresses”. He further engages in suggesting an 
approach or a “plan” to deal with the aftermath of the regime’s downfall. The prognosis 
he presents advocates integrating former elites, parts of the political institution, the 
judiciary system, the army, and protesters in a new system of power transition that 
introduces a democratic era. The transitional phase should thus be inclusive of certain 
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state institutions (especially the judicial system and the army), yet exclusive of other 
institutions that closely adhere to the existing regime (the presidency and vice 
presidency, the government, the parliament, in addition to core elites representing the 
“cluster of forces” that the regime is dependent on, as explained earlier). In other words, 
Bishara identifies the institutional facts in need of deconstruction in order to achieve the 
social movement’s aim to overcome autocracy on the one hand, and those that need to 
be incorporated in a new system that introduces democratic rule on the other. 
Accordingly, contrary to regime institutions, state institutions are considered essential 
pillars for any sustainable alternative political platform, and since the main aim of the 
army – as a key state institution – is to maintain stability in Egypt, Bishara expects it to 
positively interact with the demonstrating masses and to preserve the country’s security 
while it safeguards the launching of a democratic process at the same time.  
 In the course of his implied distinction between state institutions and 
bureaucracies on the one hand and regime institutions on the other, Bishara’s argument 
presents a form of motivational framing. When the anchor asks about the possibility of 
bloodshed if the demonstrators march towards the presidential palace, Bishara stresses 
the importance of the army’s position, since the latter had not collided with protesters at 
the time, and was thus thought to have taken a neutral stance regarding the uprising 
rather than one siding with the regime. Bishara’s mention that “the army has given a 
green light” for more demonstrations aims to provoke his viewers to further escalate in 
order to force the president to flee, in the same way his counterpart in Tunisia had done 
few weeks earlier. Thus, reassuring messages like “guns will fall silent when a million 
demonstrate”, are meant to counter the regime’s methods of intimidating protesters. The 
main goal for all this, as the following excerpt shows, was to topple the regime’s head, 
yet propose an exit strategy to cut down possible losses and destruction.  
The distinction between state institutions and regime institutions is once again 
underscored in Bishara’s commentaries, as he specifically names the army and judicial 
apparatus. This is because the regime in Egypt, despite its authoritarian nature, was often 
challenged by parts of the state’s institutions. Compared to other bodies, the judiciary 
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was the most defying, especially with regard to its supervisory powers during elections. 
In 2005, for example, following constitutional amendments that allowed for the first 
presidential elections to take place in Egypt, the PEC (Presidential Election 
Commission)252 excluded some 1200 judges from supervising the electoral process.253 
The struggle between the PEC and the Judges’ Club (comprising of thousands of 
operating and retired judges) demonstrates the difference between regime institutional 
facts and state institutional facts, in the same way the army’s discontent regarding the 
issue of Tawreeth earlier discussed did. The PEC was closely associated with the 
regime, as it was “largely a ploy to neutralize the Judges Club’s members, who had 
threatened not to monitor elections or endorse winners unless they were granted full 
independence”.254 The Judges Club’s confrontational stance towards Egypt’s authorities 
was not solely restricted to this electoral event. It was rather one based on contesting the 
executive’s subordination of the judicial body and the latter’s lack of full autonomy in 
terms of managing its own affairs as well as supervising and monitoring elections in 
general.255 Thus, the Judges’ Club that was established in 1939 as an independent 
institution whose main aim (or function) was to maintain judicial autonomy256 was not a 
regime institutional fact, as opposed to the PEC that was granted legitimacy (in terms of 
status and function) by the ruling authorities themselves. Hence, whilst the regime’s loss 
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of collective recognition (or collective intentionality) does not affect the presence of 
institutional facts that outdated the regime itself (such as the Judges’ Club or the judicial 
body as a whole), it results in the delegitimation and therefore dissolution of institutional 
facts that were organically linked to it (such as the PEC). Bishara’s call for alignment 
with state institutional facts (the judiciary as a whole) against regime institutional facts 
(the PEC) comes within this context.  
 Exit strategy needed 
The eighth day of protests witnessed mounting domestic pressures on the 
Egyptian President, in addition to signs of abandonment by international allies. In an 
article published by The New York Times one day earlier, Chairman of the American 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, John Kerry, sent a strong message saying 
“President Hosni Mubarak must accept that the stability of his country hinges on his 
willingness to step aside gracefully to make way for a new political structure”.257 Calls 
for Mubarak to step down were gaining international acceptance by the day, and this 
seemed to have encouraged emphasizing the same demand by protesting masses. 
In his eighth day commentary, Bishara once again presents a form of prognostic 
framing. This time, however, his prognosis stresses the need to grant Mubarak an exit 
strategy, as that would minimize the possible damages of political transformation. For 
leaders to accept transition, an “honorable way out should be insured” instead of 
threatening them with trials and executions. Otherwise, they will fight back with all they 
have. Bishara refers to several examples in Latin America and South Africa to assert this 
thought. Even the extreme case of apartheid in the latter was dealt with through 
reconciliation. He criticizes some slogans and acts that were performed in Tahrir Square 
and had attracted media coverage, giving the example of a protester who held a rope and 
a gibbet before TV cameras to symbolize their calls to apply severe punishment. In his 
prognostic framing of the situation, Bishara highly recommends a peaceful transition 
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that would allow the Head of State to bargain for an exit, on condition that clear 
mechanisms to ensure an interim democracy were guaranteed. 
(Presenter asks for commentary, minutes before President Mubarak issues 
a statement) 
Bishara: The principle issue is that the Egyptian people took the streets to 
impose their will, a democratic will. What we’ve seen is a form of 
referendum, a form of elections. This is one of the manifestations of 
democracy.  
The primary achievement would be forcing President Mubarak to step 
down. This means crossing more than half the way, not all of it though. 
The people aim to overthrow the regime. The regime is not an individual. 
The regime is that which precludes free elections. The regime is a 
security apparatus. The regime is torture in prisons. The regime is a 
system of corruption and lack of censorship on the movement of financial 
bids from the state. The regime is corrupting the public sector. The 
regime is corrupt businessmen. The regime is repressive structures. The 
regime is not only Mubarak.  
(Presenter asks for commentary on speculations that Mubarak plans to 
make gradual concessions since “he is of a military background” and, 
thus, “does not run away from the battlefield”).   
Bishara: There is a debate between historians regarding [claims] that he 
actually took part in the first air strike [against Israel in 1973] and 
whether he has any military achievements or not. Many Arab leaders 
claim that they are descendants of the Prophet and that they have military 
achievements. Those are the two hobbies that Arab leaders have.   
I don’t think that a democratic change in the Arab World is possible if 
there were constant threats to kill the leaders [of Arab states] or execute 
them or put them on trial, because this will make it harder for other 
leaders in the region to accept transition. I don’t approve of the tone, [like 
in the case of] someone holding the rope of a gibbet [in the protests]. 
Even in Latin America, bloody dictatorships were offered honorable exits 
and gradual transitions. In South Africa, a committee for truth and 
reconciliation was established but after announcing the end of apartheid. 
So if it were announced that the regime will end and a transition to 
democracy will occur, and mechanisms for that were guaranteed, I 
believe an honorable way out should be insured.258   
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Bishara’s reference to mass demonstrations as a form of referendum or elections 
is meant to counter the narrative promoted by the regime and its media regarding the 
social movement in question. However, and apart from the counterframes it proposes, 
the account is meant to emphasize the receding legitimacy of Mubarak’s regime. The 
regime, as formerly mentioned, is more than the head of state. It is rather a labyrinth of 
power structures and relations whose interest is to maintain the status quo and preserve 
the dominance of its ruling elites. In the excerpt above, Bishara also envisions the 
regime as a system that legitimizes corruption, fraud, repression, and torture, and whose 
antithesis is a democratic form of governance and accountability that respects human 
rights.  
Searle’s model of interpretation helps explain how the system of representation 
that the regime aims to sustain is losing significance. Its representative powers are 
gradually eroding, as a vast poplar consensus is materializing in the form of protests 
contesting its legitimacy. These protests are of immense representative power. They aim 
to question the status-function of the regime, as a representative state apparatus, by 
denying that it acquires collective intentionality. By doing so, they reduce it to a mere 
set of organizational hierarchies rather than an institutional fact whose status is 
recognized by a collective acceptance of its functions.  
In this sense, the “democracy” that these protests convey is one that disarms the 
ruling structures of the collective intentionality that renders them legitimate. 
Concomitantly, a new collective intentionality is crystallizing in open public spaces, one 
whose implications, according to Bishara, are analogous to those of a “referendum” (in 
terms of representative power). This emerging power of representation in the Egyptian 
public sphere evolved into what some (including Bishara) later came to call 
revolutionary legitimacy, as opposed to constitutional legitimacy. Thus, if one were to 
use Searle’s model of interpretation, one could assume that revolutionary legitimacy 
represents an evolving collective intentionality that aims to void constitutional 
legitimacy, being an existing institutional fact, from its own collective intentionality, and 
therefore disarm it of its status and function. 
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 In the second part of the excerpt above, Bishara articulates a satirical account of 
Mubarak’s legacy and personal qualifications, as well as of other Arab rulers that he 
doesn’t name. This serves to consolidate his suggested counterframes that deny the 
narratives and challenge the rhetoric of Egypt’s regime and its president. Mubarak’s 
speech that was aired minutes after this commentary, coincidentally tackled the same 
topic, as he highlighted “his achievements” in the service of his country in what seemed 
to be an attempt to gain popular empathy. 
A battle of camels… and credibility 
When al-Jazeera’s giant screen in Tahrir Square aired Mubarak’s speech on the 
eighth day, scores of protesters chanted their discontent.259 However, Mubarak’s 
emphasis on his years of service in the public office and his vows to stay in Egypt until 
his death sparked the sympathy of many Egyptians. Following his speech, the national 
television aired videos showing his years of presidency along with recordings of 
patriotic songs, and dedicated wide coverage to pro-Mubarak rallies,260 whereas al-
Ahram, the state owned newspaper, followed that by leading its front page headline with 
“Millions march in support of Mubarak”.261  
Yet the regime faced a major setback on the ninth day, when Mubarak’s 
supporters charged protesters in Tahrir Square, some riding camels and horses, in what 
later became known as the “battle of the camels”.262 The battle-like scene was aired live 
on television, and the regime’s image was once again severely damaged. Subsequently, 
the White House announced that American President Barack Obama informed President 
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Mubarak that the transition of power “cannot wait till the end of his term”.263  Egypt’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied to that saying that initiating an immediate 
transitional phase would “contradict the constitution”.264  
Bishara’s commentary on the tenth day comes within this context. It provides a 
response to the argument Mubarak presented in his interview on American network 
ABC, in which he said he is “troubled by the violence in Tahrir Square”, blaming the 
Muslim Brotherhood for that and warning of chaos in case he leaves office or they seize 
power.265 The counterframes presented in the commentary emphasize the predicament of 
chaos versus stability. The former, according to Bishara, has been caused by the 
regime’s deliberate release of thugs to disrupt social order, and not by its protesting 
antagonists, as it claims. However, Bishara’s defensive act of counterframing impels 
him to further clarify his interpretation of the situation. This time, he refers to the 
popular upsurge as a “reformist movement” with a “revolutionary structure”, rather than 
simply a “revolution”. This hybrid description or representation of the event, albeit 
vague, aims to distinguish between two different scenarios. The first is a complete 
dismantling of the constitutional order and state structures, leading to power vacuum and 
high risks of chaos, whereas the second is an organized form of transition that introduces 
gradual alterations of the constitution, until the basic structure of power relations gets 
reformulated on different grounds. 
(Presenter asking for commentary on Mubarak’s interview with ABC in 
which he warned of chaos in the event of him leaving office or the Muslim 
Brotherhood seizing power) 
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Bishara: There is no truth in what he or his deputy said today. Regarding 
the issue of chaos, revolutions in general create chaos and lead to 
constitutional vacuum. In principle, revolutions are against [existing] 
constitutions. They are not within those constitutions. He [i.e. Mubarak] 
has an organized revolution that opposes chaos and he faced it with chaos 
and thugs… This is a reformist movement and not a revolution. It has a 
structure of a revolution yet carries reformist demands… I’m not worried 
of chaos… There is no such thing as chaos due to replacing an individual. 
This is egomania; a sanctification of the individual as if he has no 
replacement.  
[Omar Suleiman] does not even appear to be representing Mubarak. He 
lacks charisma. It’s as if he’s an employee of Mubarak. Second, he thanks 
the youth [protestors] for exhibiting their need for change. Then he asks 
them to go back home. How can we guarantee that the demands would be 
fulfilled if they went back home? How can we guarantee that this doesn’t 
turn into arrests? How can we believe him after today’s events in Tahrir 
Square? It is obvious that they do not want to submit to the demands but 
rather to pass the crisis then sit with the parties and tell them that foreign 
policy is not your concern, that security is not your concern, that relations 
with Israel are not your concern: let’s focus on domestic affairs. The 
Muslim Brotherhood are outside the picture, let’s organize elections with 
the current existing parties; elections managed in the presence of a man 
who controls all the security apparatus and all the intelligence. He can 
then appoint the new president [under the banner of] an electoral process.  
(Presenter asking about the regime’s harassment of media outlets) 
Bishara: Al-Jazeera, irrespective of our opinion [regarding its output], 
saved lives yesterday. Imagine it had not been present in Tahrir Square 
last night… Who would they have blamed for initiating [aggression]? An 
investigation committee would have been created. [It would have 
concluded that] infiltrators were the ones who started it and that they bear 
responsibility.  
(Presenter asking for commentary on Suleiman’s reference to a conspiracy 
in his portrayal of events) 
We can say, with full confidence, that 90% of the Egyptian people are part 
of this conspiracy if this were one.266  
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Albeit exposing a form of inconsistency, Bishara’s description of the uprising as 
a reformist movement with a revolutionary structure could be linked to his previous 
mention of the necessity to cooperate with existing state institutions (the army and 
judicial body in particular) in order to secure the envisioned change. It could also be 
seen within the context of a discursive process involving both, al-Jazeera’s narrative and 
that of the regime. Accordingly, when the regime highlights issues that closely relate to 
the people’s everyday concerns (such as lack of security), al-Jazeera is compelled to 
reassess its promoted frames in order to balance between long-term and short-term 
demands. Thus, frames of democracy, freedom of expression, and revolution, for 
instance, lose much of their resonance if none of the daily concerns were articulated 
alongside. This balance between abstract or distant demands (like democracy) and the 
daily experiences of the subjects of mobilization (like security) is of particular 
importance, as it relates to the salience of the framing process itself. In order to maintain 
this salience, the latter should have a high experiential commensurability, i.e. it should 
be “congruent or resonant with the personal, everyday experiences of the targets of 
mobilization”.267 Accordingly, Bishara seems to be more selective when it comes to his 
descriptions, as he aims to absorb the counterframes promoted by regime figures, 
precisely those regarding the daily experiences of the subjects of mobilization. 
Concomitantly, and in a more direct response to the regime’s frames, he refers to the 
previous day’s events (charge against protesters in Tahrir Square) to further accent his 
viewpoints, discredit the narrative of the president, and underscore the potent role of al-
Jazeera: had it not been for the latter’s live broadcast of the event through smuggled 
cameras and activists’ phone devices, the regime would have easily been able to 
manipulate the story. The channel’s interactivity with the event in question has thus 
empowered a narrative that challenges the regime’s diagnostic framing (blame and 
responsibility) that was carried out since the protests’ early days. It has complemented 
the role of its guest intellectuals and has accordingly acted as an institutional organic 
intellectual as earlier explained.  
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In the course of his counterframing, Bishara undermines the formal Egyptian 
narrative alleging that the discourse is reflective of some form of conspiracy. He 
emphasizes the protests’ representative scope, once again, by sarcastically asserting that 
“90% of Egyptians are part of the conspiracy”. In a study on “framing the Egyptian 
uprising in Arabic language newspapers and social media”, Hamdy and Gomaa 
demonstrate how protesters in pro-government newspapers were “systematically 
portrayed as incapable, misguided youth who were helpless to resist foreign influence or 
to formulate a strategy”.268 This had been the attitude of pro-regime media from the very 
first day and was reflective of the regime’s narrative and congruent with its rhetoric. 
Nonetheless, this narrative was gradually breached, as some officials began showing 
signs of relative submission to certain realities. This was evident on the tenth day when, 
on the private owned network, al-Hayat, newly appointed Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik 
defined the events taking place as an “extreme, collective expression of public opinion”, 
albeit stressing that they do not constitute a revolution.269  
In this tenth day commentary, Bishara also undermines the capabilities of Vice 
President Omar Suleiman, regarding him as someone who “lacks charisma” and who 
acts as “an employee of Mubarak”. This serves in demoting Suleiman’s image as a 
frame articulator defending the regime’s stance and countering the social movement’s 
frames. Following this devaluation of stature, Bishara exposes the contradictions that 
Suleiman’s statement conveys, namely when the latter thanks protesters for vocalizing 
their demands, while, at the same time, accenting the narrative of conspiracy (that they 
allegedly took part in). He also casts doubt on all the initiatives proposed by regime 
figures (President, Vice President, and Prime Minister), stressing that they “do not want 
to submit to the demands, but rather to pass the crisis”. Basing on that, he warns the 
opposition of succumbing to the regime’s exit strategy, as the latter is meant to fracture 
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the social movement calling for radical change by bribing certain factions with limited 
parliamentarian representation and using the Muslim Brotherhood as a tool for 
intimidation, in the same way it had done for decades. This battle of credibility 
involving various forms of framing and counterframing between the social movement’s 
protagonists and antagonists was carried out on a daily basis. Bishara took part in this 
battle in the course of articulating the movement’s demands and proposing 
confrontational strategies. In the excerpt below from the eleventh day of the uprising, he 
goes back to emphasizing the revolutionary nature of the movement after the regime’s 
setbacks following the “Battle of the Camels”, and couples that with forms of 
motivational framing that call for testing the army and pushing it to choose sides.  
Bishara [giving a brief summary of the course of the uprising]: It started 
off with youngsters acting on Facebook, Twitter, and other social 
networks. This evolved into demonstrations and soon they [young 
activists] figured they are capable of triggering the movement of millions, 
whereas the regime changed [its techniques] from provoking [the 
protesters] with F15s and F16s to provoking them with animals… So the 
regime is deteriorating whereas they [the protesters] are progressing. It is 
clear from the regime’s attitude that it is deteriorating and losing 
confidence, and its behavior is characterized by confusion, whereas it is 
clear that the people of Egypt are joining the revolution and that the 
revolution is becoming more extensive and popular. The people of Egypt 
have expressed the best of what’s in them. For example, when was the 
last time in which a mosque preacher addressed Egyptian men and 
women, Muslims and Christians? This regime has brought out the best of 
us as a result of the enmity expressed towards it… I believe that this, in 
itself, reassures the people of Egypt [that] the revolution is heading 
towards the better not the worse. Not [producing] violent gangs nor a 
radical movement nor a new Iran, but rather a developed civil society.    
The revolution is not as they say; a smooth transfer of power to the Vice 
President of the republic. Revolutions occur to change the nature of the 
regime. Negotiations occur with the regime after its defeat and if it 
acknowledges this [defeat], on how to change its nature. And I think that 
our brothers, our colleague intellectuals in particular, should not mix 
things up and confuse the people [when they talk about] transferring 
powers to the Vice President. This is a revolution and not some kind of 
reform from within the regime. The people have not protested and died to 
transfer power to the Vice President! 
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The issue here is how to prevent [the government] from transforming the 
revolution into a sit in. We heard the Prime Minister today saying “we 
can live with a sit-in in a square”. The Egyptian army is constantly being 
complimented but it hasn’t been pushed to choose sides up until now… 
There has been no friction with it and the protesters haven’t practically 
moved in that direction… I am sure that in the event of pushing the army 
to make a choice, it will choose the people.270  
In the excerpt above, Bishara briefly engages in a process of frame articulation, 
as he aligns the events of the uprising from their early formation, when calls for action 
on social media preceded the crystallization of the movement itself. His portrayal of the 
experience is meant to construct a narrative that undermines that of the regime. Using 
the term revolution once again, he highlights the latter’s advancement in terms of scope 
and impact, and accents its growing representational power. This progression, according 
to Bishara, came opposite to the regime’s declining position, as the latter’s techniques 
for intimidating protesters deteriorated from flying fighter jets over Tahrir Square days 
earlier, to sending horses and camels to assault demonstrators. Bishara’s sarcasm isn’t 
only used to devaluate the regime and the methods it uses for handling the situation, but 
rather to highlight the potency of pro-revolution frames. If the “revolution” is advancing, 
this means that the frames promoted by its protagonists - and Bishara is one of them - 
have empirical credibility. Contrary to that, the regime’s frames lack consistency, and 
are characterized by confusion and contradictions. 
Bishara’s engagement in frame disputes with opposition figures does not subside 
either. It rather evolves with the evolution of the popular upsurge. Once again, he warns 
his “colleague intellectuals” of confusing reform with revolutionary change. The 
argument presented here was previously raised when Omar Suleiman was appointed 
Vice President. However, and in consistency with his former account of the “organized 
form of transition” that the social movement is aiming to achieve, Bishara does not deny 
the need to negotiate with the regime on “how to change its nature”. Nonetheless, he 
stresses that this should happen after the regime admits its defeat and submits to the 
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obligations that come along with this admission. The term revolution, therefore, is once 
again used to accent the aims of the social movement with regard to fundamentally 
changing the constitution (as an institutional fact) and reconfiguring the formation of 
other institutional facts (presidency, government, parliament…). The revolution’s goal 
was to create a different constitutional order that integrates certain state institutions and 
political elites and excludes those that are representative of the ruling class or are 
organically connected to it. This relative inconsistency in Bishara’s use of the term 
pertains to the regime’s success in promoting its frames following Mubarak’s speech 
that attained popular sympathy, and its subsequent loss of credibility after the “battle of 
the camels”. The regime’s assault of protesters in Tahrir Square allowed the social 
movement’s protagonists to elevate their tone once again and bank on the footage 
broadcast on al-Jazeera and circulated on social media to motivate protesters and urge 
them to stand their grounds and pursue their demands of overthrowing the regime.  
Bishara also engages in a form of diagnostic framing when he says that the 
“regime brought out the best of (protesters) as a result of the enmity expressed towards 
it”. Accordingly, the demonstrators, because of diagnosing the regime as their rival, 
have maintained the clarity of their demands and deployed an inclusive rhetoric that 
transcends social divisions. This explains, for example, the scene of a preacher 
addressing all Egyptians, men and women as well as Muslims and Christians, with no 
discrimination. Basing on the movement’s inclusiveness, Bishara concludes it is heading 
towards a democratic form of change. His reference to the Iranian Revolution in the 
course of negating a similar outcome comes after Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamine’i 
praised what he called an “Islamic liberation movement” in Tunisia and Egypt, 
following Friday’s prayers that day in Tehran.271 Thus, this negation comes to further 
emphasize his account of the social movement’s goals and identity.   
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A day earlier, the Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmad Shafik said in his interview 
that the government “can live with a sit-in in a square”. This was an important indicator 
of the possible outcomes of the social movement, were it not able to shake the existing 
status quo. Shafik’s statement implied that his government aims to gradually contain the 
movement as it transforms into a mere sit-in in Tahrir Square, amidst calls for dialogue 
and political concessions. The time factor would then play in favor of the regime, as the 
movement’s momentum recedes and the protesters’ enthusiasm declines. Faced by the 
possibility of this scenario (albeit slight due to the vast expansion of the movement), 
Bishara proposes that the protesters “push the army to choose sides”. Previously, he had 
expressed a belief that the army has given protesters a green light to further escalate, and 
had speculated that it would not confront the demonstrators were they to head in huge 
numbers to the presidential palace. This time, he suggests a clear prognosis regarding the 
issue in question: in order to accelerate the “revolutionary” process, the army should be 
tested. Once it openly aligns with protesters, the balance will severely tilt in their favor. 
The social movement was thought to be running the last and most crucial mile before 
attaining its goals. 
Running the last mile 
 On the twelfth day of demonstrations, the Muslim Brotherhood announced they 
are ready to engage in political dialogue with the regime “as long as it shows 
seriousness”. This announcement was issued albeit their statement regarding Friday’s 
demonstrations (eleventh day) was of a relatively high tone, as it praised the protests’ 
“legitimate demands that call for changing the regime and the resignation of its 
president”, and described them using the same words Bishara did; as a “direct popular 
referendum”.272  
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 Calls for dialogue were concurrent with the resignation of the National Party’s 
politburo, whose members included the president’s son and Secretary of the Policy 
Committee Gamal Mubarak, in addition to the party’s Secretary General Safwat al-
Shereef and the Chief of Presidential Staff Zakaria Azmi,273 i.e. what Bishara described 
earlier as the inner circle surrounding the president and constituting one of the regime’s 
main pillars, those who should be the target of any fundamental change. 
 The resignation of the politburo was a significant event of heavy political 
implications, as it revealed the regime’s tendency to yield under pressure. Moreover, it 
accredited the rationale of those who were pushing for fundamental change, Azmi 
Bishara being one of them. The congruency between Bishara’s previously articulated 
prognostic framing and later occurrences armed his narrative with empirical credibility. 
This credence allowed him to further accent the need to pressure the regime and force it 
to negotiate an exit strategy rather than engage with unbinding dialogue. For that to 
happen, the regime had to acknowledge its defeat and start acting accordingly, yet the 
opposition had to act as such as well. On the thirteenth day, as the following excerpt 
shows, Bishara engaged in the last main frame dispute with local opposition figures and 
social movement protagonists, before the regime began showing signs of collapse and 
alternative political possibilities are proposed.  
(Presenter asking for a commentary on the negotiations between the 
opposition and Vice President Omar Suleiman) 
Bishara: To begin with, it’s a good thing that we’re now using the term 
negotiations instead of unbinding dialogue… We have objected, right 
from the beginning, to the usage of the term dialogue because it is 
unbinding… because there is a real political dispute. This is a revolution 
against the regime and not a misunderstanding. Secondly, what are you 
negotiating the regime on? Is it possible that you negotiate the regime on 
its downfall? You go to negotiate when the regime is convinced that it 
has been defeated in order to agree on an exit strategy… This regime is 
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rulingparty], al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 6, 2011. Accessed May
 28, 2014. 
http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=1&issueno=11758&article=606998&search=%E3% 
D5%D1&state=true#.U5R8WDn7VD0. 
	   130	  
not convinced it has been defeated yet. This is why negotiating the 
regime is equivalent to granting it legitimacy.  
When you start a revolution you have to be on the offensive. You have to 
say: your presence in power [referring to the regime] is costing the state 
one billion dollars per day, your presence in power and not protesting.  
For instance, they [the opposition] want the regime, even our brothers, 
the Muslim Brotherhood, to acknowledge that the protesters are 
honorable and patriotic. Is this what is required from the regime? So you 
need a certificate from the regime acknowledging that those are not 
foreign agents? Are you taking this accusation seriously? On the 
contrary; you should be accusing this regime of submitting to foreign 
interests rather than maintaining national sovereignty, of involving the 
United States [in its decision making], of losing sovereignty over Sina’a, 
and of selling gas to Israel for one third of its price! 
This regime and all its constitutional arguments are from the past now. 
We want a new regime that creates a new constitution, or a new 
parliament that amends the constitution. This is why we need a new phase 
headed by a neutral figure; the head of the Constitutional Court [for 
instance]. This man or any other [neutral] one [should] head this 
transition. Elections are then organized and a parliament gets elected. The 
latter either amends the constitution or creates a new one.274  
 In the abovementioned, Bishara engages in a frame dispute with opposition 
factions once more. He particularly names the Muslim Brotherhood, with critical 
reference to their rhetoric that either revealed their hesitance or their avoidance of full-
fledged commitment to radical change. Following this rationale, Bishara insists that 
rather than deploying a defensive strategy, the opposition should be on the offensive, 
and instead of taking the regime’s accusations of protesters seriously, the opposition 
should be the one condemning it for submitting to foreign powers and acting in 
accordance to the latter’s interests. 
 However, calls for raising the benchmark of demands were challenged by the 
country’s aggravating political, security, and economic conditions. Bishara’s comments 
concerning the costs of the popular uprising (alleges that it is causing a loss of one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYC9nVncYTc uploaded February 6, 2011, accessed November 
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billion dollars a day) came hours after the international credit rating agency Moody’s 
issued discouraging reports regarding the economic situation in Egypt. The corporation 
speculated that the latter’s national currency would soon deteriorate as foreigners and 
rich local businessmen exchange their cash reserves of local currency into foreign 
currencies instead.275 In principle, this kind of data serves the regime. It credits the 
latter’s narrative regarding the repercussions of the uprising, as the narrative focused on 
negative outcomes on the levels of politics (Muslim Brotherhood seizing power), 
security (chaos and social discord), and economy (massive financial loss). Thus, 
blaming the regime for any of these possible outcomes was an essential part of the 
counterframing process that Bishara engages in here as well as in previous and later 
commentaries. Accordingly, Bishara’s counter narrative suggests that the regime’s 
insistence on holding on to power and its refusal to submit to calls for fundamental 
change have resulted in the exacerbation of political, economic, and security conditions 
in Egypt. 
Bishara also presents a prognosis of a possible scenario in which radical change 
is secured and an exit strategy is granted to the regime. To Bishara, a transitional phase 
headed by a neutral figure like the head of the Constitutional Court serves both purposes.  
Thereafter, parliamentary elections are organized and a new legislative body creates a 
constitution replacing the old one or substantially alters the latter. Engaging with the 
constitutional issue, even in theory, represents the first phase of deconstructing the 
institutional fact that legitimizes the regime and of proposing an alternative one. This 
shall be examined in our analysis of the following excerpts.  
Alternative political possibilities  
On the fifteenth day of the uprising, Bishara clearly defines the issue in question 
as one of creating a new constitutional order. This, accordingly, is the ultimate 
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ramification of the evolving social discourse. To support his argument, he cites the 
similar case of Indonesia in which the deconstruction of a regime’s ruling structures 
(institutional facts) and the subsequent construction of an alternative authority 
(alternative institutional facts) paid off well on the political and economic levels. His 
identification of a set of postulates that has “resulted from an exchange of opinions, 
ideas, statements, and unplanned reactions” highlights a newly emerging collective 
intentionality amongst the protesting masses, one that has disarmed the existing system 
of power structures from its status as a ruling authority.  
Bishara: A set of postulates has imposed itself, resulting from an 
exchange of opinions, ideas, and statements, as well as unplanned 
reactions. Anyone who breaches it would lose the masses. Those 
postulates include overthrowing the regime and initiating dialogue only 
after its downfall. The issue is not that of constitutional amendments in 
the presence of the current regime. It is that of overthrowing the regime 
and creating a new constitution.  
The revolutionary movement has now put everything into place. What 
were today’s demonstrations characterized by? First, their pervasiveness 
more than any other time… Secondly, the [movement towards] public 
headquarters did not affect [the sit-in in] Tahrir Square. The solid core is 
still in Tahrir Square, but this doesn’t mean that tens of thousands cannot 
move towards public facilities owned by the state and by the people, 
without resorting to violence [but rather] through civil disobedience.  
The decision here is political not legal. The resolution is political not 
constitutional. The question of power is a political one that is resolved 
politically and not through constitutional debates… There is a difference 
between legitimacy and legality [terms used in English]. Legitimacy is 
superior to law. Our question is about legitimacy. All these legal 
procedures [taken by the regime] are no more legitimate, albeit 
procedurally [term used in English] legal. They are illegitimate because a 
revolutionary legitimacy has now emerged. Constituent assemblies after 
revolutions are not elected by the way. They are representative of all 
social sectors. This was the case of the French revolution’s Declaration of 
Human Rights for instance.    
The case of Suharto in Indonesia is very similar to that of Mubarak. 
Indonesia was transformed into an economic miracle after fighting 
corruption, [allowing] people to work freely, renewing investment laws 
through transparent means that attracts people [and stimulates them] to 
work more, invest more, and become more creative… 
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[Presenter asking for a response to the argument that “10 million 
protesters” on the streets want to impose their opinion on the rest of the 
Egyptians] 
Bishara: Mush less than those have changed the course of history. The 
question should be reversed: Where are the millions of the National Party 
and the millions who have allegedly voted for the party in the elections? 
Despite that, I say that each one of those represents the Egyptian people 
or represents a family or a neighborhood. I can easily claim that 70 
million Egyptians have practically taken part in these demonstrations. 
However, I suggest that [the Egyptians] make use of former similar 
experiences done by other peoples in order to negate such claims. Even 
those who are staying home can make a signal, raise a flag for instance, 
or stop their cars for 15 minutes each day.276  
As earlier explained, the social movement’s protagonists gradually came to label 
it as one bearing revolutionary legitimacy. Bishara uses this term in the excerpt 
discussed here in the course of distinguishing the notion of “legitimacy” from that of 
“legality”. This distinction serves in countering the regime’s narrative regarding the 
uprising’s degree of representation. It is meant to assert that legitimacy lies in the vibrant 
public calling for change and not in the constitutional frameworks reflecting existing 
power relations, nor in the legal operational activity of the state’s bureaucracy. The 
latter, even though it continues to function, no more bears collective acceptance, as the 
regime was challenged by vast numbers of protesters calling for its downfall. Bishara 
emphasizes this point in the counterframing he presents as he compares the immense 
anti-regime protests to the humble demonstrations organized by their antagonists – 
supposedly millions in number according to previous elections results. He regards this as 
sufficient proof that the regime and the popular majority rest at opposite ends since anti-
regime protesters are also representative of broad stagnant social sectors. The latter 
include unmobilized segments having similar or identical viewpoints, family members 
of activists, young and old age groups, etc. 
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Bishara builds on the abovementioned to present a form of prognostic framing, 
as he urges the movement’s inactive proponents to take part in fostering the discourse 
through symbolic gestures. Thus, simple acts like raising the Egyptian flag on the place 
of residence would serve the movement even if active participation in rallies were not 
taking place. Such gestures would also serve in negating the regime’s framing narrative, 
as they credit the claim regarding the movement’s vast representation and the regime’s 
loss of collective acceptance.  
In his explication of the idea of collective intentionality, Searle explains that a 
“sufficient number of members of the relevant community must continue to recognize 
and accept the existence of institutional facts.” He adds that “because the status is 
constituted by its collective acceptance, and because the function, in order to be 
performed, requires the status, it is essential to the function that there be continued 
acceptance of the status”.277 Accordingly, if one were to integrate the literature on 
framing with Searle’s model of social constructivism, one could think of the emphasis 
on revolutionary legitimacy by the movement’s protagonists as a form of frame 
amplification of the newly emerging collective intentionality. This emphasis could also 
be understood as a form of promotion for alternative political possibilities or, using 
Searle’s terms, of alternative institutional facts. 
Bishara’s argument emphasizes the social movement’s pervasiveness once more 
and highlights its increasing momentum (ability to maintain its presence in Tahrir 
Square and mobilize towards different public institutions simultaneously). This is meant 
to further amplify the movement’s representative character vastly outweighing that of 
the regime. In other words, it is meant to underscore the movement’s expanding 
legitimacy on the one hand, and the regime’s receding legitimacy on the other, or, using 
Searle’s terms, the extent of collective acceptance that the movement is gaining and the 
regime is losing. 
On the sixteenth day of the uprising, the Muslim Brotherhood warned of a 
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possible military takeover after Egypt’s Foreign Minister Ahmad Aboul Gheit 
announced that the army shall intervene to “protect the constitution” if turmoil breaks 
out. Warnings of that sort grew louder as the regime faced further decay and questions 
regarding its legitimacy became more pressing. On the government front, the Minister of 
Culture Jaber Asfour278, a well-known writer and academic, resigned following heavy 
criticism by Egyptian intellectuals for accepting to join an “illegitimate cabinet”.279 
Concomitantly, anti-regime protesters laid siege to the parliament and national television 
headquarters and surrounded army barricades in both areas.280  
With the regime’s defenses weakening, the question of legitimacy became the 
core of its debate with its adversaries. The regime held on to the constitution, as an 
institutional fact representative of collective intentionality. On the other hand, its 
opponents alleged that a new collective intentionality had emerged and evolved in public 
spaces (where protests were taking place) and outside constitutional frameworks, 
claiming that the latter have lost their status as guarantors of social order. Accordingly, 
Bishara insists, once again, that the answer to the quandary in hand lies in reconfiguring 
existing institutional facts (regime constitution and institutions) and not in replacing 
certain ruling elites with others from within the regime itself. 
(Presenter asking for commentary on Omar Suleiman’s statement in 
which he warned from having to take “decisive measures” and on 
interpretations of this statement as a threat of staging a military coup)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 Jaber Asfour was a well known linguistic and intellectual. He taught in various Arab and International 
universities including Harvard University. He contributed to several cultural projects, some of which were 
organized by the UNESCO and the Arab League.  
See “Dr. Jaber Asfour”, Arab Thought Foundation, accessed May 15, 2016. http://arabthought.org/en/dr-
jaber-asfour#.V3A0KHgxHUo  
279 “Al-ǧālayan yataṣā’ad fī Miṣr”, [Escalation increasing in Egypt] al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ. February 10, 2011. 
Accessed June 7, 2014. 
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280 Jack Shenker, “Egypt protesters surround state TV building”, The Guardian, February 11, 2011, 
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Bishara: I hope that the idea of settling for an alternative from within the 
regime is over now because this regime wants to either survive or fall as a 
whole. There is an analogy in political science called the inverted 
pyramid. When you hit the top of a pyramid standing on its head, it 
would totter because it has no base. [Similarly] the regime fears that if its 
head were hit, it would die. Everything would get destabilized if the head 
were hit.  
There is no such thing as impartiality. In the end, the army will be 
obliged to preserve legitimacy… The question is: which legitimacy? It is 
obvious that legitimacy is gradually becoming popular legitimacy. The 
army might need time before recognizing this. It might clash [with 
protesters] and this might cause casualties. But, in the end, it will realize 
that. It is preferable that this happens prior to any clashes… [However] 
this has happened in every place around the world.  
I believe that the Egyptian revolution [should] now be guided by a 
strategy and a leadership that is ready to weigh options – and a leadership 
is an organized body that weighs options… The first phase of the 
Egyptian revolution was not a “revolution”, [albeit] we, as well as others, 
have called it a “revolution”… At a certain point, we felt that it deserves 
to be called a revolution for the following reasons: First, because it 
introduced the issue of power, the issue of rule. Second, because it was 
general, extensive, and simultaneous. Third, because it comprised all 
aspects of life. Fourth, because it didn’t propose its demands within the 
context of the regime. The difference between a revolution on the one 
hand, and an uprising or a protest on the other, is that the latter all have 
demands in the context of the [existing] regime.  
This is a revolution that was initiated by youngsters, but it is not a youth 
revolution. I should warn from this issue because many Egyptian 
commentators on the Egyptian Television and some Egyptian channels 
described it as a youth revolution, as if it were a misunderstanding 
between generations. This reminds me of the tone of the elderly in the 
1968 revolution in Europe. They dealt with it as if it were an issue of a 
generational gap [term used in English], a revolution of a generation 
against another that could be dealt with through [mutual] understanding 
and education etc…281  
In the above statement, Bishara uses the inverted pyramid analogy to explain that 
the regime has no base and would thus “totter if the head were hit”. This falls into the 
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same prognostic framing he had been promoting for days, in which he asserted that the 
ultimate goal lies in forcing the president to step down, as this is the only means to 
initiate a serious deconstruction of existing institutional facts. By the sixteenth day, the 
question of legitimacy was forcing itself upon the army - the institution acting as the 
state’s main tool for enforcing public order. Bishara asserts that the army has to choose 
between a regime whose legitimacy is eroding and a popular movement that is gradually 
attaining collective acceptance. The protesters’ movement towards (and siege of) 
institutions representing state sovereignty and symbolizing the regime’s legitimacy like 
the parliament was compelling the military to make a stance. According to Bishara, it 
might take time before the army recognizes that popular legitimacy has surpassed the 
constitutional legitimacy of the regime. Nevertheless, he asserts that this would 
ultimately change, possibly after colliding with protesters.  Thus, he reaffirms his former 
prognostic framing regarding the need to compel the army to choose sides. In parallel, 
his prognosis promoting the need to march towards state institutions was gradually 
materializing, albeit the move was still limited to the parliament and state television at 
this point (preparations for the march towards the presidential palace began the 
following day).  
Bishara’s prognostic framing also suggests the need to provide the movement 
with leadership and strategy. This prognosis is presented as a general guideline for 
fundamental change, ultimately leading to the reconfiguration of existing institutional 
facts.  Contrary to previous engagements, his account of the movement as a revolution is 
retrospectively presented in this excerpt. In this scope, he explains that his (as well as 
other protagonists’) framing of the upsurge during its early days was a motivational one, 
as it wasn’t an accurate description but rather an implicit call for action. Yet he affirms 
that the evolution of the upsurge validated its depiction as a revolution later on. Towards 
the end of the excerpt, Bishara’s counterframing of pro-regime representations claiming 
that the uprising reflects a generational gap is meant to further assert the nature of the 
discourse as one aiming to replace institutional facts that have lost their collective 
acceptance, rather than some form of “misunderstanding between generations”. 
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Bishara’s retrospective revision of his (and al-Jazeera’s) narrative construction was also 
articulated in his concluding commentary on the day Mubarak’s resignation was 
announced as shall later be shown.    
Religion in the service of motivation 
The contribution of Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi to the discourse under study 
was a substantial one. It added a religious dimension to the framing process delivered by 
al-Jazeera to its broad audience. Al-Qaradawi’s interpretations of the event, despite their 
scarcity, heavily relied on theological accounts and were often presented in the form of 
motivational framing. The cleric invested in his highly regarded stature amongst a wide 
array of Islamists to boldly defy the regime and engage in a pear-to-pear discourse. The 
motivational framing presented was regularly fueled by religious incentives. In a 
conservative society like that of Egypt, this variable helps in maximizing the impact of 
the framing process. Al-Jazeera invested in that well: The questions and comments 
posed by its presenters accented the religious facet on multiple occasions and oriented 
the discussion in that direction. In the following, we present three excerpts followed by a 
brief reference to a fourth contribution by al-Qaradawi. We have settled for mere 
references to religious texts (Quranic verses and Islamic litanies) and refrained from 
citing them, as their interpretation lies beyond our scope of discussion. We are rather 
interested in revealing their instrumental use in the framing process presented, as they 
only come to emphasize the messages delivered through the texts as a whole.  
Like Azmi Bishara, Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi was keen on distinguishing 
between the state’s institutional facts and those that legitimize the regime or constitute it. 
Following President Mubarak’s first speech, al-Qaradawi hailed the protesters for their 
endurance and urged them to persist on their demands and to refrain from sabotaging 
state property or confronting security forces. In this context, al-Qaradawi deployed a 
potent religious oratory to promote his (and al-Jazeera’s) frames of the uprising, 
precisely that it aims to maintain the state, yet replace the regime. 
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(Presenter asks al-Qaradawi to comment on events in Egypt and to send a 
message on air - via phone)  
Al-Qaradawi: I have only three messages to deliver; one to the rebellious 
people of Egypt, another to the dear Egyptian army, and a third to the 
Egyptian regime and its head President Hosni Mubarak. As for my word 
to the people, I hail them [for igniting] their blessed uprising against 
corruption after enduring poverty, hunger, and unemployment for so 
long, and while witnessing those enjoying the riches of the country, 
spending its money, and looting its lands. It is inevitable that those who 
have endured would rise up one day and say no. The people said no in 
these peaceful marches and demonstrations. They left their homes and 
took the street, not even armed with sticks, and held nothing but rosaries 
and the Quran. They refuse to live this miserable life. They want dignity, 
freedom, and their daily bread, but, unfortunately, they were met with 
security [measures]… I have made a statement today through the 
Egyptian newspaper al-Shurouk in which I asked the protesters not to 
clash with security forces, as they are part of you and you are part of 
them. And perhaps many of them have the same complaints as you do 
and would have joined you had they had the chance. Unfortunately, we 
saw martyrs falling along with more than a thousand wounded 
yesterday… I repeat my call once more. Do not lay your hands on any of 
the state’s institutions or any property, public or private, for this is haram. 
I call upon the people to continue in this uprising, for, God willing, your 
persistence will bring you [your] rights.  
As for my word to the dear Egyptian army, I call upon it to protect Egypt 
in the coming period, as it is a period of utmost importance. I do not ask 
it to rule, as we do not want to throw the ball in the military court once 
again and end up with semi-military civilians ruling us. We want the 
army to hand in the rule to civilians, and those of them [the military] who 
want to rule should take off their military uniform and practice [politics] 
according to the rules of democracy and shura. I want the army to remain 
as I see it in the footage before me, to refrain from assaulting anyone and 
to maintain security from a distance.  
As for my word to the Egyptian regime and its head, President Hosni 
Mubarak… we’ve been waiting for his statement for long. Yet he gave us 
a speech [that shows that] he’s living in a different world… He doesn’t 
feel the anguish of the people. All he said was that he’d be dismissing the 
government… He didn’t say he won’t be running for presidency, nor that 
he won’t bequeath his rule, nor that he’d be dissolving the parliament and 
the Shura Council that have been established on electoral fraud, nor that 
he’d be putting an end to the emergency law that has been ruling Egypt 
for decades. 
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I advise President Mubarak to abandon his position and leave Egypt. 
There is no other solution to this problem. Egypt has lost tens of billions 
in days… Leave, Mubarak. Thirty years are enough… Have mercy on the 
people and leave so that the destruction doesn’t increase. Tens of people 
have died in one day for protesting in demand for their right in social 
justice and human dignity, but you and your soldiers have faced them 
with bullets… I advise you, [Mr.] President, to make use of the lesson of 
Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and voluntarily leave on your feet while you 
could, instead of being forced to do that. I don’t want the masses to put 
you on trial. I want you to be on trial before a just court, a civilian court, 
unlike the military courts that you create to sue your opponents… [Cites 
Quranic verses] God gives respite but never neglects and he sets a time 
for everything [cites Quranic verses]. 
I say this in my name and in the name of all the people of Egypt who are 
asking you to leave. I say this in the name of thousands of religious 
scholars in Egypt and the Islamic World.282   
In excerpt above, al-Qaradawi’s three messages are demonstrative of diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivational framing. His word to the protesting masses is motivational 
and inciting of persistent action, as he hails the demonstrators and encourages them to 
continue their upsurge until they achieve their goals, while amplifying themes like 
dignity and freedom (alternative possibilities) as opposed to poverty, hunger, corruption, 
and unemployment (existing circumstances). Al-Qaradawi’s mention of the inevitability 
of the uprising is stimulating of further action in itself, precisely when coupled with a 
religious depiction of its occurrences. His portrayal of unarmed activists “holding 
nothing but the Quran” serves in iconizing the movement and furthering its allure 
amongst conservatives in general and Islamists in particular. Al-Qaradawi’s prognostic 
framing is evident in his emphasis on the need to maintain the peaceful character of the 
uprising and to refrain from colliding with security forces despite their occasional use of 
force, and from damaging public and private assets alike. His prognosis, however, is 
reinforced by the use of religious terminology. Thus is his emphasis that vandalism and 
intentional destruction of property is haram; it is forbidden according to the teachings of 
Islam, and any violator of the teachings is subject to divine penalty in the afterlife. This 
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Islamist terminology serves in delineating certain limits of action amongst conservative 
activists (Islamists and otherwise), the latter constituting a high percentage of protesters. 
It allows for a degree of orientation and control and therefore a relatively cohesive 
strategy, at least within the communal strata subject to the Sheikh’s influence. 
In his message to the army, al-Qaradawi anticipates a “new Egypt” with civil 
rule that functions within the frameworks of democracy and shura. This part of the 
excerpt does not exhibit any particular form of framing, as the army was neither fully 
aligned with the regime nor had it revealed any sympathy towards the uprising yet. It 
was rather still acting as a passive player in the ongoing discourse, and this dissociated it 
from the two conflicting framing processes. The Sheikh’s appeasing tone regarding the 
army, however, held special significance, as it revealed his exclusion of the military 
institution from his (and al-Jazeera’s) efforts to delegitimize the regime. As for his 
vision of “a new Egypt” with alternative political possibilities, al-Qaradawi endorses 
democracy and shura as two mechanisms capable of producing different institutional 
facts that substitute Mubarak’s regime structures. The Sheikh, however, does not 
elaborate on the two mentioned concepts. In former contributions dating back to more 
than a decade, he explicates that “the tools and guaranties created by democracy are as 
close as can ever be to the realization of the political principles brought to this world by 
Islam to put a leash on the ambitions and whims of rulers. These principles are: shura, 
nasiha (advice) enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, disobeying illegal orders, 
resisting unbelief, and changing wrong by force when possible”.283 This merger between 
Islamic and modern principles is left obscure in most of al-Qaradawi’s illuminations on 
the issue. Similarly, the frameworks he propagates outlining a new social order in Egypt 
in this excerpt (as well as others) are rather vague. Accordingly, al-Qaradawi’s 
visualization of alternative institutional facts in Egypt is not given priority during the 
uprising, partly because his central concern was to push for ousting the president prior to 
anything else, and partly because this was not his specialization, since, as a religious 
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figure, his added value lies in his compelling promotion of motivational frames rather 
than scientific or objective accounts of a new social order.  
In his word to the president, al-Qaradawi presents a clear diagnosis of the 
problem as one relating to Mubarak himself. He blames the latter for the damages and 
casualties and insists on his resignation, arguing that leaving office is the means to 
receive a fair trial rather than a military one. Al-Qaradawi’s reference to military courts 
that Mubarak has “created to sue his opponents” is meant to further motivate his 
spectators. The deterministic tone he uses regarding the outcomes of the uprising is 
amplified by his deployment of religious language. His statement about God who “gives 
respite but never neglects” (preceded by a Quranic verse and followed by another one 
for the purpose of emphasis) is meant to motivate the audience he claims to be 
representing, the latter including thousands of religious scholars and clerics who have 
their own spheres of influence as well. Al-Qaradawi’s reliance on Muslim scholars who 
look up to him eventually collided with the power practiced by al-Azhar and its head, 
the latter being the religious institution that the regime relies on as a supplementary tool 
to sustain its legitimacy. The following excerpt demonstrates this collision:  
Al-Qaradawi: I have asked the Sheikh of al-Azhar to side with the people 
and not their enemies, but unfortunately, he issued a statement today 
condemning the oppressed rather than the oppressors and saying that 
those who call for demonstrations do not have an ounce of faith in their 
hearts. Why do you not say that about those who stand against 
demonstrations? All what the protesters are asking for is some of their 
rights. They are asking for freedom and dignity. Is this forbidden? We 
call upon all Azhari scholars to go down the streets wearing their turbans, 
to stand with the people, especially on Friday. I call upon the imams and 
preachers of mosques to go down the streets with the worshipers.284  
In the excerpt above, al-Qaradawi presents counterframes in response to Sheikh 
al-Azhar’s framing of the upsurge and its activists. Sheikh al-Azhar, Ahmed al-Tayyib, 
is one of the two highest religious authorities in Egypt (along with the Mufti) and is head 
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of al-Azhar, the most prominent Islamic institute of religious studies around the world. 
Al-Qaradawi had always thought of Sheikh al-Azhar as a mere state official, albeit he 
identified himself as an Azhari (he pursued his religious studies in al-Azhar).285  
Contrary to that, he regarded himself as an independent reformist authority. This 
allegiance of al-Tayyib partly explains their divergent viewpoints regarding Egypt’s 
upsurge: Al-Tayyib denounced the activists and their motives in his framing of events 
saying they “do not have an ounce of faith in their hearts”, whereas al-Qaradawi 
amplified themes like freedom and dignity, and emphasized their centrality in the social 
movement’s driving purposes.  
This excerpt also shows al-Qaradawi’s insistence on challenging Egypt’s 
authorities: After asking the president to resign and urging the army to refrain from 
confronting protesters, he calls upon clerics, preachers, and Azhari scholars to join the 
demonstrators following Friday’s prayers, in an effort to incite rebellion within the 
state’s religious institutions, through openly engaging in a process of motivational 
framing. Al-Qaradawi’s other contributions that served this process of motivation were 
part and parcel of al-Jazeera’s output as an institution, as shall be demonstrated next. 
Conclusion 
In its coverage of the Egyptian uprising, al-Jazeera invested in the potency of 
two frame articulators whose commentaries were meant to serve in constructing a 
revolutionary narrative of events and in promoting it to millions of the channel’s 
spectators inside Egypt and around the Arab World. The social movement in Egypt 
replicated the Tunisian example and quickly evolved from calling for the downfall of the 
regime following Friday’s Day of Rage to translating its chants to various forms of 
action, as demonstrators sieged the National Television and the Parliament before 
heading to the Presidential Palace. All throughout this process, Azmi Bishara was 
particularly promoting diagnostic and prognostic frames, envisioning scenarios of action 
and advocating the creation of a different social order, whereas Sheikh Youssef al-
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Qaradawi engaged in presenting motivational frames, as he deployed religious texts to 
incite protesters and urge them to endure security measures and persist until they oust 
President Mubarak. 
Both intellectuals aimed at the Egyptian regime after defining it and called for 
deconstructing the system of power relations directly associated with the president. Thus 
they insisted that, for change to be meaningful and for revolutionary demands to be 
realized, it was necessary to replace the constitution with a new one that legitimizes a 
different form of governance. This, however, required the army’s support and a vision of 
the future that is inclusive of both, the military and judiciary bodies, as well as of some 
former political elites. It was therefore important to address these different institutions 
using a variety of tones. Whilst regime figures like the president and the vice president 
were demeaned, the army was addressed with an appeasing tone and was called upon to 
guarantee a transitional democracy. State institutions were thus distinguished from 
regime power structures and the latter were separately depicted as targets of the desired 
change. Al-Jazeera’s intellectuals framed the discourse accordingly and complemented 
the network’s intensive coverage with various forms of meaning construction as they 
promoted alternative political possibilities. Thus the channel, as an entity, functioned as 
an institutional organic intellectual, or, in Gramscian terms, as a permanent persuader 
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Chapter 5 
Al-Jazeera’s Intellectual Output 
and Deconstructing the Libyan State 
This chapter argues that the elements distinguishing the case of Libya from that 
of Egypt allowed al-Jazeera’s intellectuals to attain a more active role in deconstructing 
all institutional facts sustained by the Libyan regime, including the state’s institutional 
facts themselves. The mentioned elements comprise of inherent features that 
characterize Gaddafi’s regime, as well as intervening variables that altered the course of 
the Libyan uprising and set a discursive pattern that fundamentally differs from that 
witnessed in Egypt. The engagement of al-Jazeera’s intellectuals with the uprising in 
Libya accordingly followed a different path; not only were those intellectuals promoting 
revolutionary frames and shaping anti-regime discourse, but also taking part in 
formulating regime alternatives and concretely crystallizing these alternatives on the 
ground. Al-Jazeera and its intellectuals facilitated the creation of the National 
Transitional Council that seized power in Libya after the downfall of Gaddafi. Its 
intellectuals’ articulations were thus reflective of actual policies rather than mere 
analysis, speculations, and various forms of framing. Al-Jazeera acted as a medium for 
maverick change in Libya, using soft power as a means to introduce the deployment of 
hard power as the uprising militarized. The outlet banked on the features distinguishing 
Libya’s institutional facts from those of Egypt and Tunisia, and its choice of intellectuals 
and framing tactics accordingly expanded. 
The events in Libya succeeded those of neighboring Egypt and Tunisia. On 
February 14, 2011, social media were similarly used to call for anti-regime protests. The 
arrest of a human rights activist in the eastern city of Benghazi on February 15, ignited 
riots that security forces responded to with live ammunition. The situation escalated 
dramatically in the following days, with reports of hundreds of casualties and worldwide 
condemnations. On February 18, Saif al-Islam, the son of Libyan Leader Mo’ammar 
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Gaddafi, appeared on television asserting that his father will fight “till the last bullet”.  
Similarly, four days later, Gaddafi vowed to “fight until the last drop of blood is spilt”, 
promising to “die a martyr”. Few days after, UN Security Council announced sanctions 
on Gaddafi and his family, whereas the EU approved a similar decision involving the 
Leader and his close advisers. Starting March 5, the regime’s legitimacy began gradually 
eroding, as the National Transitional Council (NTC) created by opposition figures 
declared itself sole representative of Libyans and started seeking international 
recognition. On March 17, however, 32 days after the uprising’s advent, a major 
development fundamentally changed the local scene, as UN Security Council issued 
Resolution 1973 authorizing a no-fly zone and “all necessary measures” to protect 
Libyan civilians.286  
Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the uprising in Libya followed a track similar to that in 
Egypt during the first days. The outlet’s engagement with the event rapidly escalated, 
however, reaching its zenith prior to the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1973. 
Gaddafi’s regime was different from its overthrown neighbors in Tunisia and Egypt, as 
it adopted a dogmatic ideology, lacked proper institutional bureaucracies, and was far 
more centralized and functionally dependent on its Leader. Consequently, the 
engagement of al-Jazeera’s intellectuals with the Libyan event focused on targeting the 
regime’s symbolic icons and representations, from its Leader to its malfunctioning 
bureaucracies operating under the banner of Popular Committees (Lijan Shabiyya) that 
were envisioned in Gaddafi’s Green Book and Third Universal Theory. The 
intellectuals’ framing processes involved overt ridicule and condescending depictions of 
Gaddafi as a means to disarm him of his allure, discredit his claims, and delegitimize his 
authority. 
Concomitantly, al-Jazeera’s usage of intellectuals for promoting diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivational frames, expanded to include Libyan opposition figures who 
played key roles in establishing alternative realities in the Eastern part of the country, 
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before seizing power upon the downfall of Gaddafi. Involving local intellectuals was a 
means to cope with Libya’s distinct features and to invest in the militarization of the 
uprising. Local Libyan intellectuals supplemented Bishara’s powerful framing 
arguments and played a significant role in transforming al-Jazeera’s involvement with 
events. The first of those was Mahmoud Shammam, a Libyan media expert and 
politician in exile and former member of al-Jazeera’s administrative board. Shammam, 
who later took charge of media relations in the NTC, was given all necessary financial, 
technical, and logistic facilities by Qatari authorities to launch the first Libyan satellite 
network supporting the rebels during the uprising under the name Libya al-Ahrar.287 The 
second was Sleiman Dogha, former head of al-Ghad Media Corporation owned by Saif 
al-Islam in London, and member of the NTC. For al-Jazeera, Dogha, a young articulate 
journalist in his thirties, was thought to be an adequate representative of the vibrant 
young generation calling for change.288 The third and most influential Libyan 
intellectual was Sheikh Ali al-Sallabi, a Muslim cleric in exile hosted by Qatar since the 
late 1990s and a member of the Global Union for Muslim Scholars headed by al-
Qaradawi.289 Al-Sallabi held ties with one of the most potent opposition military factions 
in Libya: The Islamic Fighting Group. 
The three Libyan intellectuals invested in the channel’s soft power capabilities to 
acquire credence and employ it in favor of a newly established representative body 
(NTC). This body legitimized foreign intervention and facilitated the domestic use of 
hard power by channeling funds and weapons to the rebels. Al-Qaradawi, on the other 
hand, used al-Jazeera’s platform to threaten Gaddafi’s personal security as he issued a 
fatwa during one of the outlet’s interviews, calling for his assassination by any Libyan 
capable of doing so. He and al-Sallabi encouraged Libyan ministers, diplomats, and 
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army officers to defect from the regime, depicting that as a religious obligation. On 
several occasions, official Libyan figures were mentioned by name in these calls.   
Al-Jazeera promoted intense motivational frames in its coverage of the uprising. 
Yet Resolution 1973 announced a decline in its impact. Thereafter, its intellectuals’ 
engagements with Libyan events were mostly analytical and descriptive, as NATO’s 
involvement in military operations became the decisive factor in the battle against 
Gaddafi, vastly outweighing local opposition dynamics and media discourse. Hence, this 
chapter examines the engagement of al-Jazeera and its intellectuals with the uprising in 
Libya from its starting days until the Security Council’s declaration of Resolution 1973. 
Its analysis of al-Jazeera’s framing processes and promotional campaigns to delegitimize 
Gaddafi’s authority shall be restricted to this timeframe. Yet as previously done in the 
chapter on Egypt, we shall start by locating our analysis in al-Jazeera’s institutional 
setting. Hence, we present the network’s function as an institutional organic intellectual 
operating within a regional power discourse that Qatar was more vividly part of (in 
comparison to its involvement in Egypt) before we move to analyzing the output of its 
intellectuals individually. Thus, since Doha’s involvement in the case of Libya was more 
blatant, highlighting al-Jazeera’s institutional contribution to the discourse shall focus on 
its relation to this involvement rather than on the network’s mere journalistic coverage 
of the Libyan uprising. We therefore need not present any sample reports conveying al-
Jazeera’s editorial line as we did in the previous chapter, for the channel’s active 
engagement in Libya has surpassed that by far as shall be shown and discussed. Prior to 
that, however, we shall cast light on Libya’s unique institutional facts that provoked a 
different engagement by the network with the country’s uprising. 
   Libya’s unique institutional facts 
By Libya’s institutional facts, we mean the social realities that have acquired 
collective recognition by the Libyan community, and that have accordingly gained a 
specific status and function within a hierarchical social structure and inter-communal 
power relations. Hence, the country’s natural resources and other brute facts do not fall 
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within the scope of our discussion, neither do the regime’s geopolitical position, regional 
alliances, and international alienation that has facilitated the establishment of a 
multinational military coalition, un-vetoed at the Security Council, to pave the way for 
Gaddafi’s overthrow. We are rather interested in the Libyan regime’s inherent 
characteristics that have provoked a different form of behavior by al-Jazeera and its 
intellectuals, if compared to the outlet’s former engagement with the uprising in Egypt.   
Contrary to Egypt, Libya was a state with massively dysfunctional institutions. 
Anderson explains that, for decades, Gaddafi “methodically thwarted the development 
of stable institutions, civil society and economic association - all in the name of 
permanent revolution”.290 His “constitution”, The Green Book, lacked clear provisions 
defining the nature of his regime’s structures and the powers they accordingly acquire. 
As Vandewalle contends, “The Green Book contains the essential idea of statelessness, 
and of people managing their own affairs without state institutions”.291 The book also 
condemned all forms of political representation, deeming modern state bureaucracies as 
repressive. Thus, under the title “The Solution of the Problem of Democracy”, the 
book’s first part claims that representative parliaments “have become a means of 
plundering and usurping the people’s authority”.292 This explains why no elections were 
ever held in Libya since Gaddafi’s 1969 bloodless coup ousting King Idriss and the 
Sanussi dynasty.293  
Gaddafi’s denunciation of state bureaucracies rendered them effectively devoid 
of substantial constitutional powers. The country’s military and security institutions 
were similarly lacking structural hierarchies, and the most effective military brigades 
were headed by, even named after, Gaddafi’s sons. Libya’s army was weakened in the 
few years prior to the uprising as Gaddafi was thought to have feared a military coup 
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that would oust him from power, especially that several attempts had been formerly 
staged against him.294 The Leader’s armed forces were comprised of a regular army and 
elite units, and the latter’s best-trained and most equipped were headed by his sons: 
Moatassim held a leading position in the National Security Council and was in command 
of a modern brigade, Khamis was in charge of the 32nd Mechanized Brigade responsible 
for Gaddafi’s personal security, Saadi headed the special forces or the 9th Brigade, and 
Saif al-Islam who was being prepared for succession was able to give military orders 
even though he did not occupy a formal position, whether military or otherwise.295 The 
best-equipped Brigade in Libya’s armed forces was that headed by Khamis and 
popularly named after him. It was estimated to comprise of 10,000 troops supported by 
mercenaries and was equipped with tanks, artillery, and rocket launchers.296 Gaddafi 
also relied on relatives outside the immediate family as well as on members of his tribe, 
the Gadadfa, and other larger tribes linked to the Gadadfa with blood ties (such as the 
Wurfala) to fill leading positions in the military and security apparatuses.297 With such a 
military formation, it was most likely during the uprising that the army would either 
fragment (regular army units or parts of them versus elite units, which is what actually 
happened), or stay entirely loyal to Gaddafi. The Leader’s controversial policies and 
despotic forms of governance throughout his 42 years of rule provoked many attempts to 
overthrow him through a military coup. Yet his ability to gradually tame the army and 
appoint his closest confidents in top security and military positions rendered any form of 
dissent from the military - as an institution - very implausible whether regarding his 
succession plans or otherwise. The Libyan army was, therefore, mostly a regime 
institutional fact, in the same way the judicial sector and Popular Committees were. This 
was a fundamental difference that distinguished the case of Libya from that of Egypt 
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prior to the uprisings in both countries, and thus had massive effects on their regimes’ 
reactions to threat and on al-Jazeera’s strategy of engagement with these reactions.   
The judicial body in Libya, like many other apparatuses, was highly 
dysfunctional. In fact, one of the main triggers of the uprising was the unresolved case of 
Abu Salim,298 a prison where the fate of more than 1200 detainees was concealed for 
years following their mass execution in 1996. After Gaddafi’s 2004 acknowledgement 
of the massacre and demand that investigations take place, human rights agencies were 
allowed to visit Libya to carry out their own inquiries yet received no collaboration from 
state authorities.299 Contrary to the case of Egypt where political dissent within the state 
was organized and vocalized through the judicial institution and parliamentary 
opposition, it was either lacking or of absolutely no effect within Libya’s dysfunctional 
state institutions, as the Popular Committees (Libya’s equivalent of the parliament) were 
organically linked to the regime and its lawful guardians whereas the judicial body was 
merely of instrumental use. Little wonder, then, that Libya’s Minister of Justice 
Mustapha Abdil Jalil resigned from his position in 2010 due to “his inability to 
overcome the difficulties facing the judicial sector”300 before finally defecting from the 
regime on the eve of the uprising and becoming Chairman of the National Transitional 
Council representing the rebels.  
The country was also marked by an absence of domestic politics and an almost 
non-existent civil society,301 as the constitution banned parties, unions, and any form of 
political assembly, founding that on ideological grounds. Anderson explains that the 
regime shut down “institutions and places where people might gather outside 
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government supervision” and that this resulted in enhancing the role of “kinship ties [i.e. 
tribalism] in political organization because it [was] the last available organizational link 
outside the purview of the ruling authorities”.302 This lack of social organization 
explains why Libya’s upheaval was a sudden outburst and why it was stripped of 
introductory signs and has therefore resulted in massive unrest that was difficult to 
contain. 
The Libyan regime was also defined by an ideology that was tailored to fit 
Gaddafi, or the Leader of the Revolution. In practice, the Leader was iconized and 
placed above all forms of accountability and questioning, albeit not holding an official 
position within the regime. In 1975, following a failed coup attempt, the technocrats in 
the Revolutionary Command Council (the country’s ruling council after Gaddafi’s 
takeover) lost much of their influence within the regime’s circles whereas the ideologues 
enhanced their leverage.303 The ideological character of the regime was then 
institutionalized on the 1st of September 1978, when Gaddafi announced the separation 
of the “revolutionary authority” from the “people’s authority”, and resigned from the 
General Secretariat of the People’s Congress, “leaving it to deal with the everyday 
business of the country while [he] devoted [himself] to the higher cause of furthering the 
revolution”.304 This ideology that dominated all state activities and heavily revolved 
around idiosyncrasies rather than institutions, made the country’s main institutional 
facts, from the constitution to state apparatuses and agencies, contingent on Gaddafi’s 
fluctuating convictions and perceptions of the world, his state, and his society.  
With no institutional constraints to Gaddafi’s powers, the regime’s reaction to 
the popular unrest in eastern Libya was blatant and fierce. Henceforth, the non-violent 
uprising mutated into a military upheaval that extended till Gaddafi’s death in his 
hometown Sirt, more than 8 months after its outburst. Yet this only occurred after 
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foreign intervention tilted the balance in favor of militant rebels. The distinguishing 
elements in this pattern of events impacted al-Jazeera’s coverage. This impact 
manifested itself in the outlet’s reference to local intellectuals having well-established 
public relations inside Libya and acting in collaboration with the Qatari regime. The 
intellectuals’ forms of framing were coupled with attempts to alter institutional facts, as 
in the case of their compliance with NTC’s strategies and of al-Qaradawi’s fatwa to 
assassinate Gaddafi. Accordingly, and contrary to the case of Egypt, al-Jazeera 
promoted the need for a complete deconstruction of state institutional facts, as any sort 
of reform was thought to be superficial if done within the ideological constraints of a 
regime that renounces representation in the first place. Thus, for collective intentionality 
to be restored, institutional facts repudiating representation and enforcing an 
idiosyncratic form of governance ought to be dismantled along with their supportive 
narrative and rationale, and alternative ones ought to be constructed over their rubble, as 
al-Jazeera’s intellectuals insisted on various occasions. 
Re-inventing institutional facts 
In a series of six interviews with al-Hayat newspaper, Mahmoud Jibril, the chair 
of the executive board of NTC and first interim prime minister of Libya following 
Gaddafi’s downfall, gave his account regarding the establishment of the opposition’s 
council. Jibril, a politician and academic, had previously served as the head of the 
National Planning Council of Libya founded by the regime, before resigning from his 
position prior to the uprising. He narrates that, in the early days of the regime’s 
crackdown on protests, he consulted with Minister of Justice Mustafa Abdel Jalil (later 
head of NTC) and Libya’s ambassador in New Delhi and former Minister of Economy 
Ali al-Issawi (later in charge of NTC’s foreign relations) about creating an opposition 
body that voices the uprising. 305 
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Jibril explains that as soon as Qatar’s position regarding the uprising became 
clear, he called Wadah Khanfar, the Director General of al-Jazeeera, whom he got to 
know during his work as a consultant when he “set the organizational framework of al-
Jazeera and trained its senior administrators including Waddah”. Jibril, who had 
announced his support for protesters, hoped that Khanfar would connect him to the 
Qatari leadership and asked if the latter might be willing to offer him sanctuary. Within 
few hours, he asserts, he got called back and informed that he was welcome to reside in 
Qatar. Jibril explains that, henceforth, Doha became the destination for many Libyan 
figures escaping from Gaddafi.306  
Jibril narrates that he met with the Emir of Qatar 48 hours following his arrival to 
Doha. His connection with high-ranking Qatari officials was facilitated by one of al-
Jazeera’s regular guests, Mahmoud Shammam, on later occasions. Within few weeks, he 
explains, the Qatari leadership established multiple channels with various Libyan 
opposition figures and groups. Jibril argues, however, that the Qataris favored Islamists 
very early on. He asserts that Doha cooperated with him and NTC’s head, Mustafa 
Abdel Jalil, yet the unofficial, more effective channel of collaboration (in terms of 
financial and military aid), was that established with Sheikh Ali al-Sallabi (al-Jazeera’s 
regular Islamist guest), and head of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Abdel Hakim 
Belhaj.307  
Jibril’s account serves to highlight a connection between al-Jazeera’s Libyan 
intellectuals and political developments on the ground. It underscores their dual role of 
frame construction through a powerful media outlet on the one hand, and political 
activism that helped create new realities on the other. Al-Jazeera’s intellectuals have 
thus engaged in a process of deconstructing institutional facts by promoting frames that 
challenged Gaddafi’s credence and legitimacy, then followed that with contributing to 
the construction of new institutional facts in regions under rebel control. Both parts of 
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the process were intertwined in the sense that one was introductory to the other: the 
network’s guests utilized its communication tools to deconstruct the regime’s existing 
institutional facts before imagining, reinventing, and propagating the construction of 
new realities over the rubble of the old ones. 
 Dismantling Gaddafi’s institutional facts took several forms as earlier 
demonstrated. Various methods of framing were deployed to diagnose the problem and 
motivate for change, thus contributing to disarming the regime of the element of 
collective recognition. As prognosis for possible solutions was presented, alternative 
realities were imagined and promoted, including the interim NTC, an institutionalized 
rebel army, and a new flag. Concomitantly, al-Jazeera’s influential religious scholars, 
Youssef al-Qaradawi and Ali al-Sallabi, threw their weight behind efforts to physically 
eliminate or void the regime’s most potent institutional facts. This was precisely the case 
when al-Qaradawi issued a fatwa for assassinating Gaddafi, and when both called army 
officers to defect from the regime. The following excerpts demonstrate the 
aforementioned:   
Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi: I call upon the ministers whom I know to 
curse him. I want the ambassadors around the world to renounce this 
regime and to withdraw from it. I say to the officers around Gaddafi, God 
says “And whoever kills a believer intentionally, his punishment is Hell, 
abiding therein, and the wrath and curse of Allah are upon him, and a 
grievous chastisement shall be prepared for him”. I hereby address the 
Libyan army, and I do not believe it is less patriotic and conscious than 
the Tunisian army that has declined Ben Ali’s request for protection, or 
than the Egyptian army that was asked by Mubarak to open fire on 
protesters yet refused to do so. I call upon it to refrain from assaulting its 
people. Who would assault his people for a crazy man? I call upon my 
brothers and sons, the leaders, officers, and soldiers of the Libyan army to 
refrain from obeying orders. Obeying orders here is haram. The prophet 
says “a person should be obedient [to his seniors] whether he likes it or 
not as long as he is not ordered to commit sin”.  If you’re ordered to 
bomb your people with airplanes, say no. Aim for the one who gave you 
those orders instead. I hereby issue a fatwa for officers and soldiers: he 
who gets the chance to kill Gaddafi, let him do it and relieve the country 
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and the people from him.308 
Sheikh Ali al-Sallabi: I call upon the Free Officers, specifically Major-
General Mustafa al-Kharroubi: What is your stance regarding the current 
situation? I also call upon Lieutenant General Abu Bakr Younes Jaber: 
What is your stand regarding the current happenings? Are you siding with 
Gaddafi or with the people? What is your position Khuweildi al-Hmaidi 
concerning these events? Those are members of the Revolutionary 
Command Council and they have influence and respect amongst many 
officers. You are standing before historical crossroads: Either you stand 
by your people or you go into the dustbin of history along with Gaddafi 
and his sons… We want defection from the army and liberation of Tripoli 
from this invasion… The Libyans say they love martyrdom in the name 
of God. We love it in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Palestine. I call upon 
those who have the ability to carry weapons and train to collaborate with 
their brothers in order to thwart [Gaddafi’s] mercenaries. 
The Gadadhfa tribe, like all others, will join the rest of the people, God 
willing, and will reject this miserable criminal who got the invaders to 
their country. The Gadadfha are responsible before God. They are 
accountable before their country and before history. Mo’ammar Gaddafi 
and his sons have distorted the history of the Gadadhfa. We hope they 
write a new page. We are counting on this tribe to dissociate itself from 
the head of [the Libyan] regime and its security brigades. You must not 
open fire at your brothers. I call upon them to join their people in this 
great revolution.309  
Al-Qaradawi’s fatwa religiously legitimized killing the Leader and thus posed an 
actual threat to his life. It was more than a form of prognostic framing, as not only did it 
propose eliminating the central institutional fact (the Leader) that provides the rest of the 
regime’s social constructs with legitimacy, but coupled that with a sense of religious 
duty and obligation, and this, in theory, has substantial impact amidst conservative social 
strata. Al-Qaradawi’s religious leverage was thus incorporated in al-Jazeera’s formula 
aiming to target Gaddafi’s image and allure and to help in physically annihilating him. 
Much the same result was intended through aiming at two of the regime’s other 
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institutional facts: the army and the diplomatic body. Accordingly, both al-Qaradwi and 
al-Sallabi encouraged defection, depicting any form of collaboration and obedience to 
Gaddafi’s regime as haram. Quranic verses were deployed to emphasize the outcomes of 
such collaboration in Islamic narrative and belief. Thus, as opposed to the possible price 
that rebels have to pay (martyrdom) and religious gains they would acquire (heaven), 
Gaddafi proponents await a different fate that Quranic texts describe in terms of severe 
punishment (hell).  
When compared to al-Qaradawi, al-Sallabi’s added value pertains to his personal 
connections - as a Libyan - and his knowledge of Libyan politics. In the extract above, 
he addresses Libyan army officers by name, asking them to make a stance and choose 
between “standing by the people” or joining Gaddafi “in the dustbin of history”. He also 
addresses the Gadadfa tribes, where Gaddafi originates from, with the aim to provoke 
dissent in the Leader’s tribal circles. In a community where the number of tribes is 
estimated by 140, 30 of which are considered significant,310 tribal affiliations are a 
double-edged sword that both the regime and its antagonists used to rally support. Tribal 
allegiances were emphasized in many of the speeches of Gaddafi and Saif al-Islam. The 
latter even warned of a scenario where members of “different tribes would kill each 
other in the streets" if protests persisted.311 Yet the most significant of al-Sallabi’s 
connections were the ones he maintained with the “Islamic Fighting Group”. 
Comprising of former jihadists who fought in Afghanistan and opposed the regime in 
Libya, the group was considered to be one of the powerful militant actors during the 
conflict. In his interview with al-Hayat’s mentioned earlier, the head of NTC’s 
executive board Mahmoud Jibril contends that Qatar’s main support was offered to al-
Sallabi and the head of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Abdel Hakim Belhaj. Al-
Sallabi never denied the robust connections he maintained with the group. In one of his 
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interviews, he states that Libyan officials asked him to urge the faction’s militants to 
negotiate with the regime, yet he refused:    
Sheikh Ali al-Sallabi: The people shall triumph over Gaddafi, his sons, 
and this wretched regime. [The Libyan authorities] contacted me [in order 
to facilitate] dialogue and negotiations, due to my old relationship with 
the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. But it has been agreed upon between 
religious scholars and students, in Libya and abroad, to discard this 
option. I see this great ordeal as a chance for the Libyans to obtain a 
modern civil state with a social contract and with freedoms, unions, and 
associations. I can see Libyans getting rid of poverty, God willing.312 
The aforementioned means that the framing processes presented on al-Jazeera 
were interlinked with the actual deconstruction of Libyan institutional facts and 
construction of alternative realities. Al-Sallabi’s links with an Islamist militant group 
fighting against Gaddafi, in addition to Shammam joining the NTC along with Dogha, 
are elements that uncover the role of al-Jazeera’s intellectuals in materially aiding the 
uprising. The role played by al-Jazeera’s managing director, Wadah Khanfar, in linking 
NTC’s founders with the Qatari Emir, was also essential in allowing NTC to obtain early 
political, financial, military, and media support. On al-Jazeera, this support translated 
into a form of concentrated media coverage and powerful motivational frames. Al-
Jazeera gave the Libyan uprising utmost priority, as its intellectuals were hosted on its 
main bulletins on a regular basis even months after the outset of protests.313 The 
channel’s role, however, was most powerful prior to the protest’s militarization, as it 
engaged in a heavy promotional campaign emphasizing the need to establish an anti-
regime representative body that creates its own subordinate institutional facts and seeks 
collective recognition. Consider the following extracts from a variety of al-Jazeera 
interviews with Azmi Bishara: 
Azmi Bishara: The current regime, or non-regime, will end. The country 
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should not be left in a state of vacuum and [the rebels] should be ready 
[in terms of having a] constitutional assembly and founding documents. 
This is neither Tunisia nor Egypt, where the state has submitted to the 
rebels’ demands and a process of bargaining [term used in English] still 
continues while demonstrations persist to achieve the [desired] change.314 
Azmi Bishara: This is not the flag of [Libya’s former king] Sannousi as 
he claims. This flag was approved by a constitutional committee for 
Libya’s independence. Notice how much they [the rebels] refuse chaos. 
They want to even get rid of the flag. This is a real and full-fledged 
revolution. Full-fledged revolutions create vacuum and vacuum is 
dangerous. Therefore, in the liberated areas, judicial and security 
institutions must materialize… The problem is that [overthrowing 
Gaddafi] is going to be costly. Demonstrations are not enough here. The 
remnants of the Libyan army that he has dismantled must assemble again. 
The main concern is whether [the rebels are able to] build an army 
capable of controlling the areas that have been liberated.315 
Azmi Bishara: Where does politics begin in this age? It begins with the 
people. For the Libyan people, the lieutenant’s [Gaddafi’s] rule has lost 
its legitimacy. This cannot be negotiated, neither with France nor the 
Arab League, the African Union, or the opposition abroad, precisely that 
which was betting on Saif al-Islam… The people are the base [of 
legitimacy], then comes the [regional] milieu. The issue of legitimacy has 
been settled on the level of the Libyan people. Gaddafi should not be 
offered vents. Overreliance on the West has created a sense of laxity 
amongst the rebels… This is not a spontaneous battle. It is not fought 
form the studios. As a leader, you should find the means to train and arm 
the rebels. I have no doubt that the National Council will gain legitimacy 
and it already has. The Arab League has practically offered it legitimacy. 
Now is the time when it should start acting as an entity responsible for its 
people.316  
In the extracts above, Bishara emphasizes the need to bear several factors in 
mind for a successful transition to take place from Gaddafi’s rule to a new historical 
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phase. He stresses the danger of vacuum following the disintegration of the Libyan 
regime and its patterns of governance. There is thus a need to fill this vacuum by 
establishing alternative institutional facts, for the struggle had already taken the shape of 
a “full-fledged” revolution that would dismantle the existing social order. Contrary to 
the case of Egypt, the uprising’s revolutionary character in Libya was more coherent, as 
it was meant to completely detach from past modes of governance. Bishara contends it 
was therefore necessary to create judicial and security institutions in areas under rebel 
control. A founding document and a constitutional assembly should also be established 
to design a new social contract over the remnants of the Green Book. Bishara’s account 
implies that all social constructs that were part of the country’s ruling system for over 
four decades were intrinsically prone to obstruct change, and alternatives were thus 
urgently needed to fill the expected gaps in a collapsing system of power.   
In the third excerpt, Bishara argues that legitimacy is first gained domestically, 
as the Libyans offer their acceptance (collective intentionality) of a new representative 
body responsible for formulating an alternative social order (or set of institutional facts). 
Thereafter, this body - the National Transitional Council - should seek regional 
recognition and start acting in accordance to its newly accredited role. The non-regime 
in Libya, or that which has introduced the idea of statelessness, had to be eradicated, 
from its symbolic institutional facts (such as the country’s green flag) to that topping its 
hierarchical structure of power (the Leader). Establishing new forms of legitimacy to 
replace the regime’s disintegration was a theme also emphasized by al-Jazeera’s other 
intellectuals during their interviews at different times, as the following extracts reveal: 
Sheikh Ali al-Sallabi: I call upon the Libyans to organize a national 
conference that forms a constitutional assembly, one that could fill the 
vacuum after Gaddafi’s downfall. Gaddafi is over. This is only a matter 
of time.317   
Sheikh Ali Sallabi: I think that, after the National Transitional Council 
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obtained recognition, it now has a right to acquire tools that allow it to 
protect its people from Gaddafi’s war machinery.318 
Mahmoud Shammam: I want to emphasize two points here: The domestic 
legitimacy cannot be derived from abroad, and this council has domestic 
legitimacy, as it represents all shades of the political and geographic 
spectrum. The outside world [i.e. international community] will 
accordingly show confidence in the council’s ability to regulate the 
country’s affairs… The council has emphasized its transitional and 
interim nature. When Libya regains its unity and becomes secure, general 
elections will be held. We should emphasize that future Libya will be a 
country of freedom, democracy, a constitution, law, and separation of 
powers. We have fought Gaddafi [in order to achieve] all this; so that we 
build a state of law and not a state of chaos.319 
Sleiman Dogha: We do not want to repeat the wrongdoings of the Libyan 
regime by arresting people in an illegal manner, nor do we want to be 
abusive. Even members of the Revolutionary Committees will have a 
place in the new Libya. This is how Libya should be.320 
In the excerpts above, the idea of collective recognition has been engaged with 
and thought of as the building block of Libya’s future institutional facts. In the first 
excerpt, al-Sallabi stresses the need to establish a constitutional assembly in order to 
avoid vacuum following the regime’s predicted collapse, and in the second, he contends 
that the NTC should make use of its international recognition to obtain tools for self-
defense. Thus, in the course of prognostic framing, al-Sallabi thinks of creating an army 
as a necessary step for sustaining the rebels’ newly established structures, and depicts 
the rebel’s army itself as an institutional fact whose function is to “protect the people”. 
Shammam similarly accents the idea that domestic legitimacy is the base for 
international support, and that the country’s future should be that of a constitution and 
institutions (separation of powers). He also emphasizes NTC’s representation of 
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collective intentionality, as he claims that it reflects “all shades of the political and 
geographic spectrum”. Yet he highlights the council’s interim nature to assert that this 
intentionality shall properly manifest itself through elections once a new social order 
allowing the creation of representative bodies is established. Likewise, in his 
commentary, Dogha contends that a new Libya should be founded on collective consent 
rather than marginalization, one that does not exclude Gaddafi loyalists who accept the 
emergence of a system of representation with new institutional facts. 
The evolution of the Libyan discourse and the role of al-Jazeera and its 
intellectuals in it passed through different phases, most of which were intertwined and 
chronologically overlapping. For that reason, and because the case of Libya involved 
five intellectuals rather than two, it makes more sense to highlight this evolution from a 
strictly thematic perspective in order to maintain its coherence. In the following, we 
shall start from the role of al-Jazeera’s intellectuals in de-iconizing the model of 
Gaddafi’s regime.  
De-iconizing the model: The Leader and Tawreeth 
 On the fourth day of the uprising, Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, gave a televised 
speech in which he vowed to fight the rebels till the very end. Saif al-Islam emerged on 
Libya’s domestic scene in the late 1990s as head of the Gaddafi International Foundation 
for Charitable Associations. In reality, this was his gateway to Libyan politics as a 
“reformist” representing “civil society”, and, at the same time, as the future heir of 
Mo’ammar Gaddafi.321 Although usually depicted as a reformist, Saif often promoted 
himself as someone calling for fundamental change. In this regard, he once claimed that 
he “wants shock therapy, to destroy everything and build it back up, and not to waste 
time”. Contrary to that, and in what seemed to be a division of labor and a means to 
praise his father at the same time, he described the latter “as a utopian, leading a state 
like the wise man in a village”, and depicted him as someone “in favor of gradual 
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reform”.322 
Saif al-Islam’s appearance on television to speak on behalf of the regime was an 
easy target to aim at by al-Jazeera’s intellectuals. In theory, the fact that he never held an 
official title or position within the regime meant that he lacked a representative status 
allowing him to engage with the issue as an authority. Saif was responding to the 
outbreak of chaos in parts of east Libya, as thousands of protesters were calling for the 
downfall of the regime, burning down the radio station of Benghazi and reportedly 
dismantling a statue representing the Green Book, the iconized summary of Gaddafi’s 
political ideology, in Tobruk.323 As people were demolishing Gaddafi’s institutional 
facts on the ground, Saif’s unorthodox televised intervention provided substance for 
criticism. Azmi Bishara rebuked his appearance in principle, deeming it as an 
impeccable example of the absence of legitimacy: 
Azmi Bishara (Commenting on Saif al-Islam’s speech minutes before 
airing): We have a case of tawreeth here, and in all the cases of tawreeth in 
the Arab World, there is a division of roles, whereby the son who is to 
inherit the republic presents himself as a reformist aiming to fight 
corruption. Yet the mere fact that he is the only one allowed to engage 
with the issue of corruption is a form of corruption in itself. Had anyone 
else been as critical as he was, this person would have been butchered or 
thrown in jail.324 
Azmi Bishara (Commenting on Saif al-Islam’s speech on the following 
day): One has the feeling that he owns the country as if it were a farm. 
How could one explain the appearance of someone with no official status 
[to address the Libyan people]? The Leader’s son! What kind of status is 
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this? Even in monarchies there is a crown prince!325 
Contrary to Egypt, where political activists and local media had openly engaged 
with the issue of tawreeth since 2005, this topic in Libya was taboo. Al-Jazeera’s 
intellectuals highlighted the role of Gaddafi’s sons during the upheaval on multiple 
occasions to illustrate the need for real bureaucracies in a state with malfunctioning 
institutional facts. The power that each of Gaddafi’s sons held in the country, despite 
lacking any form of official political status, was a striking example of the absence of a 
proper constitutional order. Azmi Bishara banked on this deficiency to stress Gaddafi’s 
lack of credence, especially when it comes to his revolutionary rhetoric. The issue of 
tawreeth was thus raised in the course of counterframing and was used as an obvious 
example negating all claims of progression and egalitarian rule. In the above 
commentary, however, Bishara’s reference to the issue was coupled with de-iconizing 
the main institutional fact legitimizing all others, which, in Libya’s case, was the Leader. 
The Leader is a socially constructed institutional fact in the sense that it had 
emerged as a status during Gaddafi’s 42-year rule, and, through coercive means, has 
established and maintained collective recognition. Its function was to guide a 
“revolutionary” society in accordance with The Green Book. This function extended to 
all vital decision making processes in Libya, whether local or foreign. The Leader 
himself is the author of The Green Book that he once described as “the gospel of the 
modern age and the masses”.326 Through this circle of legitimacy, Gaddafi positioned 
himself above all other domestic institutional facts: he is the founder of the Third 
Universal Theory portrayed in his Green Book and its protector at the same time, and 
this “universal theory”, he contends, is a “firm and unchangeable truth”.327 Former 
Libyan Minister Ibrahim Kuwaider who served in Gaddafi’s governments in the 1980s, 
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asserts that the Leader was superior to all institutions and laws. He explains that 
Gaddafi’s verbal orders to ministers and other bureaucrats effectively had the power of 
written legal provisions, and that Libyan officials came to recognize this as a norm 
whose breach causes severe penalties.328 
Anderson contends that Gaddafi’s reference to his Green Book as “the new 
gospel” is quite revealing of the ideology he adopts and promotes. She explains that, 
“despite his unorthodox Islam, Gaddafi’s politics were still inextricably linked with 
religion. He wished for his ideology, which might have easily been described as a 
philosophy, a manifesto, or a call to arms, the extrapolitical legitimacy conferred by 
religious referents”.329 Accordingly, the Leader’s political rationale was above the realm 
of politics and outside the margins of criticism, and his “high command” had to be 
obeyed in order to secure the “revolution” and the welfare of “the people”. He was the 
main source of legitimacy in Libya, whereas all other domestic legitimacies were of a 
subordinate status and were naturally contingent and reliant on the Leader himself.  
 Al-Jazeera, as well as other Arab networks supporting the rebels, sought to de-
iconize the Leader. Disarming his status of collective intentionality required 
deconstructing this institutional fact (the Leader) in the minds of proponent or hesitant 
spectators. For this, al-Jazeera’s guests were keen on deploying derogatory depictions of 
Gaddafi, ridiculing his ideas and actions, and overtly doubting his sanity. Bishara’s 
comments on Gaddafi’s speech on the 6th day provides a good example, as he highlights 
the Leader’s expressions reflecting his megalomania, and sheds light on his 
contradictions to discredit his rationale, namely regarding his constant condescending 
reference to rebels as rats and mercenaries, and his vow that millions of his proponents 
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from around the globe shall support him in the “peaceful cleansing” of Benghazi:330 
Azmi Bishara: Regarding his obsessive tendency to describe himself, I 
think he is doing the job of a psychiatrist. Rarely have we seen a case of 
this sort, where nothing deters a person from expressing his innermost 
thoughts. Usually, normal people lay down on a couch and a psychiatrist 
extracts information from them. In his case, [Gaddafi] voluntarily gives 
away information. For instance, one needs time to diagnose a case of 
megalomania. [Gaddafi] says “I am glory, I am history, and I am a deaf 
rock”. The absence of deterrence and extent of narcissism show that he 
does not care about his listeners and that, to him, the spectacle [term used 
in English] element overshadows that of content. 
He does not coordinate his thoughts. They come out abruptly. “If you 
want a constitution, we can design a constitution” [quoting Gaddafi]. He 
confesses that there is a need for reform. If the country requires reform, 
this means the demands are just and that those [rebels] are not rats. On 
the one hand he denies the presence of mercenaries, and on the other he 
announces that he shall come with all the nations of the earth.331 
Al-Qaradawi used a similar language during a phone interview with al-Jazeera, 
following a report on regime airstrikes targeting Benghazi on the same day. The Sheikh 
ridiculed Gaddafi’s theories, and expanded his skepticism regarding his sanity to include 
his son, Saif al-Islam, who had addressed the Libyans via television a day earlier. Al-
Qaradawi’s attempt to disparage Saif al-Islam deployed religious depictions. By 
replacing Islam in his name (literally meaning sword of Islam) with the term Jahiliyya, 
the Sheik implied a comparison between the latter’s domestic policies and those 
witnessed in the pre-Islam era of Jahiliyya, branded in Islamic narratives as a time of 
ignorance and brutality.   
Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi: I do not want to address Gaddafi, for a 
person addresses others when they are rational, and this man is no more 
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rational. He has always been described as crazy. We have seen how he 
[presents himself as] a philosopher like Marx and Mao Zedong [and how 
he claims he has a] “third universal theory”. We have seen his absurd and 
ridiculous behavior at the Arab summits, and on other occasions wearing 
his colorful outfits and carrying his tent all around the world (…) I 
thought his son, Saif al-Islam, would be more rational and more of a 
believer. He turned out to be a sword of Jahiliyya [rather than a sword of 
Islam], as he wants to push the people to fight each other.332 
To further highlight Gaddafi’s unstable personality, al-Jazeera hosted a 
psychoanalyst who presented his analysis of the Leader’s looks and actions, from his 
dress code and hairstyle, to his use of terminology. The analyst was keen on asserting 
that Gaddafi’s constant reference to rebels as addicts to hallucinogens is a projection of 
his own condition on others, adding - in a semi-sarcastic tone - that temporary insanity, 
as in the case of Gaddafi, does not drop penal liability. 
 The impact of de-iconizing the Leader was evident in the cities of eastern Libya 
after rebel forces ceased control. Graffiti representing Gaddafi in the most demeaning 
way were executed on the walls of Benghazi, Tobruk, and other neighboring cities. 
Often, al-Jazeera’s slogan was drawn as a sign of challenge to the regime as well.333 
Disarming Gaddafi of his allure helped protesters break the wall of fear that had been 
maintained for decades under his rule. In al-Jazeera’s studios, disparaging portrayals 
were frequently insinuated while offering various forms of framing and analysis. The 
following extract illustrates how Mahmoud Shammam, whilst urging the regime’s 
diplomats to resign after the prime minister’s resignation and flee to Italy, depicted 
Gaddafi as a warlord, and described him as a lunatic.  
Mahmoud Shammam: Gaddafi has lost popular legitimacy after three 
quarters of Libya was freed. He is also losing international legitimacy as 
diplomats and ambassadors resign all over the world. This means that he 
is officially a warlord now. The prime minister was supposed to rule, but 
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he escaped with his family to Italy. Gaddafi’s sons, the small warlords, 
are all he has now. I call upon the Gaddadfa tribe and tell them you know 
well that this man has killed his cousin Hassan Shakkal, and that he has 
displaced and killed many of you. Your neighbors from the tribes of 
Suleiman warn you from listening to this lunatic!334 
Gaddafi and his sons were repetitively portrayed as warlords. Yet this was not 
only for purposes of mere disparagement, but also a promotion of this diagnostic frame. 
The term, as other similar ones, was used to replace the representations that Gaddafi had 
managed to sustain in his community throughout his four-decade rule. The aim of this 
technique was to dismantle existing institutional facts – the Leader being one of them - 
by deconstructing the rationale upon which they stand. On occasions, drawing 
comparisons between Gaddafi’s regime and other forms of oligarchy served a double 
purpose. On the one hand, it was meant to discredit his claims of legitimacy, and on the 
other, it implied that the regime that Gaddafi had always promoted as progressive, was 
the most regressive of all. Such was the case when Bishara credited monarchies that, 
contrary to Gaddafi’s regime, had clear norms and structures governing power transition.   
Azmi Bishara: We’re not facing a monarchy here. A monarchy has a 
structure, norms, tradition, and ethics. It has a lineage [term used in 
English] derived from certain communal values linking the family to the 
regime and society. Some people accept this and some don’t. But it has a 
structure. A crown prince is a crown prince. Here we have his sons and 
their militias rather than a national army. We do not have protests that 
maintain restraint until the army joins [the people]. Those are warlords, 
each heading a battalion.335 
Gaddafi’s behavioral patterns were indeed the highlight of news outlets around 
the world. The Libyan leader was seen to have a borderline personality whereby he 
“swings from intense anger to euphoria”, and “when under stress he can dip below the 
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border and his perceptions can be distorted and his judgment faulty”.336 On various 
occasions, al-Jazeera’s intellectuals offered counterframes to the Leader’s desperate 
attempts to polish his tarnished image and shaky authority. The extent of provocation 
that Arab media had caused him, especially the two most prominent, Qatar’s al-Jazeera 
and KSA’s al-Arabiya, was evident in his speeches, particularly the very first one that 
lasted no more than 30 seconds on February 22 - one day after Saif al-Islam’s televised 
appearance - and that was followed by a longer speech few hours later. In the short 
video, Gaddafi addressed the Libyans from a vehicle, referring to satellite networks as 
“stray dogs”, and denying their allegations about his escape from Libya,337 whereas in 
his longer statement, he accused Qatar of standing against him rather than siding with 
him and warned the little Emirate of regretting its new stance.338 Saif al-Islam, on his 
part, accused Arab countries of “conspiring against Libya” by deploying “poisonous 
media that disseminate lies and rumors”.339 Given the Leader’s accusative tone 
regarding Qatar and the fact that al-Jazeera was effectively the only media presence in 
Libya during the first weeks of the uprising,340 and that Gaddafi’s forces targeted its 
team in the outskirts of Benghazi killing one of its members on March 23,341 it makes 
sense to assume that the Qatari channel was the main outlet referred to in Gaddafi’s 
reproach. 
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Gaddafi’s reference to media outlets as “stray dogs” was reflective of his 
aggressive attitude regarding any form of dissent. In the 1980s, his loyalists managed to 
carry out multiple assassinations of Libyan opposition figures in different parts of 
Europe. The groups that were referred to by Western media as “hit squads” were hailed 
by Gaddafi and depicted as “revolutionary committees” whose aim was to “liquidate 
stray dogs”.342 Gaddafi’s regular use of such derogatory terms rendered them part and 
parcel of his speech all throughout his rule. Often, disparaging any form of political 
opposition was coupled with praising the use of force as a form of legitimate, even 
necessary, behavior. This time, however, the targets of Gaddafi’s rhetoric were tens of 
thousands of protesters rather than small opposition groups, along with various media 
outlets fanning the flames of the uprising.  
Gaddafi’s other speech on February 22, in which he described the rebels as 
“mercenaries and rats”, was subject to severe scrutiny by al-Jazeera’s intellectuals. Not 
only did their counterframes involve his contradictory views as shown previously in 
Bishara’s commentary, but also his weakening status as a ruler. In this context, the 
following analysis presented by Sleiman Dogha cast light on the implications of the 
Leader’s speech in terms of setting (making a speech from his residential place Bab al-
Azizia), imagery (technical adjustments of the footage and addition of sound effects), 
behavior (gestures and shivering hands), and choice of words (vowing to die a martyr):  
Sleiman Dogha: It was obvious how confused Gaddafi was; from his 
shivering hands to his gestures, even the location and filming. You might 
have noticed something extremely funny: they have added sound effects 
of cheering crowds. There were no crowds. This was recorded and edited 
hours before airing. Today, the Libyan regime no longer exists outside 
Bab al-Azizia where Gaddafi resides. [Gaddafi] didn’t even [dare] leave 
his place of residence when addressing his people. We hope this is his 
last act. He might be imagining himself in Saddam Hussein’s shoes as the 
latter approached the gallows, because he always has had this feeling. He 
didn’t talk about what he’ll be doing as much as he mourned himself. He 
said that he’ll die a martyr and this clearly shows that the man has given 
all he can give. He asked the Libyan people to hit [the rebels] with an 
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iron fist. In the footage, we’ve seen youngsters hitting him [the screen 
showing him] with shoes in Benghazi rather than hitting anyone with an 
iron fist.343 
In the extract above, Dogha aims to highlight Gaddafi’s growing weakness 
despite his continued use of authoritative oratory. His analysis of the setting is meant to 
shed light on the Leader’s isolation as he took shelter in his place of residence, which, in 
al-Jazeera’s coverage, was depicted as his last resort. Real masses were missing from the 
picture and silence was replaced by poorly edited audio. The whole scene, according to 
Dogha, was a cover up for the regime’s decay, for it “no longer exists outside Bab al-
Azizia”. The guest intellectual’s enthusiasm was reflective of al-Jazeera’s portrayal of 
the regime’s stature: the network of institutional facts that the latter comprises of was 
vastly eroding on Libyan soil, and the Leader, or the principal institutional fact 
legitimizing all others, was practicing his authority in a bubble that was shrinking day by 
day. Dogha’s emphasis on Gaddafi’s deteriorating conditions as a means to belittle him 
conformed to al-Jazeera’s general coverage. De-iconizing the Leader was the network’s 
primary tool to delegitimize the Libyan regime as a whole, yet this was coupled with 
efforts to diagnose the fault prior to proposing remedies.  
Diagnosing the fault: the people want a regime! 
In 1973, Gaddafi initiated an “administrative revolution to bring the bureaucracy 
back to the people”.344 This was one of the five main pillars of his Third Universal 
Theory. He emphasized “individual sovereignty” and renounced democratic 
representation, judging it as an unfair form of domination by a political proxy, be it a 
party, group, or an individual.345 Needless to say, the establishment of Popular 
Committees proved representation was eventually inevitable, even if it were created on a 
micro-level, as in the case of the thousands of committees dispersed all around Libya. 
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Nevertheless, in al-Jamahiriyya, all forms of state bureaucracies, from grassroots 
committees to superstructural ministries, demonstrated a form of chaotic representation 
and improvised decision-making processes. In Libya, citizens, including anti-Gaddafi 
protesters, were ironically in desperate need of a “regime with a system”. Highlighting 
this issue was a form of diagnostic framing, with an aim to accent that the root problem 
of the Libyan crisis was Gaddafi’s ideology and the resultant form of governance. 
Radical change, rather than reform, was accordingly promoted as an absolute need. The 
following extract draws on this argument: 
Azmi Bishara: The currently prevailing violence is a desperate one. It is 
the regime’s attempt, better say the non-regime, to end things right from 
the beginning before they exacerbate, as it has seen how they have 
evolved in the neighboring countries. And this is perhaps because it 
perceives the issue as a matter of life or death and that its downfall would 
be inevitable [if things exacerbate]. This regime is a form of power 
without a system [stated in English]. This is a president who claims a 
monopoly on truth and bears a number of attributes pertaining to 
megalomania, and this has manifested itself in the deployment of a huge 
amount of violence because [Gaddafi] believes it is justified as his speech 
has shown. 
I think Gaddafi’s main mechanism that has allowed him to rule this long 
is chaos. Chaos could be a cover-up for the worst kinds of tyranny. When 
you say I’m not a president, it seems modest of you but actually means 
that you are a president with absolute powers, because any definition of 
your power is a limitation. “I am not a president” means you refuse to be 
defined, because every word has a definition. If you are a president, this 
has a definition. If you are a king, this has a definition. Whereas if you 
say I refuse these definitions, it means you are everything. And he is 
actually everything. There is no structure. I think that even those who 
have a minimum bureaucratic culture in Libya such as government 
employees, including ministers, have no idea how they should be acting 
now. People should be chanting “the people want a regime” rather than 
“the people want to topple the regime”.346 
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The Green Book was Gaddafi’s guidebook to society. It presented a “utopian” 
yet simplistic form of governance, and displayed the Leader’s anarchic approach 
concerning political affairs. Regarding the stateless society that Gaddafi advocates, 
Bishara accents in the abovementioned that one of the key reasons for revolt in Libya 
was the lack of organized institutional structures. This absence allowed Gaddafi to break 
free from all restrictions and possible forms of deterrence. This is because institutions 
allow for a broader circulation of viewpoints, even in authoritarian regimes. Thus 
decisions go through certain paths or channels that, in theory, could result in altering 
them or at least in systematizing them and familiarizing people with their patterns. 
Contrary to that, Gaddafi’s regime, as Bishara contends, was a form of power without a 
system. 
Bishara was commenting on Gaddafi’s first speech in which he responded to 
calls for resignation by asserting that “he is not a president nor does he occupy any other 
position”, but is rather “a leader of a revolution”.347 For decades, Gaddafi had refused to 
obtain an official status although, as the Leader, he functioned as an institutional fact 
holding absolute powers. This refusal revealed his rejection of all sorts of blame and 
responsibility, and, thus, his desire to sustain collective recognition through coercive 
means. Bishara’s counterframes were therefore meant to emphasize that the Leader’s 
abuse of power is a result of the complete absence of accountability and the lack of 
institutional means to limit his authority. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Gaddafi condemned the Arab media coverage 
of Libya’s events. He accused Arab networks of “tarnishing the image of Libyans and 
serving the devil”.348 This condemnation created an indirect discourse involving his 
frames and the counterframes presented on various Arab networks, of which al-Jazeera 
was the most prominent. The contribution of influential figures such as the head of the 
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Global Union for Islamic Scholars, Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi, was thus an added 
value for al-Jazeera’s counter narrative, as revealed by the following excerpt: 
Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi: The Libyan people are revolting against the 
vicious [regime], angered by the loss of their rights, and this day had to 
come. Every person can be patient, but patience has limits. The Libyan 
people have said their word, and the entire world has heard it, except for 
Gaddafi and the ones around him. He [thinks he] is all of Libya. He is the 
parliament, the constitution, the parties, and the philosopher, whereas the 
Libyans are nothing.349 
Gaddafi’s “philosophy”, the Third Universal Theory, was meant to be an 
alternative to both, capitalism and communism. It was presented in his Green Book, 
which was effectively Libya’s constitution that replaced representative parliaments with 
popular committees and banned parties and any other form of political organization and 
assembly. This was Gaddafi’s way of distinguishing himself from all other regional and 
international figures in the 1970’s bipolar world and to sell his theoretical baggage by 
promoting it as genuine.350 With this amount of power concentration in his hands, 
Gaddafi was the ultimate ruling authority and was hence the target of the protesters’ 
contempt. As al-Qaradawi does in the excerpt above, al-Jazeera’s intellectuals were keen 
on pointing this out whenever Gaddafi made a speech, whereas he, on the other hand, 
not only denied charges of power exploitation, but negated his acquisition of power in 
the first place. In this context, responding to Gaddafi’s claims was meant to proceed 
within an indirect yet peer-to-peer discourse. After all, the fact that Gaddafi took time in 
his speeches to respond to media allegations meant that he believed they were 
threatening to his authority. This discourse involved al-Jazeera’s promotion of 
counterframes, whose aim was to further discredit Gaddafi’s narrative, as shall be seen 
in the following. 
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Countering the Narrative  
On February 18, 2011, the Revolutionary Committees, through their official 
gazette al-Zahf al-Akhdar warned that the “power of the people, the Jamahiriyya, the 
revolution, and the Leader are red lines, and that trying to overcome them is playing 
with fire and suicide”. It added that, thereafter, “neither the United States, nor the West, 
nor al-Jazeera shall be able to provide aid [to the rebels]”.351 
Al-Jazeera was implicitly referred to in the speeches of Gaddafi and Saif al-Islam, 
and overtly held responsible by the regime’s media for inciting Libyan protests. This 
discourse involving al-Jazeera on the one hand, and the Libyan regime and its media on 
the other, comprised of frames and counterframes that each used to discredit the other’s 
narrative and rationale. From his very first speech, Gaddafi accused Libyan protesters of 
owing allegiance to foreign powers or having a hidden Islamic agenda. They were also 
depicted as fools, mercenaries, and drug addicts.352 As early as 23 February 2011, only 9 
days after the outset of the protest movement, Libyan vice minister of foreign affairs 
alleged that al-Qaeda had already created an Islamic Emirate in the eastern city of 
Derna.353 On al-Jazeera, this rhetoric was constantly discarded and depicted as a false 
representation of changing realities on the ground that the Libyan regime was unwilling 
to admit. Al-Jazeera’s intellectuals thus argued that the allegations of Gaddafi and his 
loyalists had become failed attempts to change irreversible facts. The Leaders’s 
investment in public relations companies was portrayed as a desperate attempt to 
convince the West of a faulty narrative that he was incapable of promoting domestically. 
The following sample-extracts present good examples: 
Sleiman Dogha: The Libyan state first sponsored fatwas that ban protests. 
Then it tried to sell a story that those youngsters have been manipulated. 
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At first, there was no talk of foreign intervention. The manipulators were 
rather portrayed as criminals and former prisoners. This is an old rhetoric 
that no more convinces anyone.354  
Mahmoud Shammam: Our youngsters from the second and third 
generation, those who were born and have lived abroad due to the given 
circumstances in Libya, have managed to establish a network aiming to 
discredit the public relations campaign lead by an American and an 
English corporation. They are accusing those companies of supporting 
Gaddafi in his inhumane war on the Libyan people, and are sending 
messages to the Congress, the European Union, and European media 
outlets for that sake. We can now tell [the West] that this generation 
speaks with its heart and mind. It is addressing you using your own 
language. Don’t say this is the generation of Bin Laden, as it has been 
educated in your universities and institutions, and [those youngsters] are 
launching their campaigns from Dubai, Doha, London, Geneva, and 
Austria, and will soon be launching a campaign from America.355         
 In a speech on March 6, Gaddafi warned the West of the emergence of “a jihad 
Islamic front on the Mediterranean”, adding that Europe shall “see a return to the time of 
Barbarossa, the pirates, and the Ottomans imposing ransoms on boats”.356 As bizarre as 
his speculations may have seemed, their main aim was to highlight a possible future 
where terrorist networks would proliferate in vacuum and chaos and pose serious treats 
to the West, if his regime were to fall apart. Thus, Gaddafi was keen on depicting his 
alternative as a threat to regional and international peace and security, and since 
terrorism was a password to Western concerns, he heavily capitalized on the possibility 
of the expansion of al-Qaeda in Northern Africa and his ability to prohibit that from 
happening. Gaddafi’s warnings regarding political chaos were similar to those of 
Mubarak, only further exaggerated. Hence, al-Jazaeera’s counterframes were meant to 
stress that many Libyan youth activists have been educated in the West, hold Western 
principles, and call for the respect of human rights. The network’s intellectuals 
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articulated imagined political possibilities in which they speculated a better future in 
terms of a stable, institutional, and constitutional democratic rule. They deployed 
diagnostic frames and counterframes as tools for uncovering the regime’s weaknesses 
and discrepancies, and as introductory efforts for later attempts to mobilize masses. 
Thereafter, motivational frames were used to fuel the “revolution” and drive it forward 
towards a total deconstruction of the regime’s institutional facts. Al-Jazeera’s 
intellectuals engaged in this process very early on. Their most powerful attempts were 
those carries out by Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi’s, who invested well in a potent 
religious speech, as shall be demonstrated in the following.  
Fueling the “Revolution” 
Perhaps the most powerful motivational frames that serve to fuel a conservative 
community facing an existential threat are of a religious nature. Following Gaddafi’s 
announcements of his intent to “cleanse” the eastern part of the country, Libyan 
protesters started reaching out for alternative forms of action, whereas international 
players began considering the choice of intervention. In the midst of uncertainty and 
what could turn into a blood bath, maintaining the morale of Libyan dissidents became 
one of the main goals of al-Jazeera’s intellectuals. In the same way he had previously 
addressed Egypt’s protesters, Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi presented a religious account 
of the issue, with an aim to maximize the incentives of protesters and armed rebels (the 
latter term is used to denote militarized action) to hold their ground and challenge 
Gaddafi till the very end. With the frequent mention of possible international support for 
the dissidents, time became a crucial factor to both sides of the struggle. To Gaddafi, the 
faster the issue gets settled, the less chance things could get out of hand. Contrary to 
that, the rebels invested in the time element in the hope of upgrading their capabilities 
and receiving international aid or regional sponsorship. Motivational framing was vital 
for the rebels during this time interval, lest some of them submit to the regime’s 
threatening oratory. For these reasons, al-Qaradawi’s contributions were significantly 
important. 
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Consider the following two extracts from interviews with al-Qaradawi on al-
Jazeera:  
Sheikh Yousssef al-Qaradawi: I ask the Libyan people to be patient. God 
told his believers; “O you who have believed, persevere and endure and 
remain stationed”. No matter how severe the sacrifices are, they are not 
more precious than freedom. Freedom has a price that we have to pay if 
we encounter oppressive pharaohs. God says “if you are suffering, then 
surely they [too] are suffering as you are suffering, but you expect from 
Allah what they expect not”. He who falls from us is a martyr for the 
cause of God and [shall be rewarded in] the highest heavens. “Think not 
of those who have been killed in the cause of God as dead. Nay, they are 
living, with their Lord, and they have provision”. I call upon the Libyan 
people to persevere and to stand en bloc as God says “Allah loves those 
who fight in his cause in [solid] ranks, as though they were a [firm] 
structure cemented with molten lead”. During the battle, they should be 
united. There should be no difference between one tribe and the other, 
between east and west. They should all stand against the oppressor.357  
Sheikh Yousssef al-Qaradawi: The same thing happened in Egypt and 
Tunisia. These oppressive regimes, as I previously stated, are blind, deaf, 
foolish, and rigid. God says “Indeed there is a reminder in this for him 
who has a heart or gives ear and is a witness”. Gaddafi has seen with his 
eyes and heard with his ears about what happened to his friends and 
neighbors in the east and west, yet he did not learn his lesson… The 
people have asked for their rights and were faced with gunfire, tanks, and 
airplanes. And [Gaddafi] couldn’t find a Libyan he could use in this 
scheme, so he referred to mercenaries to kill hundreds of Libyans in just a 
few days. I call upon the people to be patient and to hold their grounds. I 
offer them the same advice I have given Egyptians. No matter how much 
they sacrifice, they are eventually the winners. Gaddafi will soon be 
gone… I call upon the Libyan tribes to join the rebels. Anyone who 
hasn’t joined the rebels yet should do that. This is an Islamic duty.358  
 The extracts above exhibit a form of intense religious motivational framing. Al-
Qaradawi referred to the triumphant uprisings of Tunisia and Egypt to assure the rebels 
that things would head the same way if they maintain their unity. His usage of numerous 
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Quranic verses was meant to motivate them as well as to reduce the extent of 
compliance with Gaddafi’s orders amongst his loyalists by encouraging defections 
within the regime’s inner circles. Al-Qaradawi highlighted the gains of the struggle 
(freedom) and glorified the possible price (heaven). He reminded the rebels of their 
ability to inflict damage upon their opponents, deploying religious figures of speech for 
that purpose, while urging those who haven’t joined protesters to shift sides. If they 
refrain from doing so, he explained, they would be breaching their Islamic duty. 
 Al-Qaradawi’s speeches were thus deployed to fuel the rebels with religious 
incentives as they engaged in bloody battles on various fronts with Gaddafi’s heavily 
armed brigades. The cleric asserted that the new Libya to emerge from this bloodshed 
was worthy of sacrifice. Deconstructing the existing authoritarian rule required 
persistence and will, and for collective intentionality to be restored, it had to be enforced 
after decades of regime maintenance through coercive means. Al-Qaradawi stressed that, 
in order to affirm the legitimacy of their demands, the rebels had to strive for the 
protection of their social movement. Delegitimizing Libya’s oligarchy required 
commitment to the uprising’s aims within severe circumstances, and the regime’s 
institutional facts had to be dismantled by engaging in a full-fledged war. 
In this context, the term mercenaries was often used by al-Jazeera’s intellectuals 
(as shown in the excerpt above) as well as throughout the channel’s coverage in general 
to further delegitimize Gaddafi’s regime. Depicting Gaddafi loyalists as such was meant 
to stress the claim that the regime’s institutional facts do not rely on local collective 
recognition but rather on the support of foreign intruders who fight to maintain the 
ruling elite’s interests in return for financial gains. Not only was this rationale part of 
media rhetoric, but NTC members also deployed it in their communication with the 
outside world. In this regard, Deputy Head of the NTC Abdel Hafiz Ghoka banked on 
these allegations, as he later urged the UN and the “countries that support the revolution 
to launch airstrikes against sites and positions occupied by mercenaries, which have 
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been used against civilians and against the Libyan people”.359 
Proponents of the Libyan uprising, including al-Jazeera’s intellectuals, often used 
the terms Libyan people and mercenaries in the course of constructing a narrative that 
hails one side of the conflict while demonizing the other. Accordingly, the term Libyan 
people was deployed to denote collective recognition and to emphasize the source of 
legitimacy, whereas the term mercenaries was meant to deny Gaddafi’s allegations 
regarding his acquisition of popular support amongst Libyans.  
Al-Jazeera’s intellectuals contributed in various ways to the transmission of 
motivational messages. Some, as the following excerpt reveals, deployed a zealous tone 
to lift confidence and promote optimism by stressing their absolute faith in Libya’s 
future prospects. This form of motivation incorporated counterframes that refute the 
regime’s vision regarding an unknown and insecure alternative in the case of its 
downfall. Its counterframes were also meant to deny claims that the rebels were seeking 
foreign intervention or would even accept it. Few days following this commentary, 
however, opposition figures did call for international aid, as Gaddafi launched a counter 
attack and began recapturing the cities he had previously lost, thus putting the Libyan 
uprising in jeopardy.   
Mahmoud Shammam: The cities are falling one after the other. By God 
this country shall be a safe one. Don’t believe those who say it will 
transform into warring emirates. This will not happen. There will be some 
irregularities, but those will not exceed the normal range. I want to 
emphasize that no Libyan has called for international intervention. The 
Libyan people rather insisted on not having foreign troops on their soil, 
even though few might have called for that in response to the [regime’s] 
violence.360   
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Motivational frames were employed to serve a full-fledged “revolution” whose 
aim was to create a new social order. They paved the way for imagining a country with 
alternative political possibilities. Re-inventing Libya’s institutional facts was, as 
previously mentioned, the ultimate phase to follow al-Jazeera’s framing processes, and 
this succession of phases allowed for the materialization of certain revolutionary visions 
promoted by the Qatari network. As al-Jazeera disseminated its revolutionary rhetoric 
and narrative regarding Libya’s events, new institutional facts were actually emerging in 
eastern Libya. In parallel, discussing future prospects became part of the intellectuals’ 
output on al-Jazeera, as Gaddafi’s measures to restore legitimacy were failing on the 
local and international levels alike. However, the future that these discussions entailed 
went further than imagining a new political order. Issues of identity soon surfaced in the 
discourse and the reconstruction of a new Libya, even hypothetically, introduced 
intricate questions regarding the very basic constituents of the Libyan state and society.	  
Disputes over identity: Defining future Libya  
How far should deconstruction go in order to rebuild a legitimate social order 
bearing collective intentionality? Would it be reasonable to presume that the Libyan 
society is Arab or Islamic prior to discussing future possibilities, or should all forms of 
identity be reinterpreted in light of the vast deconstruction of the state’s institutional 
facts? To what extent do issues of identity facilitate or hinder the creation of a newly 
modeled state?  
The aforementioned were sample questions and issues that were raised in the 
course of discussing post Gaddafi Libya. They were triggered by concerns on the costs 
of a power vacuum following the disintegration of the country’s social order and by the 
fact that tribal affiliations were gradually replacing loyalty to the state. The collapse of 
Libya’s institutional facts drove many Libyans to search for alternative forms of 
belonging that either had dominated past eras or presently reduce identity to pre-state 
constituencies. The rebels’ reference to Libya’s flag of independence (or of the 
monarchy) provides a striking example in this regard.  
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Following its independence in 1951, the legitimacy that Libya’s king Idris the 
First enjoyed was neither established on Libyan patriotism nor on Arab nationalism but 
rather on Sanusiyya, an Islamic Sufi order that emerged in the mid 19th century.361 In the 
1950s and 1960s, many young Libyans were attracted by Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
advocacy of Arab nationalism, and Gaddafi was one of them. Gaddafi’s identity politics, 
however, constantly changed throughout his rule that initiated in 1969, one year before 
Nasser’s death. His Green Book offered the ideological tools for this change as it “stove 
to blend nationalism, Pan Arabism, Africanism, and Islamism to confront anti-
imperialism and purportedly protect African nations from what he called Western 
usurpation and exploitation”.362 This broad understanding of Libya’s identity allowed 
Gaddafi to remold it and introduce it differently in accordance with changes and 
developments in regional and international contexts (Egypt’s shift in foreign policy 
during Sadat’s rule in the 1970s, Western sanctions on Libya especially in the 1980s, the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Oslo Accords in 1993, “War on Terror” 
followed by the war on Iraq in 2003…). Hence, Gaddafi accented Pan Africanism and 
called for the creation of a “United States of Africa” when he felt that Arab Nationalism 
was on the decline and Pan Arab politics were no more profitable, and as he got 
frustrated from the continuous fragmentation of the Arab political system, especially 
following the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978 and the Oslo 
Accords between Israel and the PLO a decade and a half later. In this context, for 
example, he emphasized in a 2007 interview on al-Jazeera that Libya “is an African 
country” and wished that Arabs “would stay away, for they did not fight with us against 
Italians, nor against Americans, nor did they lift the sanctions and siege from us. On the 
contrary, they gloated at us, and benefited from our hardship”.363  
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In pursuit of political representation in these extra-national frameworks, Gaddafi 
claimed himself the King of Kings of Africa, the Dean of Arab rulers, and the Imam of 
Muslims. 364 During the uprising, some of al-Jazeera’s intellectuals echoed concerns that 
the Leader’s deployment of such forms of identification in the hope of expanding his 
regional influence might create a backlash amongst his dissidents regarding Libya’s 
identity. In the following two excerpts, for example, Bishara warns of the damages of 
emphasizing tribal affiliations and of a possible resentment of Arab and Islamic 
discourse in future Libya. 
Azmi Bishara: This is the first time where the Libyans get the chance to 
organize themselves in modern civil societies. I am interested in 
following up with their means of organization and of developing a 
political discourse. [Gaddafi] did not leave a civil society, nor did he 
leave political parties, institutions, or unions. There is a danger that 
people might refer to their local communities to protect themselves, and 
that organization would be made on a local level due to the absence of 
links and communication between cities. The political discourse should 
be more than a mere reaction to [Gaddafi’s] ideology. [Gaddafi] has 
sometimes used Islam and Arabism at other times. There is a risk that 
people would react against Islam, Arabism, and Africa. This discourse 
has been used to exploit them. The Libyans must hold on to their Arab 
Islamic identity and must be part of Africa, for this is how they could 
develop a national project.365 
(Commenting on Gaddafi’s speech in which he warned of the threat 
posed by al-Qaeda) 
Azmi Bishara: Emphasizing the tribal nature of Libya is annoying. The 
guarantees lies in building national institutions; a national army and 
institutions that the Arab World recognizes. This would lead to opening 
borders with Egypt and Tunisia and engaging the Arab World. It is okay 
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to use the tribal element as a tool in the revolution. But we must realize 
that this tool cannot be a base for changing the regime. The tool should be 
a national one, based on citizenship, institutions, equality before the law, 
and the Arab and Islamic identity, and not on the same tools that Gaddafi 
used.366  
With the lack of modern state institutions, it was only normal for tribal affiliations 
to maintain their strength and to form a second layer of identity under the thin national 
facet that defined Gaddafi’s era. Albeit he worked on moderating these affiliations on 
the national level by establishing administrative divisions that transcend tribal 
segmentation, Gaddafi enhanced the links joining his own tribe to those that were 
closely associated with it due to political, historical, or geographic factors.367 In his 
armed forces, all major tribes were represented, yet, as BBC’s Mohammad Hussein 
contends, “fostering rivalries among the various tribes in the army through selective 
patronage has not only strengthened his control over the military, but has also worked to 
draw attention away from Col. Gaddafi and his regime”.368 Accordingly, Bishara’s 
criticism of stressing tribal affiliations in revolutionary rhetoric is based on the grounds 
that tribalism had formerly been Gaddafi’s means to divide and rule before later being 
deployed by his loyalists to accent the dangers of his regime’s downfall. This frame 
dispute that Bishara engages in with protagonists of the uprising aims to highlight the 
importance of creating alternative institutional facts following the dissolution of 
Gaddafi’s stateless realm of power. In this context, Arab and Islamic identities serve as 
adhesive elements in the process of state building. Emphasizing them rather than 
frequently referring to tribal affiliations serves in reaffirming Libya’s national identity 
and avoiding raising the concerns of regional players that share the country’s 
transnational forms of identification (such as neighboring Tunisia and Egypt). Bishara 
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argues that the aforementioned, in addition to the creation of proper state institutions, are 
necessary tools to dispose of Gaddafi’s legacy and replace it with an alternative political 
order. The replacement of Gaddafi’s regime, however, was not only based on this 
intricate process of framing. In parallel to this discourse, an international consensus 
regarding the need to militarily intervene was building. Henceforth, the media’s 
leverage, including al-Jazeera’s, began receding, and NATO’s hard power became the 
decisive factor in Libya’s political transformation.  
From al-Jazeera to NATO  
Within just few weeks following the outset of protests, al-Jazeera managed to 
create a well-established network in the Eastern part of Libya, with satellite transmitters 
dispersed in Tubrok, Benghazi, Ras Lanuf, and Brega. The channel made use of local 
technicians to operate SNGs369 and citizen journalists to provide it with daily footage. 
Ali Hashem, its correspondent to Benghazi in March and April 2011, was put in touch 
with local tribesmen and militant rebels by the network’s administration in Doha prior to 
his deployment in the country. This made the “team” of news providers he was part of or 
collaborated with extend beyond the channel’s actual staff, as it comprised of a wide 
circle of contributors to the network’s broadcast output.370  
The connection that al-Jazeera was able to establish with local activists, militants, 
and opposition figures, many of whom had defected from the regime, allowed it to 
communicate its message to its audience (including Libyan spectators) more powerfully, 
as it amplified the opposition’s demands and reinforced them with narrative construction 
and motivational frames. The interactive character of the channel’s coverage enhanced 
its persuasive leverage and soft power capabilities. Moreover, the role that its 
intellectuals played in proposing alternative political structures and imagining different 
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uprising. November 2014. 
	   186	  
possibilities on the one hand, and in bonding with the actual creators of these structures 
and possibilities on the other, furthered the channel’s role as an institutional organic 
intellectual.   
Al-Jazeera’s intellectual output contributed to crystallizing a vision of what ought 
to be deconstructed in Libya and what ought to replace it. In the course of doing so, it 
threatened the security of the regime’s top figures as well as the stability of its 
institutional facts. The militarization of the uprising, however, reduced the impact of the 
intellectual output including the framing processes it entailed, and augmented the role of 
hard power in shaping events. Thereafter, the tone of al-Jazeera’s intellectuals expressed 
gradual submission to the changing conditions and realities. What was unacceptable 
(foreign intervention) became necessary under the pretext that Gaddafi was using brute 
force to crack down on protesters. Nevertheless, and although some commentaries 
lamented the militarization of the conflict and the uprising’s growing contingency on 
foreign interference, al-Jazeera’s intellectuals continued to accent the need for a 
complete deconstruction of the Libyan regime. The following excerpts reflect concerns 
and shifting stances, yet flow within the same grand strategy of countering the regime 
until its downfall. 
Azmi Bishara: We hope [the uprising] does not turn into a civil war. This 
is still a popular revolution but has mutated into an armed one because 
the man ruling Libya wished to turn it into one. He did not have the 
responsibility of Zine el-Abidine Bin Ali who was much more rational, 
nor did he have Egypt’s institutions that were able to pressure the 
president and push him [to resign].371   
Sheikh Ali Sallabi: The Libyans refuse [foreign] military intervention and 
are capable of overthrowing this dictatorial regime. Every Libyan who 
calls for military intervention shall be considered a traitor and is neither 
accepted by the rebels nor by the Libyan people.372 
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Sheikh Youssef Al-Qaradawi: We wish the Leader – this is how he was 
keen on being addressed - had listened. Had he felt with his people, he 
wouldn’t have forced our Umma to refer to the United Nations to make 
him stop killing his people. 
(Commenting on Gaddafi’s depiction of the war as a Crusade): 
Is he the protector of Islam? Threatening his people with death; how is 
this Islamic? The Libyan people have urged them [the international 
community] to intervene. Even on the very last night, and while the 
Security Council was holding its consultations, he told them I shall be 
coming to invade you tonight. This is out of necessity. We did not ask the 
West for help. We asked an international organization; the United 
Nations and the Security Council.373 
 In the excerpts above, Bishara highlights the main aspect that differentiates the 
case of Libya from that of Egypt. In the latter, as previously explained, state institutions 
(mainly the army) played a major role in securing a relatively smooth transition of 
power. The lack of institutions in Libya, on the other hand, prevented the possibility of 
replicating the Egyptian scenario. Bishara was keen, however, on clearly blaming the 
regime for the uprising’s mutation into a civil war, alleging that it deliberately pushed 
the discourse in that direction. Similarly, al-Qaradawi held Libyan authorities 
responsible for inviting foreign intervention by cornering the rebels and protesters and 
forcing them to choose between death and destruction on the one hand, and reliance on 
foreign aid on the other. Al-Qaradawi explains that the rebels’ reference to foreign 
actors was their only way for salvation. Yet he adds that aid and assistance was 
requested from the United Nations, as an international organization, rather than Western 
state actors per se. This was meant to counterframe Gaddafi’s narrative that, in the 
course of drawing on Islamic sentiments, depicted foreign intervention as a form of 
Crusade. 
Legitimizing foreign intervention was a delicate issue in the Arab World where 
the public sphere, as previously explained in the literature review, was partially 
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characterized by its anti-Western sentiments and thus defined as a counterpublic. What 
made the issue even more sensitive was the insistence of NTC figures and al-Jazeera 
intellectuals on rejecting foreign support. In an excerpt displayed earlier, Shammam said 
“no Libyan has called for international intervention”, adding that “the Libyan people 
rather insisted on not having foreign troops on their soil, even though few might have 
called for that in response to the regime’s violence”. In the abovementioned, al-Sallabi 
went as far as depicting those who call for intervention as “traitors” that the Libyan 
people repudiate. The frequent use of the term Libyan people (as both excerpts show) 
was meant to frame such calls as missing the element of collective intentionality and 
therefore as lacking legitimacy. This explains why, in his commentary, al-Qaradawi 
deployed the term Umma in the course of legitimizing appeals for international aid. Al-
Qaradawi contends that the Umma, as a collective entity, was “forced” to refer to the 
Security Council to stop Gaddafi from killing his people. Accordingly, not only were 
these calls for support meant to address the United Nations (rather than specific foreign 
actors with private agendas), but were also endorsed by the vast majority of Muslims, as 
al-Qaradawi’s counterframes suggest.   
 In parallel to this battle of legitimacy, an intense PR campaign was organized to 
polish the image of Gaddafi’s regime and a psychological war was being fought between 
the regime and its antagonists prior to the declaration of Security Council resolution 
1973 that allows foreign intervention. In response to Saif al-Islam’s statement in which 
he said “it’ll be too late by the time the Security Council resolution is issued” and that 
the regime’s “military operations will end within 48 hours”, Bishara emphasizes that the 
regime is playing its last remaining cards to tilt the balance of public opinion and bribe 
international players.  
Azmi Bishara: This is primarily a psychological war. 
Telecommunications are down and the [anti-Gaddafi] channels’ 
broadcasts are often disrupted. The Libyan Television, on the other hand, 
seems to be reaching everyone in Libya. Secondly, there is a crew of 
political and military advisers and public relations experts [working in 
support of the Libyan regime]. There are attempts to win the international 
public opinion. [Saif al-Islam’s underlying message is the following]: 
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The military balance is tilting in our favor. So those who need oil 
contracts should redo their calculations. Thirdly, let’s assume he is right. 
Does occupying his cities serve his narrative? He is now saying my 
people are resisting my rule and I am obliged to invade my cities with 
tanks.374  
On the following day (one day prior to the Security Council’s discussions), 
Bishara’s commentaries seemed to be gradually changing into ones bearing analysis 
rather than promoting various kinds of frames (especially motivational ones) as the first 
excerpt below shows. This was also the case on the day the resolution was issued (see 
second excerpt below). Interestingly, Bishara hoped that the resolution itself would have 
a motivational effect on protesters in cities that had not witnessed mass protests yet. The 
fact that the decision might force Gaddafi’s brigades to withdraw from cities was 
thought to have a positive impact on Libyans that were still reluctant to join the uprising. 
The resolution’s admission of a no-fly zone and possible airstrikes against Gaddafi’s 
forces provided Libyan dissidents with an incentive to expand their protests. Thus, its 
introduction of brute force through foreign intervention offered a replacement to the 
various forms of motivational frames (religious and otherwise) that were communicated 
via the media.  
Azmi Bishara: Whether there are massacres or not, these people no more 
accept this regime. They no more accept [Gaddafi’s] weird way of 
governance, from the absence of institutions to subjecting people to his 
thoughts, philosophy, style, alliances, and whims. [The Security Council] 
will take a strong decision tonight. It will go further than imposing a no-
fly zone. The current discussion at the Security Council shows that Ban 
Ki-moon’s demand for an immediate cease-fire appeases the Russian 
position and aims to integrate it with the Arab-British proposed 
resolution.375 
Azmi Bishara: I hope this will not lead to Western intervention, in the 
sense that the Security Council resolution would have a deterring effect 
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and that this would motivate cities that have not been liberated yet to 
protest again. The best case scenario would be that this resolution would 
force [Gaddafi’s] battalions to leave the cities and that it would allow the 
people to demonstrate again in the same way they have done at the 
beginning of the uprising.376 
 Bishara’s depiction of a “best case scenario” where Libyans would protest as 
they previously had reveals the extent of change that the discourse had 
undergone and the impact of this change on al-Jazeera’s output. The uprising’s 
mutation into an armed conflict and the introduction of foreign elements to the 
struggle have reduced the impact of soft power and put state actors that possess 
hard power capabilities in control. Bishara could not but “hope” that the Security 
Council resolution would allow the Libyans to recreate the first phase of the 
uprising or reenact its first scene. The term “hope” was radically different from 
the motivational vocabulary formerly used by Bishara to incite protests or 
propose strategies for Libya’s social movement. It was a form of tacit confession 
that media leverage had been overtaken by brute force.  
Al-Jazeera’s deployment of soft power was introductory to the use of hard power 
on local and international scales. When asked by the writer of this thesis about his 
account of the uprising’s evolution, Shammam argued that Gaddafi and his antagonists 
were both responsible for its militarization in various degrees: whilst the regime’s use of 
brute force constituted a key factor for pushing in this direction, Islamist factions, 
especially the Islamic Fighting Group, saw in this militarization a chance to expand and 
to forcefully dominate the scene thereafter. In this regard, echoing Jibril’s accusations 
stated earlier, Shammam added that Qatar and al-Jazeera prioritized supporting Islamists 
on the expense of other Libyan dissidents. He also contended that the network generally 
encouraged local and foreign military action, citing al-Qaradawi’s approval of NATO’s 
intervention after the declaration of Security Council Resolution 1973 to support his 
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claim.377    
Throughout the first 33 days of the Libyan uprising, al-Jazeera and its 
intellectuals engaged in an intricate process of deconstructing and constructing meaning 
and reality. The channel made use of the vast network it established with protesters and 
rebels to magnify the scene and amplify the opposition’s narrative. Its Libyan 
intellectuals were an added value to its output, as they possessed a dual role in terms of 
promoting frames on the one hand, and of strengthening the channel’s ties and interplay 
with Libyan activists on the other. Yet the outlet’s impact soon receded, as it paved the 
way – along with other media networks - for foreign military intervention following the 
declaration of Security Council Resolution 1973. The resolution was approved by 10 
member states, whereas 5 states abstained including permanent members Russia and 
China. It was obvious that the countdown of Gaddafi’s regime had begun, and that the 
upper hand had become that of the anti-Gaddafi military coalition headed by NATO, and 
that few Arab countries, including Qatar, took part of. Thereafter, the contributions of al-
Jazeera’s intellectuals were more descriptive and analytical than motivational, as they 
had initially been.  
Conclusion 
In one of his interviews, Bishara criticized the popular Arab rush for quick 
outcomes, arguing that “one must not deal with current events according to the laws of 
live broadcast, and thus expect to get 10 news stories per day. One should rather 
understand that, on a historical scale, the regime is disintegrating very quickly”.378  
Gaddafi’s regime disintegrated in Libya as its institutional facts lost collective 
recognition and its ability to enforce this recognition. Al-Jazeera and its regular guest-
intellectuals played a role in accelerating this process and maximizing its effects, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 Interview with Libyan politician and former al-Jazeera guest Mahmoud Shammam. September 2015.  
378 Bišāra, Dr. ‘Azmī. “Ṯawrat al-ša‘b fī Lībīyā .. al-yawm al-‘āšir .. Dr. ‘Azmī Bišāra - 1” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X6YtGvTihas uploaded February 26, 2011, accessed October 10, 2014. 
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since the time element was crucial in the case of Libya as previously explained, the 
network’s impact was of substantial importance. 
As it had formerly done in the case of Egypt, al-Jazeera utilized intellectuals with 
potent oratory to promote revolutionary frames and anti-regime narratives. However, 
what distinguished the case of Libya were elements pertaining to the regime’s 
institutional facts that were founded on a dogmatic ideology and revolved around 
Gaddafi’s idiosyncrasies rather than state structures. This made change a harder task to 
achieve and necessitated a full-fledged revolution to dismantle the existing social order. 
The result was a prolonged conflict that mutated from peaceful protestation to a 
militarized conflict and foreign intervention.  
The distinct features of Gaddafi’s regime impelled a different approach by al-
Jazeera as well. The outlet made use of Libyan intellectuals that worked on two parallel 
lines. The first pertained to mediatized forms of framing and deconstruction of meaning, 
and the second related to planning the establishment of new institutional facts over the 
rubble of old ones. The National Transitional Council was the main banner that the 
outlet collaborated with to further its promotional campaign for alternative political 
possibilities. This campaign took place along with its intellectuals’ active participation 
in the foundation and operationalization of the council that eventually channeled arms 
and funds to rebels on the ground, allowing them to set the building blocks of a new 










The literature on media and politics has not examined the role of intellectuals as 
articulators and transmitters of information via the media in the course of reflecting on 
political events. Rarely has an interdisciplinary association been made between 
intellectual activity and the media’s representational power in political contexts. The 
significance of this missing link relates to the enhanced ability of intellectuals to make 
sense of events and disseminate their narrative of them in the availability of new 
telecommunication technologies. In this regard, this thesis aims to contribute to bridging 
the gap between conventional accounts of intellectual output and common references to 
televised media effect as a mere outcome of image production. Thus, it emphasizes the 
potency of human agency in a postmodern medium of representation, and reinterprets 
the role of both, the media and intellectuals, in light of their ability to collaboratively 
engage with social dynamics aiming to reestablish social realities.  
The thesis thus addresses the absent intellectual facet in the politics-media 
interplay and goes beyond traditional accounts of its outcomes. As it examines al-
Jazeera’s output in revolutionary contexts, it analyzes the role of its articulate 
intellectuals in constructing collective action frames in the cases of Egypt and Libya. In 
the course of dissecting al-Jazeera’s various forms of engagement with the political 
discourse, the thesis investigates the outlet’s phenomenal emergence as an institutional 
organic intellectual during the Arab uprisings. This intellectual element is examined in 
the course of explaining the network’s role in deconstructing social facts and promoting 
alternative political possibilities. It is understood to be integrally constitutive of this 
processual phenomenon of meaning construction and social reality deconstruction. 
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Theoretical and Empirical Contributions  
Al-Jazeera’s intellectual output has organically connected the outlet to the social 
movements actively shaping events on the ground, and has thus enhanced its leverage in 
terms of impacting the discourse in question. This triangular relationship between the 
outlet mediating texts and images, an intellectual ingredient provided by regular 
commentators, and popular dynamics, constitutes the base of our resultant theoretical 
contributions. Hence, the thesis inferences primarily relate to its elucidation of this 
intricate process comprising of the aforementioned interplaying elements. Our 
investigation of this process has resulted in the generation of two main theoretical 
contributions. The first suggests the propensity of a powerful media outlet to perform the 
function of an institutional organic intellectual in the presence of human agency (its 
individual guest intellectuals capitalizing on its news output). And the second pertains to 
the ability of intellectual output disseminated through new media technologies to 
contribute to the deconstruction of social realities in revolutionary contexts, and to even 
introduce the creation of alternative social facts.  
The concept of an institutional organic intellectual constitutes an addition to the 
literature on intellectuals and media alike. As earlier explained, intellectuals have 
generally been classified in three different categories. The taxonomy of class-bound 
intellectuals was the one deployed in the course of analyzing al-Jazeera’s engagements 
with the discourse in Egypt and Libya. In this category, the notion of Gramsci’s organic 
intellectual has been formerly redefined (and often renamed) to fit a wide selection of 
cases. Of those were ones particularly relevant to social movements rather than social 
classes. Yet this interpretation of the intellectual’s organic role did not surpass the 
intellectual’s individual contribution to social and political discourse. Our understanding 
of this organic role is one involving the deployment of new media technologies to 
amplify the processes of meaning construction through intellectual articulations in the 
service of social movements calling for political change. This incorporation of media has 
resulted in the emergence of an institutional intellectual with high-tech capabilities and 
an ability to connect with wide social strata. Al-Jazeera’s engagement with the uprisings 
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was active and guided by strategies that were continuously molded and articulated 
through on-air commentaries. The contentious nature of its engagements that took the 
form of various framing processes was meant to counter hegemonic power structures in 
both, Egypt and Libya. Al-Jazeera, as an institutional organic intellectual, was thus 
operating as a counter hegemonic force opposing despotic regimes along with congruent 
circles of ruling elites and loyalists that were linked to the governing class through 
clientalistic or ideological connections (the former in the case of Egypt and the latter in 
that of Libya).  
The second theoretical contribution explaining the ability to restructure social 
realities through intellectual articulations serves as an addition to the literature on media 
on the one hand, and that on framing and social movements on the other. Regarding the 
literature on media, and as earlier explained, the impact of media on collective cognition 
has primarily been addressed with reference to the representational power of mediated 
images and texts that often constitute modified versions of reality. The media’s tendency 
to redesign the sequence of events or rearrange their constellation, in addition to their 
propensity to amplify certain angles of a discourse and discard others, have both been 
thought to result in the generation of a hyper form of reality that eventually effaces 
distinctions between the real world and the constructed one. Our thesis offers something 
that vastly differs from this account of hyperreality construction, as it suggests that the 
meaning generated through intellectual articulations could constitute the basic building 
block of language contingent social realities. This form of social reality construction 
through linguistic practices gains potency when using a powerful media platform like al-
Jazeera, and while operating in a vibrant context such as that of the Arab uprisings. As 
for the contribution to the literature on framing, this thesis presents two empirical 
illustrations of how collective action frames were constructed in the context of a 
revolutionized public sphere. By presenting thorough analysis of al-Jazeera’s framing 
process in two distinct settings with different intervening variables, this research serves 
in enriching the literature on the subject with an empirical contribution on the Arab 
World during one of its most critical junctures in modern times. Critics of the framing 
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perspective have specifically referred to the scarcity of empirical research as opposed to 
the abundancy of conceptual accounts as formerly discussed. This adds to the 
significance of our contribution, as it serves in complimenting the existing body of 
literature with further illustrations.  
 Limitations of the Contribution  
Despite establishing this connection between representation and social reality 
construction through intellectual participation, the thesis does not prove the presence of 
a tangible link between linguistic articulations on the one hand, and the actual 
establishment of institutional facts on the other. This is its first major limitation. Al-
Jazeera has contributed to change, not only through its promotional discourse, but by 
functioning as an active institutional entity that offered a space for interaction between 
individuals sharing similar goals (intellectuals and opposition figures on the one hand, 
and intellectuals and social movement activists on the other). It has also contributed to 
the deconstruction of regime social facts in Egypt and state social facts in Libya, as it 
participated in the delegitimation of both through intense framing processes. These 
framing processes have played a role in disarming the institutional facts in question of 
the element of collective recognition and in provoking protesting masses to pursue 
fundamental change rather than mild reform. Not only has the network’s impact on the 
discourse been noticed on the ground (as empirical evidence has precisely shown in 
Cairo’s Tahrir Square and Libya’s Benghazi) but also in the retaliatory reactions of the 
regimes themselves in both countries. Al-Jazeera has also facilitated the creation of 
alternative political realities in the case of Libya due to its active anti-regime 
participation in the discourse and the dual role that its Libyan guest intellectuals have 
played regarding the promotion of alternatives and the actual establishment of them 
(their membership in Libya’s NTC or connections with militant rebels, the space of 
interaction between Libyan dissidents and Qatari authorities that the network offered…). 
Notwithstanding, proving a quantifiable and direct causal relationship between the 
intellectual processes of engagement – as ideational constructs – on the one hand, and 
the material deconstruction and construction of social facts on the other, is beyond the 
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aims and possible means of this study. Thus, this thesis does not claim (and cannot 
either) that a) it can nullify the effects of all intervening variables in the course of 
assessing al-Jazeera’s effect nor that b) it can quantify the causal relationship between 
ideational constructs and social realities. It rather aims to explain how al-Jazeera 
contributed to the processes of deconstructing social realities as opposed to illustrating 
to what extent it has done so. The wealth of empirical evidence provided in this thesis 
has indeed shown that al-Jazeera has had a substantial impact in this regard, yet does not 
allow one to measure this impact.   
Another major limitation of this thesis is that it refrains from expounding the 
relationship between al-Jazeera and its sponsoring state, Qatar, and does not aim to 
provide an explanation of the network’s editorial line. Arab regimes facing dissent often 
blamed al-Jazeera for inciting protestations against them and accused the network of 
acting as a tool for foreign intervention. On various occasions, they coupled these 
allegations with charging Qatar, al-Jazeera’s partisan state, of meddling with their 
domestic affairs in the hope to enhance its regional leverage. A former senior journalist 
in the channel asserts that al-Jazeera’s general editorial policies were indeed designed by 
the head of its board of directors who was also a member of the Qatari ruling family, 
whereas high-ranking managerial employees and senior bulletin producers worked on 
translating these guidelines through the outlet’s coverage on a day to day basis.379 This 
partisan relationship has been discussed in several contributions during times of peace as 
shown in our literature review. Yet none of these contributions has so far illuminated the 
forms of instrumental deployment of this relationship in the context of a vibrant regional 
power discourse, as in the case of the Arab uprisings. Our thesis, although providing 
empirical data and presenting theoretical implications that could be readapted and 
reapplied in later studies, neither addresses the topic of Qatari foreign policy nor aims to 
situate al-Jazeera’s role in this regard. It is true that the idea of organicity that this thesis 
deploys could serve in highlighting the forms of Qatar’s deployment of al-Jazeera, yet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 Interview with Osama Radi, former senior bulletin producer in al-Jazeera. 
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this does not fall within the scope of our study and any research in this regard is left for 
possible contributions in the future. 
 Comparisons and deductions 
It is worth noting, as a start, that the discourse between regime antagonists and 
protagonists regarding the social movements calling for change in both, Egypt and 
Libya, was mainly expressed by the regimes’ officials on the one hand, and rival media 
networks (primarily al-Jazeera) on the other. This was because official media outlets in 
both countries were weaker than engaging in this confrontational battle of credibility 
alone, for apart from the difference in capabilities, their output was rather a form of 
maladroit propaganda. Thus, Mubarak and Gaddafi as well as other regime figures often 
took part in this discourse in person, whereas al-Jazeera’s intellectuals concentrated their 
remarks on the regimes and their heads rather than merely analyzing events in what 
seemed at times to be a pear-to-pear discourse. Accordingly, the network’s intellectual 
engagement with the uprisings involved a) a diagnosis of the situation in hand whereby 
its intellectuals blamed the regimes as a whole for the states’ deteriorating conditions; b) 
a prognosis of proposed strategies to rectify the situation and this generally involved 
ousting the heads of regimes and deconstructing institutions associated with them; and c) 
motivational vocabulary to incite mass mobilization with the aim of achieving these 
intended goals. In the following, we shall outline a brief comparison between both 
regimes’ reactions to threat as this research has shown, before explaining how this 
difference in reaction has resulted in a variant engagement by al-Jazeera.  
As explained previously, the regimes in Egypt and Libya differed in various 
aspects. In Egypt, the regime was a hierarchical structure of power relations that 
governed well-established state institutions. It was regulated by a constitution that, 
although tailored to concentrate political power in the hands of the President, was made 
up of clear provisions that defined and delineated the authority practiced by executive, 
legislative, and judicial bodies. This is not to deny that the amount of power that the 
constitution gave to the president allowed the regime to “operate outside existing state 
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institutions”.380 The Libyan regime, on the other hand, was structurally different from its 
counterpart in Egypt. As shown in chapter 5, Gaddafi’s stateless state was practically 
devoid of modern institutions that operate independently of the Leader’s centralized 
command and that of his sons. It was pretty much revolved around the Leader and other 
subordinate regime institutional facts that Gaddafi had effectively legitimized 
throughout his rule by establishing a collective recognition of them through coercive 
means.  
The Libyan regime thus illustrated an idiosyncratic form of governance. Its 
decisions were not subject to institutional hampers whether in times of stability or those 
of turbulence. Moreover, it was based on ideology and was therefore less inclined to 
respond to unpredictable or unprecedented events in a flexible manner. Contrary to that, 
the regime in Egypt functioned within a state structure and did not adopt a rigid 
ideology. It was thus more disposed to act pragmatically and to deploy containment 
methods rather than confrontational ones right away.  
On the one hand, the regime in Egypt deployed what many of its antagonists 
(including al-Jazeera’s Azmi Bishara) thought were illusive techniques aiming to 
circumvent the popular discourse and prevent it from further expansion. Hence, when 
things seemed to be getting out of hand, President Mubarak warned of a scenario of 
chaos or of the Muslim Brotherhood seizing power in the case of his downfall, whereas 
Vice President Omar Suleiman expressed the regime’s willingness to negotiate with 
opposition factions (and took preliminary steps in this regard). This dual strategy of 
intimidation and negotiations was thought to be one of the authorities’ mechanisms of 
self-defense. Accordingly, the regime worked on enhancing public concerns of turmoil 
in parallel to showing its receptivity to efforts of collaboration. It also revealed its 
willingness to undergo minimal alterations in order to sustain its basic structure of power 
relations and to maintain the network of interests it comprises of. Nevertheless, it was 
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too late for these maneuvers to achieve tangible results, as the numbers of protesters 
increased and the military refrained from confronting them.     
In Libya, on the other hand, the topic of tawreeth was rather taboo and was 
neither raised in the media nor openly discussed in the country’s public sphere. 
Following the growth of protests in the Eastern part of the country, Saif al-Islam issued 
several televised statements in which he warned of the aftermath of the regime’s 
downfall. In one of his early speeches, he “predicted” a vast civil war and massive 
bloodshed whereby “all of Libya will be destroyed” and Libyans “will need 40 years to 
reach an agreement on how to run the country, because everyone will want to be 
president or emir and everyone will want to run the country.”381 Saif’s speculations of a 
bloody war for domination proved to be true in the years to follow. At that point, 
however, its seeds lay in the regime’s increasing deficiency in terms of representation, 
after the collective recognition it assumed began vastly eroding in different parts of the 
country. Saif’s depiction of the conflict as one pertaining to the nature of the regime in 
the case of Gaddafi’s downfall (a republic with a president or an Islamic state ruled by 
an emir) and to the identity of its potential governors (who will fight to run the country) 
was an indirect admission that the battle in Libya was one of legitimacy. His statement, 
like many others that addressed Gaddafi’s loyalists for motivational purposes or were 
meant to threaten and intimidate his antagonists, was one that revealed his authority and 
status as an heir of the Leader. Saif’s attitude in this regard was opposite to that of 
Gamal Mubarak’s, as the latter refrained from giving public speeches due to the absence 
of an official status legitimizing this function. The only formal political position he held 
was head of the National Democratic Party’s politburo, which he ended up resigning 
from as a sign of concession. 
Accordingly, the means used to maintain the power of Gaddafi and his regime 
were much more aggressive than those deployed by Mubarak and his loyalists. In the 
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former’s case, there was a general disregard of state bureaucracies (state institutional 
facts), as they were highly dysfunctional and offered no added value to Gaddafi’s 
aggregate power. Any form of concession regarding the function of the government and 
the authority it assumes, for example, would have jeopardized the Leader’s status as the 
fundamental institutional fact having absolute powers and legitimizing the country’s 
entire social order. In Egypt, on the other hand, dissolving the government was a 
bargaining chip in the hands of Mubarak. It was a means to appease the opposition and 
contain it by involving it in a process of dialogue whose aim was to legitimize minor 
reforms within the regime’s existing structures. State bureaucracies were thus deployed 
by the regime to impede the uprising’s momentum in parallel to the use of enforcement 
security measures.   
 Mubarak’s patriarchal tone regarding Egyptians in general and protesters in 
particular was topped by Gaddafi’s extreme rhetoric concerning his ideology and thus 
his status as the only source of legitimacy. Hence, for example, the Leader’s reference to 
himself as history (as opposed to Mubarak’s mere emphasis on his “historic 
achievements”) was depicted as an overt expression of his megalomania (by al-Jazeera’s 
guests). In general, Mubarak revealed a tendency to deploy political means hand in hand 
with security measures in order to contain the movement and counterframe its 
allegations, whereas Gaddafi based his response on rigid ideological grounds and his 
animosity towards protesters was unchallenged by institutional hampers. 
Mubarak’s reactions ranged from denial at the uprising’s early stages to the 
deployment of policies that many protagonists of the social movement thought were 
illusive tactics aiming to abort fundamental change. His speeches never involved 
improvising and were rather prepared beforehand and always read from paper with an 
aim to deliver specific messages. Gaddafi, on the other hand, was often inconsistent in 
expressing his thoughts and actions, even when articulating them in the same speech. 
Most of his statements were fiery and improvised. They lacked proper structure and 
revealed an impatient urge to crush his opponents with little regard to the impact of his 
aggressive vocabulary on his image, as well as on internal and external reactions alike.  
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 The Libyan regime’s reaction to threat differed from that of its Egyptian 
counterpart due to the inherent characteristics it possessed. These characteristics made it 
more prone to use coercive means in order to maintain its long-sustained institutional 
facts. In Gaddafi’s stateless state, however, it was difficult to draw a clear line of 
distinction between state institutional facts and regime institutional facts, as the regime 
had managed throughout more than four decades to redefine and reconstruct all state 
institutions and to absorb them under its ideological banners and idiosyncratic forms of 
rule. Thus, most Libyan state structures were bound to be instrumentally deployed in the 
service of the country’s ruling elites due to their formation and ideological inclinations. 
Consequently, and contrary to the case of Egypt, toppling the regime was unlikely to be 
achieved without deconstructing state institutions. This difference posed a challenge to 
the Qatari network that had previously been engaging with peaceful uprisings and 
restrained regime responses. Thus, al-Jazeera reacted to this challenge by broadening its 
intellectual participation and diversifying its forms of engagement as shall be shown in 
the following. 
Firstly, the identity of al-Jazeera’s regular commentators on the Egyptian 
uprising, Azmi Bishara and Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi, had a transnational dimension. 
Bishara was a prominent Pan-Arab intellectual with a vast experience in political 
activism. The Palestinian-Israeli who was expelled by Tel Aviv due to his endorsement 
of anti-Israel activism was practically a stateless intellectual. Al-Qaradawi, on the other 
hand, was one of the most recognized clerics with a massive web of connections with 
Islamist scholars and politicians from all around the globe. The two intellectuals took 
part in the construction of collective action frames during all the uprisings that al-Jazeera 
vehemently covered. Their contributions were not limited to one setting only, but were 
rather context-transcendent. Thus, their commentaries on the uprising in Libya were part 
of their general discursive engagements with the “Arab Spring” as a whole, and Egypt 
marked no exception to that. In the case of Libya, however, al-Jazeera’s addition of local 
commentators served the purpose of presenting more informed and specialized 
contributions to its Arab audiences in general and Libyan spectators in particular. 
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Shammam contends that the network’s Libyan intellectuals – himself being one of them 
- served in dissecting the Libyan landscape and engaging with it in detail, stressing the 
centrality of motivational vocabulary deployed in this regard.382	  As earlier explained, 
each of the three Libyan intellectuals had formerly been involved in their home 
country’s domestic politics and were well connected with local politicians and 
intellectuals, some of whom later defected from the regime and established the NTC. 
Such links were of significant importance in a state where civil society and all forms of 
dissident political expression and activism had been effectively absent for decades. 
Contrary to Egypt, Libya’s political landscape was nearly an undiscovered terrain, and 
with the lack of a coherent structure of state institutions, it was challenging for 
commentators to provide detailed analysis of the evolving discourse and to identify 
strategies for engagement. Thus, as previously explained, the Libyan intellectuals’ 
motivational frames differed from those of Bishara and al-Qaradawi in terms of 
specificity, as they often addressed particular tribes and figures (political, military, and 
religious) in the course of constructing frames and inciting action. Accordingly, al-
Qaradawi issued general calls for all the Libyan tribes to join the revolution, whereas 
Shammam and al-Sallabi were keen on addressing the Gaddadfa tribe in particular, and 
made reference to its past connections with neighboring tribal entities that have 
announced revolt, such as the Suleiman tribe. The same thing could be noticed in al-
Sallabi’s reference to the Free Officers by name (General Mustafa al-Kharroubi, General 
Abu Bakr Younes Jaber…) and his mention of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and of 
the strong connections he held with it. 	  
Secondly, al-Jazeera’s intellectuals focused on de-iconizing the Leader using all 
possible means, as humanizing this institutional fact serves in deconstructing it and was 
a prerequisite to condemn Gaddafi and hold him responsible for his deeds. In the case of 
Egypt, Mubarak and his deputy were both targeted by Bishara and al-Qaradawi. Bishara 
questioned Mubarak’s “heroism” in the 1973 war and belittled his deputy by 
emphasizing that he lacks charisma and is merely a representative of the president. Al-
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Qaradawi compared Mubarak to a pharaoh and used Quranic verses to describe him as 
“deaf, blind, and heartless”. Yet neither of the two intellectuals severely scrutinized the 
personal traits and attitudes of the President of Egypt. Contrary to that, the Leader was 
depicted with disparaging descriptions, and his sanity was questioned and often said to 
be lacking. In this regard, al-Jazeera hosted a psychiatrist who affirmed that Gaddafi’s 
reference to his dissidents as drug addicts was a projection of his own mental state on 
protesters; Bishara regarded his “obsessive tendency to describe himself” as an explicit 
“expression of his megalomania” and “narcissism”; al-Qaradawi described him as 
“irrational”, “crazy”, and “absurd”, adding that he “thinks he is a philosopher” but in 
reality “is ridiculous”; whereas Shammam called him a “lunatic” and depicted him and 
his sons as “warlords”, a term that was constantly used by other guest commentators as 
well. These examples in addition to others demonstrate that the Leader was 
systematically targeted for being the Libyan regime’s central institutional fact. This form 
of engagement was not needed in the case of Egypt for two reasons; the first is the fact 
that the President, unlike the Leader, was not an extrapolitical phenomenon and 
functioned within a wider structural order, and the second is because, unlike Gaddafi, 
Mubarak showed signs of retreat on various occasions. Hence was Bishara’s prognosis 
to offer him an exit.   
Thirdly, al-Jazeera’s intellectuals came from various backgrounds. Whether 
secular or Islamist, however, they were all bound to the social movements and 
expressive of their aspirations, usually in their most radical forms (i.e. calling for 
fundamental change rather than mild reform). Thus, they sometimes engaged in disputes 
with opposition factions and figures (also social movement protagonists) over the extent 
of change that the movements should be aiming for, as well as on the limits and nature 
of concessions that ought to be given to ruling elites. This was true in the case of Egypt, 
where the political opposition was still able to voice its dissent even during the uprising 
(whereas in Libya, the regime’s crackdown on protests did not allow for this discourse to 
occur). Thus, in Egypt, al-Jazeera’s intellectuals strongly argued against settling for 
governmental change rather than the resignation of the President and Vice President, the 
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dissolution of the cabinet and parliament, and the amendment of the constitution. 
According to their rationale, any form of negotiations with the regime would have to be 
restricted to outlining an exit strategy that serves the demands for fundamental change 
and secures a peaceful transition of power at the same time. In Libya, on the other hand, 
opposition figures were actively participating in shaping the discourse on al-Jazeera’s 
platform as regularly hosted intellectuals. They were in connection with the main 
dissident bodies (political and military) acting on Libyan soil and thus did not need to 
engage in any form of on-air frame disputes.  
Fourthly, the fact that Gaddafi’s response to the uprising was an extremely 
violent one made it easier to counterframe regime narratives in Libya than it had been in 
Egypt, as well as to further emphasize religious motivational frames. In the case of 
Egypt, for example, Bishara used the term revolution to depict the protests very early on. 
Yet he preferred calling the movement a “reformist” one having a “revolutionary 
structure” when the regime seemed to be gaining momentum, before later explaining 
that the term fulfilled its meaning following Friday’s “Day of Rage”, as the social 
movement evolved to become inclusive, simultaneous, and representative. In the case of 
Libya, on the other hand, the regime’s reaction to protests made it clear that for any real 
change to happen, it was crucial to uproot the existing social order through the most 
radical revolutionary means. Thus, the term was more comfortably used in the Libyan 
context and was not questioned in the same way it had been in Egypt. This particular 
frame held special significance in Libya, as it represented an additional challenge to the 
Leader’s account of his regime as one being “in constant revolution”. Gaddafi’s 
animosity was also met with a different form of religious motivational framing. In Libya 
and Egypt, the Leader and the President were both depicted as pharaohs and sacrifice in 
the battle against them was glorified. However, whilst al-Qaradawi urged for endurance 
in Egypt, he and al-Sallabi called for active resistance in Libya and for “inflicting 
damage” upon the rebels’ opponents. Al-Qaradawi’s fatwa calling for the physical 
extermination of Gaddafi demonstrated the peak of this form of engagement. Moreover, 
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it was only in Libya that he (and al-Sallabi) made reference to martyrdom and that all 
forms of collaboration with the regime were depicted as haram.  
Fifthly, al-Jazeera’s intellectuals distinguished state institutional facts from 
regime institutional facts in Egypt and accordingly structured their motivational frames. 
Thus, for example, Bishara proposed to “test the army” and to push it to choose sides. At 
a later stage, he inferred that the military’s flexibility with protesters meant it had given 
them the green light to head to the presidential palace. Bishara’s positive regard of state 
institutional facts could also be noticed in his reference to the judiciary, especially when 
proposing an interim body headed by a judge to secure a peaceful transition of power. 
Similarly, al-Qaradawi’s message to the army asking it to protect protesters reveals his 
good faith in the institution. However, this was not the case in Libya, as Gaddafi’s sons 
heading the military’s elite units were depicted as warlords and the regular army was 
rightfully believed to be almost out of order. Moreover, emphasis was put on external 
factors aiding the regime (mercenaries) to imply that its institutional facts did not rely on 
local collective recognition. Al-Jazeera’s intellectuals began actively burning bridges 
with the Libyan regime in this context, as they called ministers, ambassadors, and army 
officers to defect from institutions that were bound to serve the existing power 
structures. Defection, a tool for delegitimizing the regime’s institutional facts by 
depriving them from the element of collective intentionality, proved to be effective in a 
short lapse of time. Within only 12 days, Libya’s representatives in the UN announced 
their support of the uprising, Minister of Immigration and Expatriates Ali Errishi 
resigned, followed by Minister of Justice Mustapha Abdel Jalil, Minister of Interior 
Abdel Fattah Younes, and Libya’s chief prosecutor Abdel Rahman Al Aybar.383 Many 
regular army units also turned against Gaddafi in compliance with the Minister of 
Defense’s decision to defect, as their interest was to sabotage the status quo due to 
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Gaddafi’s imposed restrictions on the army, whereas elite units preferred fighting with 
the Leader till the very end.384  
Sixthly, Egypt’s post-Mubarak interim phase was imagined to take place within 
existing power structures, whereas Libya’s transition was in need for the construction of 
alternative institutional facts. Accordingly, in Egypt, al-Jazeera’s intellectuals promoted 
the deconstruction of institutional facts legitimizing Mubarak’s regime, particularly the 
constitution, yet they called for collaboration between protesters and other institutional 
facts that can guarantee the continued functioning of the state; the army and judiciary 
first and foremost. The revolutionary legitimacy that had emerged in Egypt as opposed 
to the constitutional legitimacy could be understood in this context. It represented a 
symbolic annulment of the constitution and a referendum legitimizing the establishment 
of a new one. In Libya, on the other hand, the social movement was aiming to replace its 
stateless state with another model. Protesters were calling for the creation of new state 
institutional facts rather than merely a deconstruction of regime institutional facts. 
Concomitantly, al-Jazeera (as an institution) and its intellectuals were promoting 
alternative political possibilities and facilitating their emergence. The channel was thus 
operating as an organic intellectual that actively contributed to the construction of new 
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